query large_stringlengths 39 1.7k | ground_truth_code large_stringlengths 26 116k | severity large_stringclasses 3
values | vuln_type large_stringclasses 95
values | report_name large_stringclasses 16
values | audit_firm large_stringclasses 7
values | report_date large_stringclasses 10
values | source large_stringclasses 10
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
LOW severity: Bid expiration is not constrained. The `enterBid` method is missing input validation on the `expiration` argument so it is possible to enter an already expired bid or a bid that is never expiring. Another thing is that the `updateBids` method allows an already expired bid to be updated. While currently th... | require(expiration > block.timestamp && expiration < block.timestamp + 365 days); | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Curve gauge rewards can be griefed. **Details**
[Gauge.sol#L123-L131](https://github.com/hyperstable/contracts/blob/35db5f2d3c8c1adac30758357fbbcfe55f0144a3/src/governance/Gauge.sol#L123-L131)
function claimFees() external lock {
@> require(msg.sender == IVotingEscrow(_ve).team(), "o... | def claim_rewards(_addr: address = msg.sender, _receiver: address = ZERO_ADDRESS):
"""
@notice Claim available reward tokens for _addr
@param _addr Address to claim for
@param _receiver Address to transfer rewards to - if set to
ZERO_ADDRESS, uses the default reward receiver
for the caller
"""
if _receiver != ZERO_ADDR... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Unnecessary usage of `_msgSender()` to validate if caller is the `Issuer` on the `STBL_PT1_YieldDistributor`. **Description:** On the `STBL_PT1_YieldDistributor` contract, the functions `enableStaking()` and `disableStaking()` use the modifier `isIssuer()` to validate if the caller is the authorized issu... | modifier isIssuer() {
AssetDefinition memory AssetData = registry.fetchAssetData(assetID);
@> if (!AssetData.isIssuer(_msgSender()))
revert STBL_Asset_InvalidIssuer(assetID);
_;
}
function _msgSender()
internal
view
override(ERC2771ContextUpgradeable)
... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Missing `notEmptyURI` modifier during initialization. **Description:** Currently, there is no `notEmptyURI` modifier present in the `initialize()` function that checks for the empty URI and, if it's empty, reverts the transaction:
**Impact:** Insufficient validation, `projectURI` may not be set during th... | //RWASegWrap.sol#L98-103
modifier notEmptyUri(string memory newUri) {
if (bytes(newUri).length == 0) {
revert EmptyUriInvalid();
}
_;
}
//RWASegWrap.sol#L131-147
function initialize(
string memory baseNameArg,
string memory baseSymbolArg,
string me... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Reentrancy allows any user allowed even one free `HoneyJar` mint to mint the max supply for himself for free. **Impact:**
High, as the user will steal all `HoneyJar` NFTs, paying nothing
**Likelihood:**
High, as reentrancy is a very common attack vector and easily exploitable
**Description**
The `clai... | _canMintHoneyJar(bundleId_, numClaim); // Validating here because numClaims can change
// If for some reason this fails, GG no honeyJar for you
_mintHoneyJarForBear(msg.sender, bundleId_, numClaim);
claimed[bundleId_] += numClaim;
// Can be combined with "claim" call above, but keeping separate to separate view + mod... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: `PrincipalShareDeposited` is being increased without actual transfer/minting of shares. **Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In Contract Tranche.sol, the method _withdraw(...) has the following logic:
Here, when receiver != owner, the mapping principalShareDeposited and princip... | function _withdraw(
address caller,
address receiver,
address owner,
uint256 assets,
uint256 shares
) internal virtual override {
. . .
super._withdraw(caller, receiver, owner, assets, shares);
if (fee > 0) {
SafeERC20.safeTransfer(ERC20(asset()), ad... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Possible overflow will break the logic in `HoneyBox`. **Impact:**
High, as bundles storage variables will be overwritten
**Likelihood:**
Low, as it is not expected to add more than 255 bundles
**Description**
In `HoneyBox::addBundle` we have the following code:
The comment is wrong, as it assumes t... | uint8 bundleId = uint8(slumberPartyList.length); // Will fail if we have >255 bundles | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: SiloAMO can be forced to fund reduced interest rates by manipulating utilization. When `update()` is permissionlessly called on the SiloAMO, it decides whether to deposit or withdraw funds by comparing the `totalDeposits` to an "ideal" amount of deposits that is calculated by multiplying the `totalBorrow... | function _update() internal {
// Accrue interest on Silo
ISilo(market).accrueInterest(address(OHM));
// Get current total deposits and target total deposits
ISilo.AssetStorage memory assetStorage = ISilo(market).assetStorage(address(OHM));
uint256 currentDeployment = getUnderlyingOhmBalance();
... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Wrong value is returned in `upperLookupRecentCheckpoint`. **Description:** In `Checkpoint::upperLookupRecentCheckpoint` function is designed to check if there exists a checkpoint with a key less than or equal to the provided search key in the structure (i.e., the structure is not empty). If such a che... | function at(Trace256 storage self, uint32 pos) internal view returns (Checkpoint256 memory) {
OZCheckpoints.Checkpoint208 memory checkpoint = self._trace.at(pos);
return Checkpoint256({_key: checkpoint._key, _value: self._values[checkpoint._value]});
}
contract CheckpointsBugTest is Test {
usin... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: `IER` specification requires `pinTokenURI` to revert for non-existent `tokenId`. **Description:** Per the specification of `IERC7160`:
But the implementation of `pinTokenURI` doesn't revert for tokens which don't exist, since `_tokenURIs[tokenId].length` will always equal 2 even for non-existent `tokenI... | /// @notice Pin a specific token uri for a particular token
/// @dev This call MUST revert if the token does not exist
function pinTokenURI(uint256 tokenId, uint256 index) external;
// mapping value always has fixed array size of 2
mapping(uint256 tokenId => string[2] tokenURIs) private _tokenURIs;
function pinTokenU... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Retrieve and enforce token decimal precision. **Description:** Retrieve and enforce token decimal precision using [`IERC20Metadata`](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol). For example:
1) `PledgeManager::initialize`
2) `T... | constructor(
address authority,
address _holderWallet,
address _propertyToken,
address _stablecoin,
- uint16 _stablecoinDecimals,
uint32 _fundingGoal,
uint32 _deadline,
uint32 _withdrawDuration,
uint32 _pledgeFee,
uint32 _earlySellPenalty,
... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: In `tokenURI` avoid copying entire `_tokenURIs[tokenId]` from `storage` into `memory`. **Description:** `tokenURI` only uses the "pinned" URI index so there's no reason to copy both token URIs from `storage` to `memory`. Simply use a `storage` reference like this:
**CryptoArt:**
Fixed in commit... | function tokenURI(uint256 tokenId)
public
view
override(ERC721Upgradeable)
onlyIfTokenExists(tokenId)
returns (string memory)
{
- string[2] memory uris = _tokenURIs[tokenId];
+ string[2] storage uris = _tokenURIs[tokenId];
string memory uri = uris[_getToke... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Description. The current implementation of the VotingEscrow has the [following function](https://github.com/leNFT/contracts/blob/master/contracts/protocol/VotingEscrow.sol#L323-L335):
Here, the ` require(index < _lockHistory[tokenId].length, "VE:GLHP:INDEX_TOO_HIGH");` isn't necessary since solidity... | function getLockHistoryPoint(uint256 tokenId,uint256 index) public view returns (DataTypes.Point memory) {
require(index < _lockHistory[tokenId].length, "VE:GLHP:INDEX_TOO_HIGH");
return _lockHistory[tokenId][index];
} | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: DAOs of all types can be updated with a lower number of tiers and are not validated to be above zero. **Description:** When creating a new DAO membership in `MembershipFactory::createNewDAOMembership`, the tiers are [validated](https://github.com/OneWpOrg/audit-2024-10-oneworld/blob/416630e46ea6f0e9bd9bdd... | require(daoConfig.noOfTiers == tierConfigs.length, "Invalid tier input.");
require(daoConfig.noOfTiers > 0 && daoConfig.noOfTiers <= 7, "Invalid tier count.");
if (daoConfig.daoType == DAOType.SPONSORED) {
require(daoConfig.noOfTiers == 7, "Invalid tier count for sponsored.");
} | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: User Controlled Options Price. **Severity** - Critical
**Severity** - Resolved
**Description**
When joining a duel the amount put up as wager is compared against an options price and can’t be lower than that price. But since the options price is controlled by the user →
The user can provide a very lo... | function joinDuel(
string memory _duelId,
string memory _option,
uint256 _optionsIndex,
uint256 _optionPrice,
uint256 _amount
)
uint256 amountTokenToMint = (_amount * 1e18) / _optionPrice; | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Users can select higher-value NFTs by delaying prize claims. **Description:** When a user wins, the contract only tracks that they have won a specific `prizeID` in [`Spin::_fulfillRandomness`](https://github.com/Consensys/linea-hub/blob/295344925ec4321265f7cbac174fcf903b529a4e/contracts/src/Spin.sol#L576... | if (winningThreshold < cumulativeProbability) {
selectedPrizeId = localPrizeIds[i];
// ...
break;
}
}
userToPrizesWon[user][selectedPrizeId] += 1;
uint256 tokenId = prize.availableERC721Ids[
prize.availableERC721Ids.length - 1
]; | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Manipulation of price outside of the `FullRangeHook` liquidity range can result in DoS and financial loss to liquidity providers. **Description:** The minimum and maximum ticks used by the `FullRangeHook` differ from those defined in Uniswap V4 pools:
This means that there are two regions into which the... | FullRangeHook.sol:
/// @dev Min tick for full range with tick spacing of 60
int24 internal constant MIN_TICK = -887220;
/// @dev Max tick for full range with tick spacing of 60
int24 internal constant MAX_TICK = -MIN_TICK;
TickMath.sol:
/// @dev The minimum tick that may be passed to #getSqrtPriceAtTick computed from... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Unsafe downcast in `ValkyrieSubscriber::toInt256` could silently overflow. **Description:** While it is highly unlikely that liquidity amounts will ever get close to overflowing `int256` for tokens with a reasonable number of decimals, there is an unsafe downcast in `ValkyrieSubscriber::toInt256` from `ui... | function toInt256(uint256 y) internal pure returns (int256 z) {
z = int256(y);
}
function test_notifyUnsubscribe_Overflow() public {
IncentivizedPoolId expectedId = IncentivizedPoolKey({ id: id, lpToken: address(0) }).toId();
positionManager.notifySubscribe(0, EMPTY_BYTES);
positionManager.notifySubsc... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: [LID-1] Stealing ETH using discount factor bypass. **Severity:** Critical
**Path:** WithdrawalQueueBase.sol:_claimWithdrawalTo#L428-L462
**Description:**
Whenever a batch of withdrawal requests is finalised, a discount factor is calculated and a checkpoint is created if the new factor differs. The disc... | if (_hint + 1 <= lastCheckpointIndex) {
if (_getCheckpoints()[_hint + 1].fromId <= _hint) {
revert InvalidHint(_hint);
}
} | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Inconsistent timestamp range validation in `TimestampEnforcer`. **Description:** The `TimestampEnforcer` contract allows the creation of delegations with a time-based validity window. However, it lacks validation to ensure logical consistency of the time range.
Specifically, when both the "after" and "be... | //TimeStampEnforcer.sol
function getTermsInfo(bytes calldata _terms)
public
pure
returns (uint128 timestampAfterThreshold_, uint128 timestampBeforeThreshold_)
{
require(_terms.length == 32, "TimestampEnforcer:invalid-terms-length");
timestampBeforeThreshold_ = uint128(bytes16(_terms[16:]));
tim... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Wrong `PoolSize` increment in `Goldilend.repay()`. **Severity:** High
**Description:** When a user repays his loan using `repay()`, it increases `poolSize` with the repaid interest. During the increment, it uses the wrong amount.
It should use `interest` instead of `userLoan.interest` because the user ... | function repay(uint256 repayAmount, uint256 _userLoanId) external {
Loan memory userLoan = loans[msg.sender][_userLoanId];
if(userLoan.borrowedAmount < repayAmount) revert ExcessiveRepay();
if(block.timestamp > userLoan.endDate) revert LoanExpired();
uint256 interestLoanRatio = FixedPointMathLib.divWad(... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Operator can over allocate the same stake to unlimited nodes within one epoch causing weight inflation and reward theft. **Description:** The `AvalancheL1Middleware::addNode()` function is the entry-point an operator calls to register a new P-chain validator.
Before accepting the request the function asks... | function addNode(
bytes32 nodeId,
bytes calldata blsKey,
uint64 registrationExpiry,
PChainOwner calldata remainingBalanceOwner,
PChainOwner calldata disableOwner,
uint256 stakeAmount // optional
) external updateStakeCache(getCurrentEpoch(), PRIMARY_ASSET_CLASS) updat... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Forwarders who aren't also holders are unable to claim forwarded payouts. **Description:** Forwarders who aren't also holders are unable to claim forwarded payouts due to this check in `DividendManager::payoutBalance`:
**Impact:** Forwarders who aren't also holders are unable to claim forwarded payout... | function payoutBalance(address holder) public returns (uint256) {
HolderManagementStorage storage $ = _getHolderManagementStorage();
HolderStatus memory rHolderStatus = $._holderStatus[holder];
uint16 currentPayoutIndex = $._currentPayoutIndex;
if (
// @audit must be a hold... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Instant withdrawals in priority pool can result in loss of funds for StakingProxy contract. **Description:** When instant withdrawals are enabled in the priority pool, `staker` can permanently lose funds when withdrawing through the `StakingProxy` contract. The issue occurs because the withdrawn amount i... | function _withdraw(
address _account,
uint256 _amount,
bool _shouldQueueWithdrawal,
bool _shouldRevertOnZero,
bytes[] memory _data
) internal returns (uint256) {
if (poolStatus == PoolStatus.CLOSED) revert WithdrawalsDisabled();
uint256 toWithdraw = _amount;
uint256 withdrawn;
uint2... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: <a name="GAS-9"></a>[GAS-9] Using `private` rather than `public` for constants, saves gas. If needed, the values can be read from the verified contract source code, or if there are multiple values there can be a single getter function that [returns a tuple](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-08-frax/blob/... | File: bonding-curves/ExponentialCurve.sol
15: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1000000 wei;
File: bonding-curves/GDACurve.sol
21: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1 gwei; | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Update proportion not handling properly when totalProportion > 100%. **Severity**: High
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In Contract AFiManager.sol, the method updateProportion(...) is handling the case when totalProportion > 100% as follows:
In this case, there can be situations where this fix w... | // fail safe condition
if(totalProp > 10000000){
uint256 rem = totalProp - 10000000;
if(_uTokenProportions[uTokenLen - 1] > rem){
_uTokenProportions[uTokenLen - 1] -= rem;
}
} | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Changing stablecoin on TokenBank can mess up fees collection. **Description:** The feeAmount on each token is computed with the decimals of the current stablecoin (initially, a stablecoin of 6 decimals). If the stablecoin is changed to another one that uses decimals != than 6, if there are any pending fee... | function buyToken(
address tokenAddress,
uint32 amount
) external nonReentrant {
...
uint64 feeValue = (stablecoinValue * curData.saleFee) / 1e6;
...
curData.feeAmount += feeValue;
IERC20(stablecoin).transferFrom(
to,
address(this),
... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Insufficient update window validation can cause denial of service in `forceUpdateNodes`. **Description:** The `AvalancheL1Middleware` constructor fails to validate that the `UPDATE_WINDOW` parameter is less than the `EPOCH_DURATION`. This validation is critically important because the `onlyDuringFinalWind... | modifier onlyDuringFinalWindowOfEpoch() {
uint48 currentEpoch = getCurrentEpoch();
uint48 epochStartTs = getEpochStartTs(currentEpoch);
uint48 timeNow = Time.timestamp();
uint48 epochUpdatePeriod = epochStartTs + UPDATE_WINDOW;
if (timeNow < epochUpdatePeriod || timeNow > epochStartTs + EPOCH_DURAT... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Frontrunning or reorg attacks can be used to corrupt initial pricing data to drain funds from MarketMaker. **Details**
[ConditionalTokens.sol#L92-L131](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/64157824f67d6000588ae4235a49ccd24dede5c3/contracts/conditions/ConditionalTokens.sol#L92-L131)
... | function prepareCondition(
...
) public returns (ConditionID) {
// Limit of 256 because we use a partition array that is a number of 256 bits.
if (outcomeSlotCount < 2 || outcomeSlotCount > 255) revert InvalidOutcomeSlotsAmount();
// If not prepared, initialize, and emit the event, otherwise just return existing condi... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: [G-01] `RecoverySpell` save gas by setting `recoveryInitiated = 0` to signify a Disabled Spell. **Gas - Set it to 0 to save gas due to refund**
https://github.com/solidity-labs-io/kleidi/blob/1a06ac16bc99d0b4081281329d03064c3737f5e4/src/RecoverySpell.sol#L302
There is no zero timestamp so this is a saf... | recoveryInitiated = type(uint256).max; | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Liquidation fails if the chainId is not configured for `collateralId` or `debtId`. **Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
In Contract `LiquidationManager.sol`, the method `liquidate(...)` allows a liquidator to liquidate a borrowers’ default loan.
This method has the followin... | if (chainId[collateralId] == "" || chainId[debtId] == "")
revert ChainIdNotConfigured(TAG); | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: [LOGLAB-13] The strategy does not pause when the deviation of sizeDeltaInTokens exceeds the threshold. **Severity:** High
**Description:** The function `BasisStrategy._afterDecreasePosition()` is called after the hedge position is decreased. This function returns a boolean value, `shouldPause`, to indic... | if (requestParams.collateralDeltaAmount > 0) {
(bool exceedsThreshold,) = _checkDeviation(
responseParams.collateralDeltaAmount, requestParams.collateralDeltaAmount, _responseDeviationThreshold
);
shouldPause = exceedsThreshold;
} | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Incorrect accounting of `reportRecoveredEffectiveBalance` can prevent report from being finalized when a validator is slashed. **Description:** When a validator is slashed, a loss is incurred. In the `finalizeReport()` function, the `rewardStakeRatioSum` and `latestActiveBalanceAfterFee` variables are re... | } else if (change < 0) {
uint256 loss = uint256(-change);
rewardStakeRatioSum -= Math.mulDiv(rewardStakeRatioSum, loss, totalStake);
latestActiveBalanceAfterFee -= loss;
}
_Report Period 1_
Rewards: 0.1 per validator on BC.
Withdrawal: 32
Unstake request: 15
_Report Period 2_
unstake request: 20
last vali... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Sequencer Sentinel Config can be updated to follow first principles. **Impact**
The sequencer sentinel has 2 types of checks:
- `_requireSequencerUpAndOverGracePeriod` - Safer check, ensures that prices are updated
- `_requireSequencerUp` - Less safe check, prices may not be updated
A check that is less... | function adjustTroveInterestRate(
uint256 _troveId,
uint256 _newAnnualInterestRate,
uint256 _upperHint,
uint256 _lowerHint,
uint256 _maxUpfrontFee
) external {
_requireSequencerUp();
_requireIsNotShutDown();
function setBatchManagerAnnualInterestRate(
... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: [LID-16] Adding a node operator does not increase the nonce. **Severity:** Low
**Path:** NodeOperatorRegistry.sol:addNodeOperator#L302-L322
**Description:**
The function to add a new node operator to the node operator registry does not increase the staking module nonce, even though this nonce should in... | function addNodeOperator(string _name, address _rewardAddress) external returns (uint256 id) {
_onlyValidNodeOperatorName(_name);
_onlyNonZeroAddress(_rewardAddress);
_auth(MANAGE_NODE_OPERATOR_ROLE);
id = getNodeOperatorsCount();
require(id < MAX_NODE_OPERATORS_COUNT, "MAX_OPERATORS_COUNT_EXCEEDED... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Calls to methods with `nonETHReuse` modifier can be force reverted. **Severity**
**Impact:**
Medium, as the user will get its transaction reverted, but it can be replayed through a `Multicall` call
**Likelihood:**
Medium, as it can only happen when there is a direct call to such methods, which isn't ... | function _nonReuseBefore() private {
// On the first call to nonETHReuse, _status will be NOT_ENTERED
if (_status == ENTERED) {
revert EtherReuseGuardCall();
}
// Any calls to nonETHReuse after this point will fail
_status = ENTERED;
} | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Use input `amount` in `TradingAccountBranch::withdrawMargin` when calling `safeTransfer`. **Description:** Remove redundant conversion by using input `amount` in `TradingAccountBranch::withdrawMargin` when [calling](https://github.com/zaros-labs/zaros-core-audit/blob/de09d030c780942b70f1bebcb2d245214144a... | - uint256 tokenAmount = marginCollateralConfiguration.convertUd60x18ToTokenAmount(ud60x18Amount);
- IERC20(collateralType).safeTransfer(msg.sender, tokenAmount);
+IERC20(collateralType).safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount); | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Protocol may be short-changed by `BuidlRedeemer` during a USDC depeg event. **Description:** `OUSGInstantManager::_redeemBUIDL` assumes that 1 BUIDL = 1 USDC as it [enforces](https://github.com/ondoprotocol/rwa-internal/blob/6747ebada1c867a668a8da917aaaa7a0639a5b7a/contracts/ousg/ousgInstantManager.sol#L... | uint256 usdcBalanceBefore = usdc.balanceOf(address(this));
buidl.approve(address(buidlRedeemer), buidlAmountToRedeem);
buidlRedeemer.redeem(buidlAmountToRedeem);
require(
usdc.balanceOf(address(this)) == usdcBalanceBefore + buidlAmountToRedeem,
"OUSGInstantManager::_redeemBUIDL: BUIDL:USDC not 1:1"
); | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Removal of Hypervisor data locks deposited Smart Vault collateral. **Description:** A Gamma Vault (aka Hypervisor) is an external contract that maintains and offers fungible shares in Uniswap V3 liquidity positions. The Standard leverages multiple Hypervisors to enable the collateral backing `USDs` to ea... | function _withdrawOtherDeposit(address _hypervisor, address _token) private {
HypervisorData memory _hypervisorData = hypervisorData[_token];
if (_hypervisorData.hypervisor != _hypervisor) revert IncompatibleHypervisor();
/* snip: withdraw and swap */
}
it('locks collateral when hypervisor is removed', asy... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: `doNFTTransferIn()` should not perform fee on transfer token check. In `doNFTTransferIn()`, we perform a check that is taken from the ERC20 market, checking the balance before and after the transfer, and adjusting the amount to the difference between these values.
While this situation should not be possi... | function doNFTTransferIn(address from, uint[] memory nftIds) virtual internal returns (uint) {
// Read from storage once
IERC721 underlying_ = IERC721(underlying);
uint balanceBefore = underlying_.balanceOf(address(this));
for(uint i = 0; i < nftIds.length;) {
underlying_.transferFrom(from, add... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: [TOKE-5] Immediate Reward for the First Staker if Time Has Passed. **Severity:** Medium
**Path:** src/rewarders/AbstractRewarder.sol#L120-L135
**Description:**
In the function `AbstractRewarder::_updateReward()`, the `lastUpdateBlock` is only updated if `rewardPerTokenStored` is greater than 0. Conside... | function _updateReward(address account) internal {
uint256 earnedRewards = 0;
rewardPerTokenStored = rewardPerToken();
// Do not update lastUpdateBlock if rewardPerTokenStored is 0, to prevent the loss of rewards when supply is 0
if (rewardPerTokenStored > 0) {
if (account != address(0)) {
... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: [VLTS3-9] Withdrawal queue priority bypass for feeless instant withdrawal. **Severity:** High
**Description:** When a `Withdrawal` is created, it references the `cumulativeAmountToken1ClaimableLPWithdrawalCheckpoint` pointer to track when a claim is allowed, according to the existing withdrawal queue.
... | LPWithdrawals[idLPWithdrawal] = LPWithdrawalRequest({
recipient: _recipient,
amountToken1: amountToken1.toUint96(),
cumulativeAmountToken1ClaimableLPWithdrawalCheckpoint: cumulativeAmountToken1ClaimableLPWithdrawal
});
if (address(this).balance <= amountToken1ClaimableLPWithdrawalCache) {
a... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Extreme weight ratios combined with large balances can cause denial-of-service for unbalanced liquidity operations. **Description:** The weighted pool math can potentially overflow when making unbalanced liquidity adjustments to a pool tokens with very small weights and large balances.
The issue occurs i... | newBalance = oldBalance * (invariantRatio ^ (1/weight))
// Balance computation scenario:
balance = 7500e21 (7.5 million tokens)
weight = 0.01166 (1.166%) // Just above absoluteWeightGuardRail minimum of 1% proposed for Balancer pools
invariantRatio = 3.0 // maximum value
calculation = 7500e21 * (3.0 ^ (1/0.01166))
... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: withdrawRakeback() function will always be failed. **Severity**: Critical
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In the withdrawRakeback() function of the Treasury contract, it mints xyro tokens to the users. The current IERC20Mint interface has a mint() function which returns a boolean but the xyro tok... | function withdrawRakeback(uint256 amount) public {
require(
earnedRakeback[msg.sender] >= amount,
"Amount is greated than earned rakeback"
);
earnedRakeback[msg.sender] -= amount;
IERC20Mint(xyroToken).mint(msg.sender, amount);
}
interface IERC20Mint {
function decimals() external... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Users can be overslashed in `Karma.sol`. **Description:** `Karma::_calculateSlashAmount` increases slashed amount to `MIN_SLASH_AMOUNT = 1e18` or even full balance:
Problem is that such rounding is applied multiple times in the same action
Suppose following scenario:
1) Current balance is `0.9e18`
2)... | function _calculateSlashAmount(uint256 balance) internal view returns (uint256) {
uint256 amountToSlash = Math.mulDiv(balance, slashPercentage, MAX_SLASH_PERCENTAGE);
if (amountToSlash < MIN_SLASH_AMOUNT) {
if (balance < MIN_SLASH_AMOUNT) {
// Not enough balance for minimum s... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: If multiple users call `DefaultSession::assertResults` all but the first caller lose their bonds. **Description:** The `assertResults` is a permissionless function that allow anyone to assert a result for a `gameId` (sessionId):
Users that call this function have to pay a usdc bond of 250 dollars, see [... | function assertResults(
uint256 sessionId,
string calldata resultCid,
address[] calldata proposedWinners,
uint256[] calldata totalXPs,
uint256[] calldata totalTimes
) external returns (bytes32 assertionId) {
require(SessionManager(sessionManager).getSessionState(sessi... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Asymmetry in Transceiver pausing capability. **Description:** Pausing functionality is exposed via `Transceiver::_pauseTransceiver`; however, there is no corresponding function that exposes unpausing functionality:
**Impact:** While not an immediate issue since the above function is not currently in use ... | /// @dev pause the transceiver.
function _pauseTransceiver() internal {
_pause();
}
+ /// @dev unpause the transceiver.
+ function _unpauseTransceiver() internal {
+ _unpause();
+ } | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: State changes without events. There are state variable changes in this function but no event is emitted. Consider emitting an event to enable offchain indexers to track the changes.
- [Line: 47](https://github.com/Accountable-Protocol/audit-2025-09-accountable/blob/fc43546fe67183235c0725f6214ee2b876b1aa... | function setSecurityAdmin(address securityAdmin_) external onlyOwner {
function setOperationsAdmin(address operationsAdmin_) external onlyOwner {
function setTreasury(address treasury_) external onlyOwner { | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Updating the entity allowance when the individual belongs to a group that has multiple catalysts for different entities can result in mistakenly modifying the allowance of entities where the individual is not even part of. **Description:** The problem is that entities that have nothing to do with either ... | function canTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {
...
if (iFrom.isEntity) {
entityData[from].allowance += SafeCast.toUint64(amount);
//@audit-info => If `from` is on a group and that group has multiple catalysts!
} else if (gId != 0... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Withdraw can return zero tokens while burning a positive amount of shares. **Description:** Invariant fuzzing found an edge-case where a user could burn an amount of shares > 0 but receive zero output tokens. The cause appears to be a rounding down to zero precision loss for small `_shares` value in `Bee... | uint256 _amount0 = (_bal0 * _shares) / _totalSupply;
uint256 _amount1 = (_bal1 * _shares) / _totalSupply;
if (_amount0 < _minAmount0 || _amount1 < _minAmount1 ||
(_amount0 == 0 && _amount1 == 0)) revert TooMuchSlippage(); | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Lack of validation when updating prizes can lead to `lotAmount` underflow when randomness is fulfilled. **Description:** In [`SpinGame::_fulfillRandomness`](https://github.com/Consensys/linea-hub/blob/0af327319636960e9683897c5935aa1a78d1ded5/contracts/src/Spin.sol#L595-L603), there's an `unchecked` block... | /// Should never underflow due to earlier check.
unchecked {
prize.lotAmount -= 1;
}
if (prize.lotAmount == 0) {
totalProbabilities -= prizeProbability;
prize.probability = 0;
}
function testFulfillRandomnessWith0LotAmount() external {
MockERC20 token = new MockERC20("Test Token", "TST");
ISpinGam... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Disallow single-outcome markets. **Description:** When creating a market in [`PredictionMarketV3_4::_createMarket`](https://github.com/Polkamarkets/polkamarkets-js/blob/24f1394be94d27433d2e3a7370442126e1c1e5ba/contracts/PredictionMarketV3_4.sol#L299-L356), the following... | require(desc.outcomes > 0 && desc.outcomes <= MAX_OUTCOMES, "!oc");
require(desc.outcomes > 1 && desc.outcomes <= MAX_OUTCOMES, "!oc"); | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Loss of precision in `scalarPrice` function. **Impact:**
Medium, as the price will not be very far from the expected one
**Likelihood:**
Medium, as it will not always result in big loss of precision
**Description**
In `scalarPrice` there is this code:
Here, when you calculate `x` you divide by `t_r... | uint256 b_18 = 1e18;
uint256 t_mod = t % (t_r - t);
uint256 x = (t + t_mod) * b_18 / t_r;
uint256 y = !isInitialised ? state.price : window.price;
return y - (y * x) / b_18; | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: `MembershipER` profit tokens can be drained due to missing `lastProfit` synchronization when minting and claiming profit. **Description:** When [`MembershipERC1155:claimProfit`](https://github.com/OneWpOrg/audit-2024-10-oneworld/blob/416630e46ea6f0e9bd9bdd0aea6a48119d0b515a/contracts/dao/tokens/Membershi... | it("lets users steal steal account balance by transferring tokens and claiming profit", async function () {
await membershipERC1155.connect(deployer).mint(user.address, 1, 100);
await membershipERC1155.connect(deployer).mint(anotherUser.address, 1, 100);
await testERC20.mint(nonAdmin.address, ethers.utils.p... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: [LOGLAB-9] The change in priority after requestWithdraw may block the claiming of the withdrawal request. **Severity:** Low
**Path:** src/vault/LogarithmVault.sol#L408-L419, src/vault/LogarithmVault.sol#L762-L764
**Description:** If the priority is changed after a withdraw request is made, the withdrawa... | if (isPrioritized(owner)) {
_accRequestedWithdrawAssets = $.prioritizedAccRequestedWithdrawAssets + assetsToRequest;
$.prioritizedAccRequestedWithdrawAssets = _accRequestedWithdrawAssets;
} else {
_accRequestedWithdrawAssets = $.accRequestedWithdrawAssets + assetsToRequest;
$.accRequestedWithdrawAssets ... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: `_liquidationFeeUsd` and `_fundingRateFactor` Initialization Checks. **Severity** : Low
**Status** : Resolved
**Description**
The initialize function in Vault.sol should include checks to ensure that `_liquidationFeeUsd` and `_fundingRateFactor` are less than or equal to their respective maximum allowe... | require(_liquidationFeeUsd <= MAX_LIQUIDATION_FEE_USD, "Liquidation fee exceeds maximum");
require(_fundingRateFactor <= MAX_FUNDING_RATE_FACTOR, "Funding rate factor exceeds maximum"); | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Malicious borrower can repeatedly fill then kill orders to permanently lock funds of lenders and other borrowers. **Details**
[Orderbook.sol#L118-L133](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/bloom-v2/blob/87a60380331cc914be41ad57691f08b532a4d6fb/src/Orderbook.sol#L118-L133)
function killBorrowerMatch(addre... | uint256 len = matches.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i != len; ++i) {
if (matches[i].borrower == msg.sender) {
lenderAmount = uint256(matches[i].lCollateral);
borrowerReturn = uint256(matches[i].bCollateral);
// Zero out the match order to preserve the array's order
matches[i] = MatchOrder({lCollateral: 0, bCollateral: 0,... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: `massUpdatePools` needs to be capped due to OOG reverts. **Impact**
`massUpdatePools` looks as follows:
Meaning it will iterate over all known pools
The gas limit on SEI is 10MLN gas per block
Assuming around 25k gas per update, that's 400 pools before the function reverts
I just did some quick napki... | function massUpdatePools() public {
uint length = pools.length;
for (uint n = 0; n < length; n++) {
updatePool(pools[n]);
}
} | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Some NFTs may be incompatible with pools due to `totalSupply()` check. When initializing a new ERC721 market, we end the `initialize()` function with a `totalSupply()` call to the underlying NFT.
This is forked from a check that Compound performs on their `CErc20` markets, which is intended to ensure ... | function initialize(address underlying_,
ComptrollerInterface comptroller_,
InterestRateModel interestRateModel_,
uint initialExchangeRateMantissa_,
string memory name_,
string memory symbol_,
uint8 decimals_
) public {
...
// Set underlying and sanity check it
underlying = underly... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Calling `StakingVault::notifyRewardAmount` on empty vault leaves ILV stuck. **Description:** `StakingVault::notifyRewardAmount` is the vault’s reward hook that updates the rewards-per-share accumulator (`accIlvPerShare`) so stakers can later claim ILV. It is called by [`L2RevenueDistributorV3::_applyAllo... | if (pool.kind == PoolKind.Vault) {
// Transfer ILV to the vault and notify
ilv.safeTransfer(pool.recipient, amount);
IStakingVaultMinimal(pool.recipient).notifyRewardAmount(amount);
} else {
function notifyRewardAmount(uint256 ilvAmount)
external
override
nonReentrant
whenNotPaused
only... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: TRST-Deposits of fee-on-transfer tokens will favor later depositors, making earlier investors lose funds. **Description:**
When deposits are processed, the percentage of **Denominator** minted to the depositor is
linear to the contribution, compared to the current balance.
The calculation will lead ... | uint256 T = vlt.virtualTotalBalance(); //will be at least 1
uint256 D = vlt.D();
if (functions.willOverflowWhenMultiplied(amt, D)) {
require(T > amt || T > D, "overflow");
}
deltaN = Arithmetic.overflowResistantFraction(amt, D, T);
vlt.setN(msg.sender, vlt.N(... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Airdrop supply methodology has been changed leading to excess token emissions. **Details**
[MerkleClaim.sol#L48-L69](https://github.com/velodrome-finance/v1/blob/de6b2a19b5174013112ad41f07cf98352bfe1f24/contracts/redeem/MerkleClaim.sol#L48-L69)
function claim(
address to,
... | function claim(
address to,
uint256 amount,
bytes32[] calldata proof
) external {
// Throw if address has already claimed tokens
require(!hasClaimed[to], "ALREADY_CLAIMED");
// Verify merkle proof, or revert if not in tree
bytes32 leaf = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(to, amount));
bool isValidLeaf = MerkleProof.verify(pr... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Investors using smart contract wallets may have their destination chain tokens issued to an address they don't control. **Description:** `SecuritizeBridge::bridgeDSTokens` encodes `_msgSender()` in the payload message to be destination address for bridged tokens delivered on the destination chain; this... | // Send Relayer message
wormholeRelayer.sendPayloadToEvm{value: msg.value} (
targetChain,
targetAddress,
abi.encode(
investorDetail.investorId,
value,
_msgSender(), // @audit destination address of bridged tokens
... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: TRST-Decreasing a losing hedge position could make it overly-leveraged. **Description:**
It may be necessary to decrease a position in order to be delta neutral. When
GMXFuturesPoolHedger does that, it also decreases the collateral so that the leverage ratio
would equal the set **targetLeverage**. In... | if (currentPos.unrealisedPnl < 0) {
uint adjustedDelta = Math.abs(currentPos.unrealisedPnl).multiplyDecimal(sizeDelta)divideDecimal (currentPos.size);
if (adjustedDelta > collateralDelta) {
collateralDelta = 0;
} else {
collateralDelta -= adjustedDelta;
}
... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: [RUS7] RushERlaunch fee bypass due to flash loan stake. **Severity:** High
**Path:** LiquidityDeployer.sol:deployLiquidity#L114-L222
**Description:** When a user launches their own RushERC20, they will have to provide fees as ETH through `msg.value`. The fee consists of a fee paid to the LiquidityPool ... | // Interactions: Transfer the remaining portion of the fee to the LiquidityPool as APY.
IERC20(WETH).transfer(LIQUIDITY_POOL, vars.totalFee - vars.reserveFee);
function deployLiquidity(
address originator,
address uniV2Pair,
address rushERC20,
uint256 amount,
uint256 duration,
... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Asymmetry in validation between `RiskOracle::addUpdateType` and contract constructor. **Description:** The following [validation](https://github.com/ChaosLabsInc/risk-oracle/blob/9449219174e3ee7da9a13a5db7fb566836fb4986/src/RiskOracle.sol#L92) is present within `RiskOracle::addUpdateType`:
However, this ... | require(!validUpdateTypes[newUpdateType], "Update type already exists."); | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: TRST-Hedging won't work if token1.decimals() < token0.decimals(). **Description:**
`tickToToken0PriceInverted()` performs some arithmetic calculations. It's called by
`_getTicksAndMeanPriceFromWei()`, which is called by `hedgeDelta()`. This line can overflow:
Also, this line would revert even if the ... | uint256 intermediate = inWei.div(10**(token1.decimals() -
token0.decimals()));
meanPrice = OptionsCompute.convertFromDecimals(meanPrice,
token0.decimals(), token1.decimals());
function convertFromDecimals(uint256 value, uint8 decimalsA, uint8 decimalsB) internal pure
returns (uint256) {
... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: `vaultRewardsPerWeight` Should Be Updated When `_processVaultRewards()`. **Severity** - Medium
**Status** - Resolved
**Description**
The `vaultRewardsPerWeight` is incremented whenever there are rewards transferred in to the core pool contract →
But it is not decremented when `BUIDL` is transferre... | SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom(IERC20(buidl), msg.sender, address(this), _rewardsAmount);
vaultRewardsPerWeight += rewardToWeight(_rewardsAmount, usersLockingWeight);
// transfer fails if pool BUIDL balance is not enough - which is a desired behavior
SafeERC20.safeTransfer(IERC20(buidl), _staker, pendingVaultCla... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: [ASTRO-22] No slippage protection for bridgeFunds. **Severity:** High
**Path:** BridgeConnectorHomeSTG.sol, BridgeConnectorRemoteSTG.sol
**Description:** The function bridgeFunds (in both Home and Remote contracts) is used to send assets from a crate to a remote chain; it uses Stargate to make the swap... | function bridgeFunds(
uint256 _amount,
uint256 _chainId
) external payable override onlyCrate {B
// Loading this in memory for gas savings
// We send directly to the allocator
address destination = allocatorsMap[_chainId];
uint256 dstPoolId = dstPoolIdMap[_chainId];
... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: `Timelock` encoding of bytes is unambigous while strings may cause issues. **Encoding (UI risk)**
This test fails
This doesn't
Because the first one is converting the bytes to literals
While the second one is converting them from hex, which is consistent with encodePacked values
It's important that w... | bytes wrongCheck = "a54D3c09E34aC96807c1CC397404bF2B98DC4eFb";
bytes rightCheck = "a54d3c09E34aC96807c1CC397404bF2B98DC4eFb";
function test_bytes_checksum() public {
bytes32 kak1 = keccak256(wrongCheck);
bytes32 kak2 = keccak256(rightCheck);
assertEq(kak1, kak2, "same res");
}
byt... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: TRST-setPositionRouter leaks approval to previous positionRouter. **Description:**
positionRouter is used to change GMX positions in GMXFuturesPoolHedger. It can be replaced
by a new router if GMX redeploys, for example if a bug is found or the previous one is hacked.
The new positionRouter receives app... | function setPositionRouter(IPositionRouter _positionRouter) external onlyOwner {
positionRouter = _positionRouter;
router.approvePlugin(address(positionRouter));
emit PositionRouterSet(_positionRouter);
} | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: No storage gap for upgradeable contract might lead to storage slot collision. **Description:** For upgradeable contracts, there must be storage gap to "allow developers to freely add new state variables in the future without compromising the storage compatibility with existing deployments" (quote OpenZ... | uint256[50] private __gap; | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Owner can steal all funds locked in bridge by changing `REMOTE_TOKEN` value. In the new `BridgedIndexToken.sol`, which the L1 contract will be upgraded to, there is a `setBridge()` function used to set the `REMOTE_TOKEN` and the `BRIDGE` addresses.
This function can be called by the owner at any time ... | function setBridge(
address _remoteToken,
address _bridge
) external onlyOwner {
REMOTE_TOKEN = _remoteToken;
BRIDGE = _bridge;
}
function setBridge(
address _remoteToken,
address _bridge
) external onlyOwner {
+ require(REMOTE_TOKEN == address(0) && BRIDGE == address(0), "values already set"... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Loss of user locked voting tokens due to unsafe downcast overflow. **Description:** `TokenLocker::AccountData` [stores](https://github.com/Bima-Labs/bima-v1-core/blob/09461f0d22556e810295b12a6d7bc5c0efec4627/contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#L41-L49) the account's current `locked`, `unlocked` and `frozen` ba... | struct AccountData {
// Currently locked balance. Each week the lock weight decays by this amount.
uint32 locked;
// Currently unlocked balance (from expired locks, can be withdrawn)
uint32 unlocked;
// Currently "frozen" balance. A frozen balance is equivalent to a `MAX_LOCK_WEEKS` lock,
// whe... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: State variables should be cached in stack variables rather than re-reading them from storage. **Description:** The instances below point to the second+ access of a state variable within a function. Caching of a state variable replaces each Gwarmaccess (100 gas) with a much cheaper stack read. Other less ... | File: core/PriceFeed.sol
385: IERC20(token).safeApprove(address(uniswapV2Router), MAX_UINT);
File: gov/GovPool.sol
257: nft.safeTransferFrom(address(this), address(_govUserKeeper), nftIds[i]);
File: gov/user-keeper/GovUserKeeper.sol
567: ERC721Power nftContract = ERC721Power(nft... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Allow custom Creator and Collector names to be emitted in `IStory` events to build artwork provenance. **Description:** The `IStory` interface is designed to allow custom names to be emitted for the Creator and Collector events. Here is an [example](https://www.transient.xyz/nfts/base/0x6c81306129b3cc63b... | function addCollectionStory(string calldata, /*creatorName*/ string calldata story) external onlyOwner {
emit CollectionStory(msg.sender, msg.sender.toHexString(), story);
}
/// @inheritdoc IStory
function addCreatorStory(uint256 tokenId, string calldata, /*creatorName*/ string calldata story)
external
onl... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Reduce approval before transferring tokens in `rOUSG::transferFrom`. **Description:** `rOUSG::transferFrom` [L286-289](https://github.com/ondoprotocol/rwa-internal/blob/6747ebada1c867a668a8da917aaaa7a0639a5b7a/contracts/ousg/rOUSG.sol#L286-L289) currently checks approvals, transfers the tokens then reduc... | // verify approval
require(currentAllowance >= _amount, "TRANSFER_AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_ALLOWANCE");
// perform transfer
_transfer(_sender, _recipient, _amount);
// reduce approval
_approve(_sender, msg.sender, currentAllowance - _amount); | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Method `getEarnings()` underflows. **Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
As we notice in the above findings, the principalAssetDeposited is being increased for a receiver who has 0 LP tokens or no shares. The method getEarning(...) returns an unexpected result if it is checked fo... | function testGetEarnings() public {
uint rand = uint(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(block.timestamp))) %
numTraders;
address ownerTrader = traders[rand];
vm.startPrank(ownerTrader);
uint amount = usdc.balanceOf(ownerTrader);
usdc.approve(address(juniorTranche), amount);
... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Incorrect storage slot annotation in `Storage::SiloSettings`. While it appears that the order struct members in storage have not changed, the storage slot annotation of [`Storage::SiloSettings`](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Beanstalk/blob/dfb418d185cd93eef08168ccaffe9de86bc1f062/protocol/contracts/b... | struct SiloSettings {
bytes4 selector; // ─────────────┐ 4
- uint32 stalkEarnedPerSeason; // │ 4 (16)
+ uint32 stalkEarnedPerSeason; // │ 4 (8)
- uint32 stalkIssuedPerBdv; // │ 4 (8)
+ uint32 stalkIssuedPerBdv; // │ 4 (12)
- uint32 milestoneSeason; // │ 4 (12)
+ uint32 milestoneSeas... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Taker receives Aave yield for cancelled pending bets. **Description:** If a bet uses an Aave pool but never becomes `ACTIVE` (taker never accepts), only the maker’s stake is supplied to Aave. In `Bet::cancel`, the recovered Aave balance is still split using maker/taker logic:
So the taker can receive pa... | uint256 aTokenBalance = IERC20(_aavePool.getReserveAToken(b.asset))
.balanceOf(address(this));
_aavePool.withdraw(b.asset, aTokenBalance, address(this));
makerRefund = _min(makerRefund, aTokenBalance);
takerRefund = _min(takerRefund, aTokenBalance - makerRefund); | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: If insider deposits and unlocks in quick succession, attacker can steal their NFT and their deposit funds. The dNFT contract allows the owner to mint a predefined quantity of "insider" NFTs without any deposit attached to them. These NFTs begin in a locked state, which stops them from being immediately l... | function unlock(uint id)
external
isNftOwner(id)
{
if (!id2Locked[id]) revert NotLocked();
if (id2Shared[id] == 0) revert MustDepositFirst();
id2Locked[id] = false;
emit Unlocked(id);
} | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Quorum initialized to 0.03% instead of 30% due to overridden denominator. When `OptimismGovernorV5.sol` is initialized, the `quorumNumerator` is set to `30`:
This value is intended to represent a 30% quorum when the denominator is set to 100, which is the default value set by OpenZeppelin and is represen... | function initialize(IVotesUpgradeable _votingToken, address _manager) public initializer {
__Governor_init("Optimism");
__GovernorCountingSimple_init();
__GovernorVotes_init(_votingToken);
__GovernorVotesQuorumFraction_init({quorumNumeratorValue: 30});
__GovernorSettings_init({initialVotingDelay: 65... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Use named return variables to save at least 9 gas per variable. **Description:** Using [named return variables](https://x.com/DevDacian/status/1796396988659093968) saves at least 9 gas per variable; named returns are already used in some functions of the protocol but not in others:
**Linea:** Fixed in... | PauseManager.sol
136: function isPaused(PauseType _pauseType) public view returns (bool)
l1/L1MessageManager.sol
98: function isMessageClaimed(uint256 _messageNumber) external view returns (bool) {
l1/L1MessageService.sol
150: function sender() external view returns (address addr) {
l2/v1/L2MessageServiceV1.sol
1... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Use Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern in `swEXIT::createWithdrawRequest`. **Description:** The current implementation uses [`_safeMint`](https://github.com/SwellNetwork/v3-contracts-lst/blob/a95ea7942ba895ae84845ab7fec1163d667bee38/contracts/implementations/swEXIT.sol#L209) before modifying state varia... | function createWithdrawRequest(
uint256 amount
) external override checkWhitelist(msg.sender) {
if (AccessControlManager.withdrawalsPaused()) {
revert WithdrawalsPaused();
}
if (amount < withdrawRequestMinimum) {
revert WithdrawRequestTooSmall(amount, withdrawRequestMinimum);
}
i... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: NTT Manager cannot be unpaused once paused. **Description:** `NttManagerState::pause` exposes pause functionality to be triggered by permissioned actors but has no corresponding unpause functionality. As such, once the NTT Manager is paused, it will not be possible to unpause without a contract upgrade... | function pause() public onlyOwnerOrPauser {
_pause();
}
+ function unpause() public onlyOwnerOrPauser {
+ _unpause();
+ } | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Precision loss in the `SecuritizeSwap.calculateDsTokenAmount()` function.. **Description:** When `stableCoinDecimals` is greater than `dsTokenDecimals`, the calculation is divided into two parts: dividing by `(10 ** (stableCoinDecimals - dsTokenDecimals))` at `L242` and then multiplying by `10 ** stableCo... | if (stableCoinDecimals <= dsTokenDecimals) {
adjustedStableCoinAmount = _stableCoinAmount * (10 ** (dsTokenDecimals - stableCoinDecimals));
} else {
242 adjustedStableCoinAmount = _stableCoinAmount / (10 ** (stableCoinDecimals - dsTokenDecimals));
}
// The InternalNavSecuriti... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Treasury cannot withdraw expired assets if NFT is disabled. **Description:** The `STBL_LT1_Issuer::withdrawExpired` function attempts to claim rewards for disabled NFTs, but the `STBL_LT1_YieldDistributor::claim` function explicitly reverts when called on disabled NFTs.
In `STBL_LT1_Issuer.withdrawExpire... | // If NFT is disabled then claim for yield is not done
if (MetaData.isDisabled) {
iSTBL_LT1_AssetYieldDistributor(AssetData.rewardDistributor).claim(_tokenID);
}
if (MetaData.isDisabled) revert STBL_YLDDisabled(id);
function claim(uint256 id) external returns (uint256) {
// current logic
// @audit Allow iss... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: [FTN-2] Validator can add more than one contract. **Severity:** High
**Path:** beacon-chain/core/altair/deposit.go/ProcessDeposit(), beacon-chain/core/helpers/contracts.go/appendValidatorContractsWithVal()
**Description:** Function `ProcessDeposit()` is responsible for adding new validators and their c... | func ProcessDeposit(beaconState state.BeaconState, deposit *ethpb.Deposit, verifySignature bool) (state.BeaconState, bool, error) {
var newValidator bool
if err := verifyDeposit(beaconState, deposit); err != nil {
if deposit == nil || deposit.Data == nil {
return nil, newValidator, err
... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Use low level `call()` to prevent gas griefing attacks when returned data not required. **Description:** Using `call()` when the returned data is not required unnecessarily exposes to gas griefing attacks from huge returned data payload. For [example](https://github.com/SolidlyV3/v3-rewards/blob/6dfb4353... | (bool sent, ) = _to.call{value: _amount}("");
require(sent);
(bool sent, bytes memory data) = _to.call{value: _amount}("");
require(sent);
bool sent;
assembly {
sent := call(gas(), _to, _amount, 0, 0, 0, 0)
}
if (!sent) revert FailedToSendEther(); | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Use named mappings to explicitly denote the purpose of keys and values. **Description:** Use named mappings to explicitly denote the purpose of keys and values:
**Lido:** Fixed in commit [4898c26](https://github.com/lidofinance/defi-interface/commit/4898c26cd0abc8426ad9e2220a8d7cac487ab9b8).
**Cyfrin:*... | RewardDistributor.sol
52: mapping(address => bool) private recipientExists; | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Receiver Address Checks for Zero Address. **Severity** : Low
**Status** : Resolved
**Description**
Functions like `sellZKUSD`, `buyZKUSD`, `swap`, `increasePosition`, and `decreasePosition` should include checks to ensure that the `_receiver` address is not the zero address. This is a common practice t... | require(_receiver != address(0), "Receiver cannot be the zero address"); | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Liquidations could be blocked by reverting ERtransfers. **Description:** When liquidations are performed via `SmartVaultV4::liquidate`, ERC-20 collateral tokens are handled within a loop:
If the contract balance of a given ERC-20 is non-zero, it will proceed to perform a transfer to the protocol address... | function liquidate() external onlyVaultManager {
/* snip: validation, state updates & native liquidation
ITokenManager.Token[] memory tokens = ITokenManager(ISmartVaultManagerV3(manager).tokenManager()).getAcceptedTokens();
for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
if (tokens[i].symbol != NATIVE... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: All CCIP messages reverts when decoded. **Description:** YieldFi has integrated Chainlink CCIP alongside its existing LayerZero support to enable cross-chain token transfers using multiple messaging protocols. To support this, a custom message payload is used to indicate the token transfer. This payload ... | (uint32 dstId, address to, address token, uint256 amount, bytes32 trxnType) = abi.decode(_data, (uint32, address, address, uint256, bytes32)); | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: The `fulfillRandomWords` method might revert with out of gas error. **Impact:**
High, as randomness won't be fulfilled
**Likelihood:**
Low, as it requires misconfiguration of gas
**Description**
The `fulfillRandomWords` method in `HibernationDen` calls the internal `_setFermentedJars` method which l... | if (party.assetChainId != getChainId() && address(honeyJarPortal) != address(0) && address(this).balance != 0) {
uint256 sendAmount = address(this).balance / party.checkpoints.length;
honeyJarPortal.sendFermentedJars{value: sendAmount}(
address(this), party.assetChainId, party.bundleId, fermentedJars
... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: TRST-maxSigners can be bypassed. **Description:**
**maxSigners** is specified when creating an HSG and is left constant. It is enforced in two ways
**–targetThreshold** may never be set above it, and new signers cannot register to the HSG
when the signer count reached **maxSigners**. Below is the imple... | function claimSigner() public virtual {
if (signerCount == maxSigners) {
revert MaxSignersReached();
}
if (safe.isOwner(msg.sender)) {
revert SignerAlreadyClaimed(msg.sender);
}
if (!isValidSigner(msg.sender)) {
revert NotSign... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: The `gasLeft()` after gas-limited external call might not be enough to complete the transaction. In `StargateArbitrum::sgReceive` we have the following piece of code
Now if the `arbitrumSwaps` call took up all of the gas it is possible that there is not enough gas left for the `safeTransfer` call, as wel... | try IArbitrumSwaps(payable(address(this))).arbitrumSwaps{gas: 200000}(steps, data) {}
catch (bytes memory) {
IERC20(_token).safeTransfer(to, amountLD);
failed = true;
} | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Meta transactions do not work with most of the calls in `MembershipFactory`. **Description:** `MembershipFactory` uses a custom meta transactions implementation by inheriting `NativeMetaTransaction` which allow a relayer to pay the transaction fees on behalf of a user. This is achieved by following the s... | describe("Native meta transaction", function () {
it("Meta transactions causes creation to use the wrong owner", async function () {
await currencyManager.addCurrency(testERC20.address);
const { chainId } = await ethers.provider.getNetwork();
const salt = ethers.utils.hexZeroPad(ethers.utils.hexlify(chai... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Old Comments. https://github.com/liquity/bold/blob/3ad11270a22190e77c1e8ef7742d2ebec133a317/contracts/src/TroveManager.sol#L690-L711
https://github.com/liquity/bold/blob/3ad11270a22190e77c1e8ef7742d2ebec133a317/contracts/src/ActivePool.sol#L39
https://github.com/liquity/bold/blob/3ad11270a22190e77c1e8ef... | /* Send _boldamount Bold to the system and redeem the corresponding amount of collateral from as many Troves as are needed to fill the redemption
* request. Applies redistribution gains to a Trove before reducing its debt and coll.
*
* Note that if _amount is very large, this function can run out of gas, s... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: [MNBD1-5] Early Pair Creation Breaks Fair Launch of New Moon Tokens And Gives An Attacker The Possibility To Steal All KAS from BondingCurvePool. **Severity:** Critical
**Path:** contracts/BondingCurvePool.sol#L234-L265
**Description:** A bonding curve is designed to create fair and manipulation-resist... | kasAmount = (moonTokenAmount * kasReserves) / moonTokenReserves;
ERC20(token).approve(zealousSwapRouter, tokenForLiquidity);
IZealousSwapRouter02(zealousSwapRouter).addLiquidityKAS{ value: kasCollected }(
token,
tokenForLiquidity,
0,
0,
address(this),
block.timestamp + 15 minutes
);
function graduateToken... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: [FNG-8] All NFTs are evaluated at their floor price and can lead to user's loss. **Severity:** Medium
**Path:** CErc721.sol:doNFTTransferOut#L624-L637
**Description:** In the `CErc721.sol` when the user mints CTokens with the `mint()` function the user supplies `nftIds` which they would like to exchang... | function mint(uint[] memory nftIds) external override nonReentrant returns (uint) {
comptroller.autoEnterMarkets(msg.sender); // silent failure allowed
accrueInterest();
uint mintAmount = nftIds.length * expScale;
address minter = msg.sender;
/* Fail if mint not allowed */
... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit |
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