Daily Papers

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems using Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show great promise for complex document understanding, yet their development is critically hampered by inadequate evaluation. Current benchmarks often focus on specific part of document RAG system and use synthetic data with incomplete ground truth and evidence labels, therefore failing to reflect real-world bottlenecks and challenges. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Double-Bench: a new large-scale, multilingual, and multimodal evaluation system that is able to produce fine-grained assessment to each component within document RAG systems. It comprises 3,276 documents (72,880 pages) and 5,168 single- and multi-hop queries across 6 languages and 4 document types with streamlined dynamic update support for potential data contamination issues. Queries are grounded in exhaustively scanned evidence pages and verified by human experts to ensure maximum quality and completeness. Our comprehensive experiments across 9 state-of-the-art embedding models, 4 MLLMs and 4 end-to-end document RAG frameworks demonstrate the gap between text and visual embedding models is narrowing, highlighting the need in building stronger document retrieval models. Our findings also reveal the over-confidence dilemma within current document RAG frameworks that tend to provide answer even without evidence support. We hope our fully open-source Double-Bench provide a rigorous foundation for future research in advanced document RAG systems. We plan to retrieve timely corpus and release new benchmarks on an annual basis.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities, yet they often suffer from overthinking, expending redundant computational steps on simple problems, or underthinking, failing to explore sufficient reasoning paths despite inherent capabilities. These issues lead to inefficiencies and potential inaccuracies, limiting practical deployment in resource-constrained settings. Existing methods to mitigate overthinking, such as suppressing reflective keywords or adjusting reasoning length, may inadvertently induce underthinking, compromising accuracy. Therefore, we propose ReBalance, a training-free framework that achieves efficient reasoning with balanced thinking. ReBalance leverages confidence as a continuous indicator of reasoning dynamics, identifying overthinking through high confidence variance and underthinking via consistent overconfidence. By aggregating hidden states from a small-scale dataset into reasoning mode prototypes, we compute a steering vector to guide LRMs' reasoning trajectories. A dynamic control function modulates this vector's strength and direction based on real-time confidence, pruning redundancy during overthinking, and promoting exploration during underthinking. Extensive experiments conducted on four models ranging from 0.5B to 32B, and across nine benchmarks in math reasoning, general question answering, and coding tasks demonstrate that ReBalance effectively reduces output redundancy while improving accuracy, offering a general, training-free, and plug-and-play strategy for efficient and robust LRM deployment. Code is available at https://github.com/yu-lin-li/ReBalance .

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has enabled them to express their confidence in natural language, enhancing transparency and reliability. However, their confidence often exhibits overconfidence, the cause of which remains poorly understood. In this work, we conduct a detailed analysis of the dynamics underlying verbalized confidence and identify answer-independence as a key factor, defined as the model's failure to condition confidence on its own answer. To address this, we propose ADVICE (Answer-Dependent Verbalized Confidence Estimation), a fine-tuning framework that facilitates answer-grounded confidence estimation. Extensive experiments show that ADVICE substantially improves confidence calibration while preserving task performance. Further analyses confirm that ADVICE strengthens answer-groundedness, leading to more balanced and well-calibrated confidence distributions. Our findings shed light on the origin of overconfidence and establish a framework for more trustworthy confidence verbalization.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Large language models (LLMs) often produce confident but incorrect answers in settings where abstention would be safer. Standard evaluation protocols, however, require a response and do not account for how confidence should guide decisions under different risk preferences. To address this gap, we introduce the Behavioral Alignment Score (BAS), a decision-theoretic metric for evaluating how well LLM confidence supports abstention-aware decision making. BAS is derived from an explicit answer-or-abstain utility model and aggregates realized utility across a continuum of risk thresholds, yielding a measure of decision-level reliability that depends on both the magnitude and ordering of confidence. We show theoretically that truthful confidence estimates uniquely maximize expected BAS utility, linking calibration to decision-optimal behavior. BAS is related to proper scoring rules such as log loss, but differs structurally: log loss penalizes underconfidence and overconfidence symmetrically, whereas BAS imposes an asymmetric penalty that strongly prioritizes avoiding overconfident errors. Using BAS alongside widely used metrics such as ECE and AURC, we then construct a benchmark of self-reported confidence reliability across multiple LLMs and tasks. Our results reveal substantial variation in decision-useful confidence, and while larger and more accurate models tend to achieve higher BAS, even frontier models remain prone to severe overconfidence. Importantly, models with similar ECE or AURC can exhibit very different BAS due to highly overconfident errors, highlighting limitations of standard metrics. We further show that simple interventions, such as top-k confidence elicitation and post-hoc calibration, can meaningfully improve confidence reliability. Overall, our work provides both a principled metric and a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM confidence reliability.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

Large language models (LLMs) are revolutionizing every aspect of society. They are increasingly used in problem-solving tasks to substitute human assessment and reasoning. LLMs are trained on what humans write and are thus exposed to human bias. We evaluate whether LLMs inherit one of the most widespread human biases: overconfidence. We algorithmically construct reasoning problems with known ground truths. We prompt LLMs to answer these problems and assess the confidence in their answers, closely following similar protocols in human experiments. We find that all five LLMs we study are overconfident: they overestimate the probability that their answer is correct between 20% and 60%. Humans have accuracy similar to the more advanced LLMs, but far lower overconfidence. Although humans and LLMs are similarly biased in questions which they are certain they answered correctly, a key difference emerges between them: LLM bias increases sharply relative to humans if they become less sure that their answers are correct. We also show that LLM input has ambiguous effects on human decision making: LLM input leads to an increase in the accuracy, but it more than doubles the extent of overconfidence in the answers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used as automated judges, where practical value depends on both accuracy and trustworthy, risk-aware judgments. Existing approaches predominantly focus on accuracy, overlooking the necessity of well-calibrated confidence, which is vital for adaptive and reliable evaluation pipelines. In this work, we advocate a shift from accuracy-centric evaluation to confidence-driven, risk-aware LLM-as-a-Judge systems, emphasizing the necessity of well-calibrated confidence for trustworthy and adaptive evaluation. We systematically identify the Overconfidence Phenomenon in current LLM-as-a-Judges, where predicted confidence significantly overstates actual correctness, undermining reliability in practical deployment. To quantify this phenomenon, we introduce TH-Score, a novel metric measuring confidence-accuracy alignment. Furthermore, we propose LLM-as-a-Fuser, an ensemble framework that transforms LLMs into reliable, risk-aware evaluators. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach substantially improves calibration and enables adaptive, confidence-driven evaluation pipelines, achieving superior reliability and accuracy compared to existing baselines.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce confident yet incorrect answers, which can lead to risky failures in real-world applications. We study whether post-training can make a model's self-assessment explicit: when the model is uncertain, can it be trained to signal so within its own response? A central design question is where in the response this signal should be exposed -- during reasoning, while the answer is still being formed, or at the end, once the answer has been produced. We study both. For end-of-reasoning self-assessment, we train the model to verbalize a confidence score for its response, with the aim of high confidence on correct answers and low confidence on incorrect ones. For during-reasoning self-assessment, we train the model to emit the marker <uncertain> whenever its current reasoning state appears unreliable. Across factual reasoning tasks, both forms sharply reduce overconfident errors while improving answer quality, and both can be used as triggers for retrieval augmented generation (RAG) to improve the final response. We further analyze their internal mechanisms: end-of-reasoning verbalized confidence sharpens a confidence-related structure already present in the pretrained model, whereas during-reasoning <uncertain> emission teaches the model to mark high-risk reasoning steps, with parameter changes concentrated in the model's late layers.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

Can AI agents predict whether they will succeed at a task? We study agentic uncertainty by eliciting success probability estimates before, during, and after task execution. All results exhibit agentic overconfidence: some agents that succeed only 22% of the time predict 77% success. Counterintuitively, pre-execution assessment with strictly less information tends to yield better discrimination than standard post-execution review, though differences are not always significant. Adversarial prompting reframing assessment as bug-finding achieves the best calibration.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce erroneous responses that sound fluent and convincing, raising the risk that users will rely on these responses as if they were correct. Mitigating such overreliance is a key challenge. Through a think-aloud study in which participants use an LLM-infused application to answer objective questions, we identify several features of LLM responses that shape users' reliance: explanations (supporting details for answers), inconsistencies in explanations, and sources. Through a large-scale, pre-registered, controlled experiment (N=308), we isolate and study the effects of these features on users' reliance, accuracy, and other measures. We find that the presence of explanations increases reliance on both correct and incorrect responses. However, we observe less reliance on incorrect responses when sources are provided or when explanations exhibit inconsistencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for fostering appropriate reliance on LLMs.

Language model calibration refers to the alignment between the confidence of the model and the actual performance of its responses. While previous studies point out the overconfidence phenomenon in Large Language Models (LLMs) and show that LLMs trained with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) are overconfident with a more sharpened output probability, in this study, we reveal that RLHF tends to lead models to express verbalized overconfidence in their own responses. We investigate the underlying cause of this overconfidence and demonstrate that reward models used for Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) exhibit inherent biases towards high-confidence scores regardless of the actual quality of responses. Building upon this insight, we propose two PPO variants: PPO-M: PPO with Calibrated Reward Modeling and PPO-C: PPO with Calibrated Reward Calculation. PPO-M integrates explicit confidence scores in reward model training, which calibrates reward models to better capture the alignment between response quality and verbalized confidence. PPO-C adjusts the reward score during PPO based on the difference between the current reward and the moving average of past rewards. Both PPO-M and PPO-C can be seamlessly integrated into the current PPO pipeline and do not require additional golden labels. We evaluate our methods on both Llama3-8B and Mistral-7B across six diverse datasets including multiple-choice and open-ended generation. Experiment results demonstrate that both of our methods can reduce calibration error and maintain performance comparable to standard PPO. We further show that they do not compromise model capabilities in open-ended conversation settings.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) represent a breakthrough in AI problem-solving capabilities, but their effectiveness in interactive environments can be limited. This paper introduces and analyzes overthinking in LRMs. A phenomenon where models favor extended internal reasoning chains over environmental interaction. Through experiments on software engineering tasks using SWE Bench Verified, we observe three recurring patterns: Analysis Paralysis, Rogue Actions, and Premature Disengagement. We propose a framework to study these behaviors, which correlates with human expert assessments, and analyze 4018 trajectories. We observe that higher overthinking scores correlate with decreased performance, with reasoning models exhibiting stronger tendencies toward overthinking compared to non-reasoning models. Our analysis reveals that simple efforts to mitigate overthinking in agentic environments, such as selecting the solution with the lower overthinking score, can improve model performance by almost 30% while reducing computational costs by 43%. These results suggest that mitigating overthinking has strong practical implications. We suggest that by leveraging native function-calling capabilities and selective reinforcement learning overthinking tendencies could be mitigated. We also open-source our evaluation framework and dataset to facilitate research in this direction at https://github.com/AlexCuadron/Overthinking.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

People overthink; language models over-sample, and the extra effort can talk both into a worse answer. Reasoning systems answer a hard question by sampling it many times (test-time scaling), and the more they draw, the more often a correct answer turns up somewhere, so coverage, the fraction of problems with at least one correct try, climbs and appears to be progress. But a deployed system must return one answer, and choosing it, not knowing which try is right, is selection; selection is capped, and past a point extra samples only make the model surer of a confident mistake, even as every draw adds cost. The gap between climbing coverage and stalled selection, the identifiability gap, is the answer a model can produce but not pick. So the real question is not whether to sample but how far, and the answer is: not far. For picking an answer, the vote has already settled within a few dozen draws, the modal ceiling; for scoring a benchmark, sooner still, the correlation ceiling. Beyond that, extra draws cost compute and add nothing, and can even make the answer worse. This paper turns the cutoff into a single number, the effective number of samples, that any sampling run already reveals. The bottleneck is recognizing a right answer, not generating one.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains such as science, law, and healthcare, where accurate expressions of uncertainty are essential for reliability and trust. However, current LLMs are often observed to generate incorrect answers with high confidence, a phenomenon known as "overconfidence". Recent efforts have focused on calibrating LLMs' verbalized confidence: i.e., their expressions of confidence in text form, such as "I am 80% confident that...". Existing approaches either rely on prompt engineering or fine-tuning with heuristically generated uncertainty estimates, both of which have limited effectiveness and generalizability. Motivated by the notion of proper scoring rules for calibration in classical machine learning models, we introduce ConfTuner, a simple and efficient fine-tuning method that introduces minimal overhead and does not require ground-truth confidence scores or proxy confidence estimates. ConfTuner relies on a new loss function, tokenized Brier score, which we theoretically prove to be a proper scoring rule, intuitively meaning that it "correctly incentivizes the model to report its true probability of being correct". ConfTuner improves calibration across diverse reasoning tasks and generalizes to black-box models such as GPT-4o. Our results further show that better-calibrated confidence enables downstream gains in self-correction and model cascade, advancing the development of trustworthy LLM systems. The code is available at https://github.com/liushiliushi/ConfTuner.

Multi-agent debates have been introduced to improve the accuracy of Large Language Models (LLMs) by having multiple agents discuss solutions to a problem over several rounds of debate. However, models often generate incorrect yet confident-sounding responses, which can mislead others. This issue arises partly because agents do not consider how confident their peers are. To address this, we propose DebUnc, a debate framework that uses uncertainty metrics to assess agent confidence. Confidence is then conveyed through a modified attention mechanism that adjusts token weights, or through textual prompts. Evaluations across benchmarks show that attention-based methods are particularly effective and that performance continues to improve as uncertainty estimation becomes more reliable. The code is available at https://github.com/lukeyoffe/debunc.

Accident, defect and outage investigations end with a decision that ordinary question answering never faces: whether the evidence gathered so far is enough to close the case. We study this decision for LLM investigators, which request evidence from a case file, revise their hypotheses, and either close the case with a conclusion grounded in what they read or leave it open and name what is missing. This judgment does not come with capability: an untrained 9B model overstates its evidence in 97% of its answers, and a frontier model that identifies the right cause in 84% of cases still overstates in 91% and closes 17 of the 41 cases whose official finding is "cause undetermined". Measuring it is also non-trivial: the source of a case largely predicts its label, and a rule that reads only the source reaches 83.0 balanced accuracy on our test cases. We therefore evaluate closure with three tests: closure accuracy, reported against this rule and within each source; evidence dependence, which removes the grounds of a conclusion and checks whether the model stops closing; and conclusion and gap quality, a judged checklist of what the model asserts and what it says is missing. We build Nautil, 731 audited cases from aviation, rail, maritime, chemical-safety and vehicle-defect reports and production server incidents, with teacher trajectories, an out-of-distribution test set and counterfactual evidence versions. Fine-tuning a 9B model on these trajectories makes its closures follow the evidence: removing the grounds lowers its closure rate by 26 points relative to a matched control, overstatement falls from 97% to 35%, and correct, non-overstated conclusions rise from 3% to 43%. Reinforcement learning that rewards only the closure decision then raises balanced accuracy from 69.2 to 83.3, on par with the teacher, and within-source accuracy from 60.4 to 74.1, at some cost in evidence dependence.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) often suffer from overconfidence when expressing their uncertainty. Confidence-aware reinforcement learning (RL) offers a promising way to optimize calibration. However, it relies on on-policy rollouts and is thus constrained by the model's pre-RL confidence distribution, which we term confidence prior. In this work, we reveal that off-the-shelf LRMs exhibit a confidence prior heavily concentrated on a few high values, which persists throughout RL. Theoretically, we prove that this concentration suppresses policy gradient updates for rarely sampled confidence values and inflates the lower bound on expected Brier risk. To overcome this exploration bottleneck, we propose CalibSFT, a plug-and-play supervised fine-tuning stage that shapes a calibrated confidence prior with broad support before RL. For each question, CalibSFT constructs confidence targets combining its success rate with response-level correctness, which provably preserves proper-scoring optimality, and then balances training responses across the confidence spectrum to enable diverse confidence exploration during RL. To learn from incorrect responses without imitating their reasoning, CalibSFT introduces correctness-conditional supervision, guiding confidence across all responses while supervising reasoning only on correct ones. Across 16 mathematical and general reasoning benchmarks, incorporating CalibSFT reduces calibration errors and improves discrimination across five representative RL algorithms while preserving comparable accuracy. Furthermore, CalibSFT delivers practical benefits for downstream selective prediction and model routing. Our code is available at https://github.com/ml-stat-Sustech/verbalized-confidence-training.

Personalized LLMs with persistent memory are increasingly deployed, yet the faithfulness of their user models remains unexamined. We study over-inference (OI): the phenomenon where LLMs fabricate user attributes beyond what evidence supports. We introduce MirageBench, comprising 150 personas balanced across stereotypical, counter-stereotypical, and neutral profiles, 6 personalization tasks spanning an ``imagination gradient'', a four-way faithfulness taxonomy operationalized by an independent judge (validated against a blind human annotator on 400 claims: Cohen's kappa = 0.863 four-class, kappa = 0.900 binary), and a leaderboard of 12 models across 7 families on 143616 judged claims. We find that over-inference is pervasive: every one of the 12 models over-infers 35%--49% of its claims (cross-model mean 41.6%; claim-weighted 41.8%), with no model in this evaluation escaping it. Most strikingly, we surface a Self-Monitoring Inversion: at the model-selection level, models' self-assessed OI is negatively rank-correlated with their judge-measured OI (rho = -0.60, p = 0.044; exploratory, wide bootstrap CI [-0.90, +0.06], n = 12). The models that report the least over-inference tend to be flagged as fabricating the most, so self-reported confidence is a misleading signal for comparing models, even though within a single model self-audit still ranks that model's own claims moderately well (AUROC 0.58--0.83). We further show that OI is task-dependent (27%--59%) and that, in a multi-turn pilot, inferred attributes accumulate approximately linearly with little revision. MirageBench positions external verification, rather than model self-report, as a more reliable foundation for trustworthy personalization.

Overfitting negatively impacts the generalization ability of deep neural networks (DNNs) in both natural and adversarial training. Existing methods struggle to consistently address different types of overfitting, typically designing strategies that focus separately on either natural or adversarial patterns. In this work, we adopt a unified perspective by solely focusing on natural patterns to explore different types of overfitting. Specifically, we examine the memorization effect in DNNs and reveal a shared behaviour termed over-memorization, which impairs their generalization capacity. This behaviour manifests as DNNs suddenly becoming high-confidence in predicting certain training patterns and retaining a persistent memory for them. Furthermore, when DNNs over-memorize an adversarial pattern, they tend to simultaneously exhibit high-confidence prediction for the corresponding natural pattern. These findings motivate us to holistically mitigate different types of overfitting by hindering the DNNs from over-memorization natural patterns. To this end, we propose a general framework, Distraction Over-Memorization (DOM), which explicitly prevents over-memorization by either removing or augmenting the high-confidence natural patterns. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in mitigating overfitting across various training paradigms.

Increasing test-time computation is a straightforward approach to enhancing the quality of responses in Large Language Models (LLMs). While Best-of-N sampling and Self-Consistency with majority voting are simple and effective, they require a fixed number of sampling responses for each query, regardless of its complexity. This could result in wasted computation for simpler questions and insufficient exploration for more challenging ones. In this work, we argue that model confidence of responses can be used for improving the efficiency of test-time scaling. Unfortunately, LLMs are known to be overconfident and provide unreliable confidence estimation. To address this limitation, we introduce Self-Calibration by distilling Self-Consistency-derived confidence into the model itself. This enables reliable confidence estimation at test time with one forward pass. We then design confidence-based efficient test-time scaling methods to handle queries of various difficulty, such as Early-Stopping for Best-of-N and Self-Consistency with calibrated confidence. Experiments on three LLMs across six datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Specifically, applying confidence-based Early Stopping to Best-of-N improves MathQA accuracy from 81.0 to 83.6 with a sample budget of 16 responses, indicating the efficacy of confidence-based sampling strategy at inference time.

Empowering large language models to accurately express confidence in their answers is essential for trustworthy decision-making. Previous confidence elicitation methods, which primarily rely on white-box access to internal model information or model fine-tuning, have become less suitable for LLMs, especially closed-source commercial APIs. This leads to a growing need to explore the untapped area of black-box approaches for LLM uncertainty estimation. To better break down the problem, we define a systematic framework with three components: prompting strategies for eliciting verbalized confidence, sampling methods for generating multiple responses, and aggregation techniques for computing consistency. We then benchmark these methods on two key tasks-confidence calibration and failure prediction-across five types of datasets (e.g., commonsense and arithmetic reasoning) and five widely-used LLMs including GPT-4 and LLaMA 2 Chat. Our analysis uncovers several key insights: 1) LLMs, when verbalizing their confidence, tend to be overconfident, potentially imitating human patterns of expressing confidence. 2) As model capability scales up, both calibration and failure prediction performance improve. 3) Employing our proposed strategies, such as human-inspired prompts, consistency among multiple responses, and better aggregation strategies can help mitigate this overconfidence from various perspectives. 4) Comparisons with white-box methods indicate that while white-box methods perform better, the gap is narrow, e.g., 0.522 to 0.605 in AUROC. Despite these advancements, none of these techniques consistently outperform others, and all investigated methods struggle in challenging tasks, such as those requiring professional knowledge, indicating significant scope for improvement. We believe this study can serve as a strong baseline and provide insights for eliciting confidence in black-box LLMs.

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks. Recent research has introduced Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) systems, which leverage multiple LLMs to simulate human debate and thereby improve task performance. However, while some LLMs may possess superior knowledge or reasoning capabilities for specific tasks, they often struggle to clearly communicate this advantage during debates, in part due to a lack of confidence expression. Moreover, inappropriate confidence expression can cause agents in MAD systems to either stubbornly maintain incorrect beliefs or converge prematurely on suboptimal answers, ultimately reducing debate effectiveness and overall system performance. To address these challenges, we propose incorporating confidence expression into MAD systems to allow LLMs to explicitly communicate their confidence levels. To validate this approach, we develop ConfMAD, a MAD framework that integrates confidence expression throughout the debate process. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, and we further analyze how confidence influences debate dynamics, offering insights into the design of confidence-aware MAD systems.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

On-policy distillation (OPD) is an increasingly important paradigm for post-training language models. However, we identify a pervasive Scaling Law of Miscalibration: while OPD effectively improves task accuracy, it systematically traps models in severe overconfidence. We trace this failure to an information mismatch: teacher supervision is formed under privileged context available during training, whereas the deployed model must report confidence using only deployment-time information. We formalize this perspective theoretically, showing that teacher-conditioned success is generally not a valid target for deployment-time confidence and that helpful privileged context induces entropy collapse and a systematic optimism bias. To address this, we propose a calibration-aware OPD framework, CaOPD, that estimates empirical confidence from model rollouts, replaces self-reported confidence with this student-grounded target, and distills the revised response through the same self-distillation pipeline. Experiments across various models and domains show that CaOPD achieves Pareto-optimal calibration while maintaining competitive capability, generalizing robustly under out-of-distribution and continual learning. Our findings highlight that capability distillation does not imply calibrated confidence, and that confidence should be treated as an essential objective in post-training. Code: https://github.com/SalesforceAIResearch/CaOPD

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Autonomous Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents rely on accurate GUI grounding, which maps language instructions to on-screen coordinates, to execute user commands. However, current models, whether trained via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT), lack self-awareness of their capability boundaries, leading to overconfidence and unreliable predictions. We first systematically evaluate probabilistic and verbalized confidence in general and GUI-specific models, revealing a misalignment between confidence and actual accuracy, which is particularly critical in dynamic GUI automation tasks, where single errors can cause task failure. To address this, we propose HyperClick, a novel framework that enhances reliable GUI grounding through uncertainty calibration. HyperClick introduces a dual reward mechanism, combining a binary reward for correct actions with a truncated Gaussian-based spatial confidence modeling, calibrated using the Brier score. This approach jointly optimizes grounding accuracy and confidence reliability, fostering introspective self-criticism. Extensive experiments on seven challenge benchmarks show that HyperClick achieves state-of-the-art performance while providing well-calibrated confidence. By enabling explicit confidence calibration and introspective self-criticism, HyperClick reduces overconfidence and supports more reliable GUI automation.

In continual learning, many classifiers use softmax function to learn confidence. However, numerous studies have pointed out its inability to accurately determine confidence distributions for outliers, often referred to as epistemic uncertainty. This inherent limitation also curtails the accurate decisions for selecting what to forget and keep in previously trained confidence distributions over continual learning process. To address the issue, we revisit the effects of masking softmax function. While this method is both simple and prevalent in literature, its implication for retaining confidence distribution during continual learning, also known as stability, has been under-investigated. In this paper, we revisit the impact of softmax masking, and introduce a methodology to utilize its confidence preservation effects. In class- and task-incremental learning benchmarks with and without memory replay, our approach significantly increases stability while maintaining sufficiently large plasticity. In the end, our methodology shows better overall performance than state-of-the-art methods, particularly in the use with zero or small memory. This lays a simple and effective foundation of strongly stable replay-based continual learning.

Large reasoning models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities by generating longer chains of thought, demonstrating outstanding performance across a variety of tasks. However, this performance gain comes at the cost of a substantial increase in redundant reasoning during the generation process, leading to high computational overhead and exacerbating the issue of overthinking. Although numerous existing approaches aim to address the problem of overthinking, they often rely on external interventions. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, Self-Braking Tuning (SBT), which tackles overthinking from the perspective of allowing the model to regulate its own reasoning process, thus eliminating the reliance on external control mechanisms. We construct a set of overthinking identification metrics based on standard answers and design a systematic method to detect redundant reasoning. This method accurately identifies unnecessary steps within the reasoning trajectory and generates training signals for learning self-regulation behaviors. Building on this foundation, we develop a complete strategy for constructing data with adaptive reasoning lengths and introduce an innovative braking prompt mechanism that enables the model to naturally learn when to terminate reasoning at an appropriate point. Experiments across mathematical benchmarks (AIME, AMC, MATH500, GSM8K) demonstrate that our method reduces token consumption by up to 60% while maintaining comparable accuracy to unconstrained models.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for tasks that require complex reasoning. Most benchmarks focus on final outcomes but overlook the intermediate reasoning steps - such as planning, revision, and decision making under resource constraints. We argue that measuring these internal processes is essential for understanding model behavior and improving reliability. We propose using strategic games as a natural evaluation environment: closed, rule-based systems with clear states, limited resources, and automatic feedback. We introduce a framework that evaluates LLMs along three core dimensions: planning, revision, and resource-constrained decision making. To operationalize this, we define metrics beyond win rate, including overcorrection risk rate, correction success rate, improvement slope, and over-budget ratio. In 4320 adversarial rounds across 12 leading models, ChatGPT-o3-mini achieves the top composite score, with a win rate of 74.7 percent, a correction success rate of 78.6 percent, and an improvement slope of 0.041. By contrast, Qwen-Plus, despite an overcorrection risk rate of 81.6 percent, wins only 25.6 percent of its matches - primarily due to excessive resource use. We also observe a negative correlation between overcorrection risk rate and correction success rate (Pearson r = -0.51, p = 0.093), suggesting that more frequent edits do not always improve outcomes. Our findings highlight the value of assessing not only what LLMs decide but how they arrive at those decisions

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are usually aligned with "human values/preferences" to prevent harmful output. Discussions around the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) generally focus on preventing harmful outputs. However, in this paper, we argue that in health-related queries, over-alignment-leading to overly cautious responses-can itself be harmful, especially for people with anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This is not only unethical but also dangerous to the user, both mentally and physically. We also showed qualitative results that some LLMs exhibit varying degrees of alignment. Finally, we call for the development of LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities that provide more tailored and nuanced responses to health queries. Warning: This paper contains materials that could trigger health anxiety or OCD.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student on its own rollouts using dense supervision from a teacher. In multi-turn environments, a mistake at a critical decision step can redirect the subsequent rollout toward poor outcomes. We use low teacher confidence on student actions to select high-uncertainty steps for correction. In a controlled ALFWorld study, a single teacher correction at a low-confidence step improves subsequent student behavior and task success, motivating selective intervention during distillation. We propose UOPD, an uncertainty-aware intervention method for on-policy distillation. At low-uncertainty turns, UOPD executes student actions and applies the standard OPD loss. At high-uncertainty turns, it samples and executes teacher actions and trains the student to imitate them through supervised fine-tuning, which minimizes forward Kullback-Leibler divergence in expectation. UOPD utilizes adaptive uncertainty thresholds to target a scheduled intervention rate. Empirically, we evaluate UOPD across a broad range of agentic tasks, including ALFWorld, WebShop, and Search, demonstrating its superior performance over OPD methods and their variants. UOPD improves WebShop score by up to 15.8% relative to standard OPD.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting is a common technique for improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, extended reasoning is often unnecessary and substantially increases token usage. As such, a key question becomes how to optimally allocate compute to when reasoning is actually needed. We study this through confidence-gated CoT, where a model produces a direct answer and a confidence estimate to decide whether to invoke CoT. We present an evaluation framework together with the first systematic study of confidence signals for this decision. We evaluate four representative confidence measures and compare them with random gating and an oracle upper bound. Experiments across two model families and diverse reasoning tasks show that existing training-free confidence measures can reduce redundant reasoning. However, we also find that the utility of individual confidence measures is inconsistent across settings. Through our evaluation framework and analysis, our study provides practical guidance toward developing and evaluating models that selectively use CoT.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1 have shown excellent performance in reasoning tasks using long reasoning chains. However, this has also led to a significant increase of computational costs and the generation of verbose output, a phenomenon known as overthinking. The tendency to overthinking is often exacerbated by Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms such as GRPO/DAPO. In this paper, we propose BFS-PO, an RL algorithm which alleviates this problem using a Best-First Search exploration strategy. Specifically, BFS-PO looks for the shortest correct answer using a backtracking mechanism based on maximum entropy nodes. By generating progressively shorter responses during training, BFS-PO learns to produce concise reasoning chains. Using different benchmarks and base LRMs, we show that BFS-PO can simultaneously increase the LRM accuracy and shorten its answers.

Recent advances in handling long sequences have facilitated the exploration of long-context in-context learning (ICL). While much of the existing research emphasizes performance improvements driven by additional in-context examples, the influence on the trustworthiness of generated responses remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by investigating how increased examples influence predictive uncertainty, an essential aspect in trustworthiness. We begin by systematically quantifying the uncertainty of ICL with varying shot counts, analyzing the impact of example quantity. Through uncertainty decomposition, we introduce a novel perspective on performance enhancement, with a focus on epistemic uncertainty (EU). Our results reveal that additional examples reduce total uncertainty in both simple and complex tasks by injecting task-specific knowledge, thereby diminishing EU and enhancing performance. For complex tasks, these advantages emerge only after addressing the increased noise and uncertainty associated with longer inputs. Finally, we explore the evolution of internal confidence across layers, unveiling the mechanisms driving the reduction in uncertainty.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a standard approach for fine-tuning large language models to follow instructions. As part of this process, learned reward models are used to approximately model human preferences. However, as imperfect representations of the "true" reward, these learned reward models are susceptible to overoptimization. Gao et al. (2023) studied this phenomenon in a synthetic human feedback setup with a significantly larger "gold" reward model acting as the true reward (instead of humans) and showed that overoptimization remains a persistent problem regardless of the size of the proxy reward model and training data used. Using a similar setup, we conduct a systematic study to evaluate the efficacy of using ensemble-based conservative optimization objectives, specifically worst-case optimization (WCO) and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO), for mitigating reward model overoptimization when using two optimization methods: (a) best-of-n sampling (BoN) (b) proximal policy optimization (PPO). We additionally extend the setup of Gao et al. (2023) to include 25% label noise to better mirror real-world conditions. Both with and without label noise, we find that conservative optimization practically eliminates overoptimization and improves performance by up to 70% for BoN sampling. For PPO, ensemble-based conservative optimization always reduces overoptimization and outperforms single reward model optimization. Moreover, combining it with a small KL penalty successfully prevents overoptimization at no performance cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that ensemble-based conservative optimization can effectively counter overoptimization.

Equipping large language models (LLMs) with search engines via reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as an effective approach for building search agents. However, overreliance on search introduces unnecessary cost and risks exposure to noisy or malicious content, while relying solely on parametric knowledge risks hallucination. The central challenge is to develop agents that adaptively balance parametric knowledge with external search, invoking search only when necessary. Prior work mitigates search overuse by shaping rewards around the number of tool calls. However, these penalties require substantial reward engineering, provide ambiguous credit assignment, and can be exploited by agents that superficially reduce calls. Moreover, evaluating performance solely through call counts conflates necessary and unnecessary search, obscuring the measurement of true adaptive behavior. To address these limitations, we first quantify the self-knowledge awareness of existing search agents via an F1-based decision metric, revealing that methods such as Search-R1 often overlook readily available parametric knowledge. Motivated by these findings, we propose AdaSearch, a simple two-stage, outcome-driven RL framework that disentangles problem solving from the decision of whether to invoke search, and makes this decision process explicit and interpretable. This transparency is crucial for high-stakes domains such as finance and medical question answering, yet is largely neglected by prior approaches. Experiments across multiple model families and sizes demonstrate that AdaSearch substantially improves knowledge-boundary awareness, reduces unnecessary search calls, preserves strong task performance, and offers more transparent, interpretable decision behaviors.

Introducing reasoning models into Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhances task performance through step-by-step reasoning, logical consistency, and multi-step self-verification. However, recent studies have shown that reasoning models suffer from overthinking attacks, where models are tricked to generate unnecessarily high number of reasoning tokens. In this paper, we reveal that such overthinking risk can be inherited by RAG systems equipped with reasoning models, by proposing an end-to-end attack framework named Contradiction-Based Deliberation Extension (CODE). Specifically, CODE develops a multi-agent architecture to construct poisoning samples that are injected into the knowledge base. These samples 1) are highly correlated with the use query, such that can be retrieved as inputs to the reasoning model; and 2) contain contradiction between the logical and evidence layers that cause models to overthink, and are optimized to exhibit highly diverse styles. Moreover, the inference overhead of CODE is extremely difficult to detect, as no modification is needed on the user query, and the task accuracy remain unaffected. Extensive experiments on two datasets across five commercial reasoning models demonstrate that the proposed attack causes a 5.32x-24.72x increase in reasoning token consumption, without degrading task performance. Finally, we also discuss and evaluate potential countermeasures to mitigate overthinking risks.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

When retrieved evidence contradicts an agent's prior beliefs, does it revise its answer, acknowledge uncertainty, or persist with an incorrect conclusion? Existing evaluations of agentic systems focus primarily on task success, offering limited insight into how agents handle such conflicts. We propose to evaluate agents on epistemic humility (EH): the agent's willingness to recognize, act on, and communicate uncertainty during task execution. We operationalize EH through three trajectory-level behavioral dimensions: Identify, Solve, and Escalate (ISE). Through knowledge conflict, situations where the backbone language model's parametric knowledge contradicts the evidence it encounters, or where two contextual sources disagree, we evaluate two conflict settings: (1) controlled conflict and (2) naturally occurring conflict during multi-step agentic execution, each paired with matched no-conflict controls. Evaluating four agents, we find that higher task accuracy does not necessarily correspond to greater epistemic humility: some high-accuracy configurations recognize conflicts during execution but do not communicate unresolved uncertainty in their incorrect final answers. Trajectory-level analysis further reveals that agents frequently detect conflicts in early steps of execution but fail to maintain or resolve them in later steps. Finally, we show that model-level interventions can improve EH, but often at the cost of task accuracy, suggesting that epistemic humility emerges from the interaction among the backbone model, agent harness, and evaluation environment.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether a specific sample was used to train a predictive model. Knowing this may indeed lead to a privacy breach. Most MIAs, however, make use of the model's prediction scores - the probability of each output given some input - following the intuition that the trained model tends to behave differently on its training data. We argue that this is a fallacy for many modern deep network architectures. Consequently, MIAs will miserably fail since overconfidence leads to high false-positive rates not only on known domains but also on out-of-distribution data and implicitly acts as a defense against MIAs. Specifically, using generative adversarial networks, we are able to produce a potentially infinite number of samples falsely classified as part of the training data. In other words, the threat of MIAs is overestimated, and less information is leaked than previously assumed. Moreover, there is actually a trade-off between the overconfidence of models and their susceptibility to MIAs: the more classifiers know when they do not know, making low confidence predictions, the more they reveal the training data.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance in complex tasks, often outperforming conventional large language models (LLMs). However, the prevalent issue of overthinking severely limits their computational efficiency. Overthinking occurs when models generate excessive and redundant tokens that contribute little to accurate outcomes, especially in simple tasks, resulting in a significant waste of computational resources. To systematically investigate this issue, we introduce Think-Bench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning efficiency of LRMs. We also propose novel efficiency metrics and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of various LRMs across multiple dimensions, including the reasoning process, outcome quality, and chain-of-thought (CoT) characteristics. Our analysis reveals that most LRMs exhibit overthinking in handling easy questions, generating unnecessarily lengthy reasoning chains. While many LRMs demonstrate high CoT quality, several suffer from low efficiency. We hope that Think-Bench can serve as a robust foundation for advancing research into LRMs.

Determining whether inputs are out-of-distribution (OOD) is an essential building block for safely deploying machine learning models in the open world. However, previous methods relying on the softmax confidence score suffer from overconfident posterior distributions for OOD data. We propose a unified framework for OOD detection that uses an energy score. We show that energy scores better distinguish in- and out-of-distribution samples than the traditional approach using the softmax scores. Unlike softmax confidence scores, energy scores are theoretically aligned with the probability density of the inputs and are less susceptible to the overconfidence issue. Within this framework, energy can be flexibly used as a scoring function for any pre-trained neural classifier as well as a trainable cost function to shape the energy surface explicitly for OOD detection. On a CIFAR-10 pre-trained WideResNet, using the energy score reduces the average FPR (at TPR 95%) by 18.03% compared to the softmax confidence score. With energy-based training, our method outperforms the state-of-the-art on common benchmarks.

The use of deep neural networks in real-world applications require well-calibrated networks with confidence scores that accurately reflect the actual probability. However, it has been found that these networks often provide over-confident predictions, which leads to poor calibration. Recent efforts have sought to address this issue by focal loss to reduce over-confidence, but this approach can also lead to under-confident predictions. While different variants of focal loss have been explored, it is difficult to find a balance between over-confidence and under-confidence. In our work, we propose a new loss function by focusing on dual logits. Our method not only considers the ground truth logit, but also take into account the highest logit ranked after the ground truth logit. By maximizing the gap between these two logits, our proposed dual focal loss can achieve a better balance between over-confidence and under-confidence. We provide theoretical evidence to support our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through evaluations on multiple models and datasets, where it achieves state-of-the-art performance. Code is available at https://github.com/Linwei94/DualFocalLoss

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently achieved significant progress in complex reasoning tasks, aided by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. However, LRMs often suffer from overthinking, expending excessive computation on simple problems and reducing efficiency. Existing efficient reasoning methods typically require accurate task assessment to preset token budgets or select reasoning modes, which limits their flexibility and reliability. In this work, we revisit the essence of overthinking and identify that encouraging effective steps while penalizing ineffective ones is key to its solution. To this end, we propose a novel rule-based verifiable stepwise reward mechanism (VSRM), which assigns rewards based on the performance of intermediate states in the reasoning trajectory. This approach is intuitive and naturally fits the step-by-step nature of reasoning tasks. We conduct extensive experiments on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including AIME24 and AIME25, by integrating VSRM with PPO and Reinforce++. Results show that our method achieves substantial output length reduction while maintaining original reasoning performance, striking an optimal balance between efficiency and accuracy. Further analysis of overthinking frequency and pass@k score before and after training demonstrates that our approach in deed effectively suppresses ineffective steps and encourages effective reasoning, fundamentally alleviating the overthinking problem. All code will be released upon acceptance.

Reasoning language models frequently overthink: generating extended chains of behaviors such as hedging, approach abandonment, and self contradiction that consume tokens without improving answers. We show that these behaviors are not merely a consequence of length; even when controlling for response length, incorrect traces exhibit higher rates of unproductive self-reflection than correct ones. Addressing this requires identifying where self-reflection helps vs hurts, but obtaining these step-level annotations is costly. We observe that intermediate answer commitments within reasoning traces can provide a cheap proxy: by comparing each final answer candidate in the trace to the ground truth, we can determine whether subsequent reflection is productive without any additional supervision. Building on this insight, we propose DASH (Drift Aware advantage SHaping), which assigns segment-level credit based on whether each reasoning segment leads toward or away from correctness. On competition-level math benchmarks, DASH achieves the highest accuracy where overthinking is prevalent (Average Accuracy: 59.45% vs. 58.1% Dr.GRPO vs. 56.95% GRPO) while reducing overthinking behaviors and achieving more productive self-correction than baselines.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has driven recent gains of large language models (LLMs) on reasoning-intensive tasks by externalizing intermediate steps. However, excessive or redundant reasoning -- so-called overthinking -- can increase inference costs and lead LLMs toward incorrect conclusions. In this paper, we present REFRAIN (REFlective-Redundancy for Adaptive INference), a training-free framework that adaptively determines when to stop reasoning to mitigate overthinking. REFRAIN integrates a two-stage stop discriminator to identify reflective yet redundant reasoning and a sliding-window Upper Confidence Bound (SW-UCB) multi-armed bandit controller to dynamically adjust stopping thresholds according to problem difficulty without supervision or fine-tuning. Across four representative benchmarks and two model families, REFRAIN reduces token usage by 20-55% while maintaining or improving accuracy compared to standard CoT prompting. Extensive ablation and robustness analyses demonstrate its stability across models, scorers, and prompt variations. In summary, our findings highlight when-to-stop as a new and practical axis of test-time scaling -- enabling models to reason not just more, but just enough.

Reasoning LLMs show improved performance with longer chains of thought. However, recent work has highlighted their tendency to overthink, continuing to revise answers even after reaching the correct solution. We quantitatively confirm this inefficiency from the distribution dynamics perspective by tracking Pass@1 for answers averaged over a large number of rollouts and find the model often begins to always produce the correct answer early in the reasoning, making extra reasoning tokens wasteful. To detect and prevent overthinking, we propose a simple and inexpensive novel signal, Entropy After </Think> (EAT), for monitoring and deciding whether to exit reasoning early. By appending a stop thinking token (</think>) and monitoring the entropy of the following token as the model reasons, we obtain a trajectory that decreases and stabilizes when Pass@1 plateaus; thresholding its variance under an exponential moving average yields a practical stopping rule. Importantly, our approach enables adaptively allocating compute based on the EAT trajectory, allowing us to spend compute in a more efficient way compared with fixing the token budget for all questions. Empirically, on MATH500 and AIME2025, EAT reduces token usage by 12 - 22% without harming accuracy. EAT also remains effective in black box settings where logits from the reasoning model are not accessible, and EAT is computed with proxy models: We verified the feasibility via early stopping Llama 70B with a 1.5B model and Claude 3.7 with a local 4B model.

A robot that fails at a task faces the first decision in corrective dialogue: act on its own diagnosis, consult another onboard sensor, or interrupt a person. Choosing well requires knowing how much the robot's sensors reveal about the cause and how reliable the robot's own diagnosis is. We build a simulated benchmark in which every failure's true cause is known, because we injected it, and measure what each sensor reveals, with explicit checks against data leakage. Some failures are diagnosable from camera images; others only from the robot's force data (0.99 from force data, no image method above 0.55). We then test six open vision-language models. Their behavior tracks the surface of the prompt, not the evidence: moving the refusal option from last to first in the answer list collapses refusal rates from 78-100% to 0-6% in three of the six swept model-and-family pairs. Accuracy from frames stays at or below a majority-class baseline under every prompt variant, with or without worked examples, and stated confidence carries no information about correctness. Handing the same models the force data as ten lines of text produces the first above-baseline diagnoses, in four of the six models: much of the failure reflects missing sensor data, not missing ability. We pose the choice as a three-action decision problem, act, consult your own sensors, or ask a human, whose optimal policy follows from measured accuracy. The models do not follow it, and their ask rates ignore a fourfold change in question cost. One question to a human still lifts them from that baseline to roughly the answerer's own reliability (0.70-0.81 when they ask). The decision to ask should be tied to measured accuracy and stated costs, not to the model's confidence.

Ecological management and decision-making typically focus on uncertainty about the future, but surprisingly little is known about how to account for uncertainty of the present: that is, the realities of having only partial or imperfect measurements. Our primary paradigms for handling decisions under uncertainty -- the precautionary principle and optimal control -- have so far given contradictory results. This paradox is best illustrated in the example of fisheries management, where many ideas that guide thinking about ecological decision making were first developed. We find that simplistic optimal control approaches have repeatedly concluded that a manager should increase catch quotas when faced with greater uncertainty about the fish biomass. Current best practices take a more precautionary approach, decreasing catch quotas by a fixed amount to account for uncertainty. Using comparisons to both simulated and historical catch data, we find that neither approach is sufficient to avoid stock collapses under moderate observational uncertainty. Using partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) methods, we demonstrate how this paradox arises from flaws in the standard theory, which contributes to over-exploitation of fisheries and increased probability of economic and ecological collapse. In contrast, we find POMDP-based management avoids such over-exploitation while also generating higher economic value. These results have significant implications for how we handle uncertainty in both fisheries and ecological management more generally.

Large language models (LLMs) can increase users' perceived trust by verbalizing confidence in their outputs. However, prior work has shown that LLMs are often overconfident, making their stated confidence unreliable since it does not consistently align with factual accuracy. To better understand the sources of this verbalized confidence, we introduce TracVC (Tracing Verbalized Confidence), a method that builds on information retrieval and influence estimation to trace generated confidence expressions back to the training data. We evaluate TracVC on OLMo and Llama models in a question answering setting, proposing a new metric, content groundness, which measures the extent to which an LLM grounds its confidence in content-related training examples (relevant to the question and answer) versus in generic examples of confidence verbalization. Our analysis reveals that OLMo2-13B is frequently influenced by confidence-related data that is lexically unrelated to the query, suggesting that it may mimic superficial linguistic expressions of certainty rather than rely on genuine content grounding. These findings point to a fundamental limitation in current training regimes: LLMs may learn how to sound confident without learning when confidence is justified. Our analysis provides a foundation for improving LLMs' trustworthiness in expressing more reliable confidence.

Recent work in open-domain question answering (ODQA) has shown that adversarial poisoning of the input contexts can cause large drops in accuracy for production systems. However, little to no work has proposed methods to defend against these attacks. To do so, we introduce a new method that uses query augmentation to search for a diverse set of retrieved passages that could answer the original question. We integrate these new passages into the model through the design of a novel confidence method, comparing the predicted answer to its appearance in the retrieved contexts (what we call Confidence from Answer Redundancy, e.g. CAR). Together these methods allow for a simple but effective way to defend against poisoning attacks and provide gains of 5-20% exact match across varying levels of data poisoning.

Recent breakthroughs in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated that extensive Chain-of-Thought (CoT) generation is critical for enabling intricate cognitive behaviors, such as self-verification and backtracking, to solve complex tasks. However, this capability often leads to ``overthinking'', where models generate redundant reasoning paths that inflate computational costs without improving accuracy. While Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on reasoning traces is a standard paradigm for the 'cold start' phase, applying existing compression techniques to these traces often compromises logical coherence or incurs prohibitive sampling costs. In this paper, we introduce ConMax (Confidence-Maximizing Compression), a novel reinforcement learning framework designed to automatically compress reasoning traces while preserving essential reasoning patterns. ConMax formulates compression as a reward-driven optimization problem, training a policy to prune redundancy by maximizing a weighted combination of answer confidence for predictive fidelity and thinking confidence for reasoning validity through a frozen auxiliary LRM. Extensive experiments across five reasoning datasets demonstrate that ConMax achieves a superior efficiency-performance trade-off. Specifically, it reduces inference length by 43% over strong baselines at the cost of a mere 0.7% dip in accuracy, proving its effectiveness in generating high-quality, efficient training data for LRMs.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) efficiently scales the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) but is bottlenecked by scarce labeled data. Reinforcement learning with intrinsic rewards (RLIR) offers a scalable alternative via self-rewarding, yet often suffers from instability and inferior performance. We trace this gap to a systemic bias in confidence-coupled self-rewarding: the model tends to over-reward high-confidence mistakes, forming a self-confirming loop. We quantify this feedback-loop bias with three metrics: reward noise magnitude (rho_noise), policy-reward coupling (rho_selfbias), and over-/under-reward skew (rho_symbias). Our analyses show a compounding effect where strong coupling amplifies confidence-conditioned errors and drives a drift toward over-reward, leading to instability and a lower performance ceiling. To mitigate this, we propose reinforcement learning with ensembled rewards (RLER), which aggregates diverse models with adaptive reward interpolation and disagreement-aware rollout selection to reduce coupling and suppress over-reward drift. Extensive experiments show that RLER improves by 6.2% over the best RLIR baseline and is within 3.6% of RLVR, while exhibiting stable scaling on unlabeled samples.

Multimodal AI models are increasingly used in fields like healthcare, finance, and autonomous driving, where information is drawn from multiple sources or modalities such as images, texts, audios, videos. However, effectively managing uncertainty - arising from noise, insufficient evidence, or conflicts between modalities - is crucial for reliable decision-making. Current uncertainty-aware machine learning methods leveraging, for example, evidence averaging, or evidence accumulation underestimate uncertainties in high-conflict scenarios. Moreover, the state-of-the-art evidence averaging strategy is not order invariant and fails to scale to multiple modalities. To address these challenges, we propose a novel multimodal learning method with order-invariant evidence fusion and introduce a conflict-based discounting mechanism that reallocates uncertain mass when unreliable modalities are detected. We provide both theoretical analysis and experimental validation, demonstrating that unlike the previous work, the proposed approach effectively distinguishes between conflicting and non-conflicting samples based on the provided uncertainty estimates, and outperforms the previous models in uncertainty-based conflict detection.

The generality of pretrained large language models (LLMs) has prompted increasing interest in their use as in-context learning agents. To be successful, such agents must form beliefs about how to achieve their goals based on limited interaction with their environment, resulting in uncertainty about the best action to take at each step. In this paper, we study how LLM agents form and act on these beliefs by conducting experiments in controlled sequential decision-making tasks. To begin, we find that LLM agents are overconfident: They draw strong conclusions about what to do based on insufficient evidence, resulting in inadequately explorative behavior. We dig deeper into this phenomenon and show how it emerges from a collapse in the entropy of the action distribution implied by sampling from the LLM. We then demonstrate that existing token-level sampling techniques are by themselves insufficient to make the agent explore more. Motivated by this fact, we introduce Entropic Activation Steering (EAST), an activation steering method for in-context LLM agents. EAST computes a steering vector as an entropy-weighted combination of representations, and uses it to manipulate an LLM agent's uncertainty over actions by intervening on its activations during the forward pass. We show that EAST can reliably increase the entropy in an LLM agent's actions, causing more explorative behavior to emerge. Finally, EAST modifies the subjective uncertainty an LLM agent expresses, paving the way to interpreting and controlling how LLM agents represent uncertainty about their decisions.

Reliable Large Language Models (LLMs) should abstain when confidence is insufficient. However, prior studies often treat refusal as a generic "I don't know'', failing to distinguish input-level ambiguity (data uncertainty) from capability limitations (model uncertainty). This lack of distinction limits downstream action decisions like requesting clarification or invoking external tools. In this work, we introduce UA-Bench, a benchmark of over 3,500 questions drawn from six datasets spanning knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive tasks, designed to evaluate explicit uncertainty attribution. An evaluation of 18 frontier LLMs shows that even state-of-the-art models struggle to reliably discriminate between data uncertainty and model uncertainty, and that high answer accuracy does not necessarily imply strong uncertainty attribution ability. To narrow this gap, we propose a lightweight data synthesis and reinforcement learning strategy. Experiments on both Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 and Qwen3-8B in thinking mode show that the proposed method improves uncertainty attribution while preserving answer accuracy. Our code and data are publicly available now.

As generative AI systems are integrated into educational settings, students often encounter AI-generated output while working through learning tasks, either by requesting help or through integrated tools. Trust in AI can influence how students interpret and use that output, including whether they evaluate it critically or exhibit overreliance. We investigate how students' trust relates to their appropriate reliance on an AI assistant during programming problem-solving tasks, and whether this relationship differs by learner characteristics. With 432 undergraduate participants, students' completed Python output-prediction problems while receiving recommendations and explanations from an AI chatbot, including accurate and intentionally misleading suggestions. We operationalize reliance behaviorally as the extent to which students' responses reflected appropriate use of the AI assistant's suggestions, accepting them when they were correct and rejecting them when they were incorrect. Pre- and post-task surveys assessed trust in the assistant, AI literacy, need for cognition, programming self-efficacy, and programming literacy. Results showed a non-linear relationship in which higher trust was associated with lower appropriate reliance, suggesting weaker discrimination between correct and incorrect recommendations. This relationship was significantly moderated by students' AI literacy and need for cognition. These findings highlight the need for future work on instructional and system supports that encourage more reflective evaluation of AI assistance during problem-solving.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable reward has recently emerged as a central paradigm for post-training large language models (LLMs); however, prevailing mean-based methods, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), suffer from entropy collapse and limited reasoning gains. We argue that these issues stem from overemphasizing high-probability output sequences while neglecting rare but informative reasoning paths. To address these challenges, we propose Risk-based Policy Optimization (RiskPO), which substitutes classical mean-based objectives with principled risk measures. Specifically, we introduce a Mixed Value-at-Risk objective that integrates weighted attention over multiple regions of the reward distribution, thereby amplifying gradient signals on challenging instances and preventing overconfident convergence. We further design a bundling scheme that aggregates multiple questions into bundles, thus enriching the feedback signal and yielding more stable and informative training dynamics. Theoretically, we prove that the risk-averse update alleviates entropy collapse and promotes exploration. Numerically, RiskPO achieves consistent and significant improvements in mathematical reasoning, multi-modal reasoning, and code generation benchmarks, surpassing GRPO and its variants on both Pass@1 and Pass@k metrics. Our results demonstrate that risk-based optimization provides a rigorous and effective paradigm for enhancing LLM reasoning capabilities.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

Large language models have made strong reasoning gains through supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and on-policy distillation, yet these post-training methods are usually evaluated only by final-answer accuracy. We study how they reshape confidence during reasoning. We introduce a three-stage calibration framework that evaluates confidence before, during, and after chain-of-thought generation, corresponding to difficulty estimation, early termination, and answer aggregation. Through a controlled comparison on mathematical reasoning benchmarks, we find that OPD provides the most useful pre-reasoning confidence, SFT gives the strongest online signal for early stopping, and RL produces the most reliable trace-level signal for aggregation. We further show that confidence reliability is position-dependent: RL confidence becomes informative after a path-commitment phase, while OPD confidence is useful early but can become inversely calibrated later. Based on this observation, we propose PosConf, a position-aware confidence strategy that uses confidence only from reliable relative-position intervals. PosConf improves RL answer aggregation by 6.1 points over majority voting and consistently improves OPD early stopping under tight token budgets, with gains up to 4.3 points by avoiding its later inverse-calibration region, showing that confidence in reasoning models should be used both stage-wise and position-awarely. Our code is available at https://github.com/EIT-NLP/Post-Training-Calibration.

LLMs are now embedded in a wide range of everyday scenarios. However, their inherent hallucinations risk hiding misinformation in fluent responses, raising concerns about overreliance on AI. Detecting overreliance is challenging, as it often arises in complex, dynamic contexts and cannot be easily captured by post-hoc task outcomes. In this work, we aim to investigate how users' behavioral patterns correlate with overreliance. We collected interaction logs from 77 participants working with an LLM injected plausible misinformation across three real-world tasks and we assessed overreliance by whether participants detected and corrected these errors. By semantically encoding and clustering segments of user interactions, we identified five behavioral patterns linked to overreliance: users with low overreliance show careful task comprehension and fine-grained navigation; users with high overreliance show frequent copy-paste, skipping initial comprehension, repeated LLM references, coarse locating, and accepting misinformation despite hesitation. We discuss design implications for mitigation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in high-stakes settings, where overconfident responses can mislead users. Reliable confidence estimation has been shown to enhance trust and task accuracy. Yet existing methods face practical barriers: logits are often hidden, multi-sampling is computationally expensive, and verbalized numerical uncertainty (e.g., giving a 0-100 score) deviates from natural communication. We revisit linguistic confidence (LC), where models express uncertainty through hedging language (e.g., probably, might), offering a lightweight and human-centered alternative. To advance this direction, we (1) release the first diverse, large-scale dataset of hedging expressions with human-annotated confidence scores, and (2) propose a lightweight mapper that converts hedges into confidence scores at near-zero cost. Building on these resources, we (3) conduct the first systematic study of LC across modern LLMs and QA benchmarks, revealing that while most LLMs underperform in expressing reliable LC, carefully designed prompting achieves competitive calibration and discriminability. Finally, we (4) introduce a fine-tuning framework that further improves LC reliability. Taken together, our work positions linguistic confidence as a scalable, efficient, and human-aligned approach to LLM uncertainty estimation, and calls for deeper exploration of this promising yet underexplored direction.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge. However, conflicts between parametric knowledge and retrieved context pose challenges, particularly when retrieved information is unreliable or the model's internal knowledge is outdated. In such cases, LLMs struggle to determine whether to rely more on their own parameters or the conflicted context. To address this, we propose **CK-PLUG**, a plug-and-play method for controlling LLMs' reliance on parametric and contextual knowledge. We introduce a novel knowledge consistency metric, Confidence Gain, which detects knowledge conflicts by measuring entropy shifts in token probability distributions after context insertion. CK-PLUG then enables fine-grained control over knowledge preference by adjusting the probability distribution of tokens with negative confidence gain through a single tuning parameter. Experiments demonstrate CK-PLUG's ability to significantly regulate knowledge reliance in counterfactual RAG scenarios while maintaining generation fluency and knowledge accuracy. For instance, on Llama3-8B, memory recall (MR) of RAG response can be adjusted within a broad range (9.9%-71.9%), compared to the baseline of 42.1%. Moreover, CK-PLUG supports adaptive control based on the model's confidence in both internal and external knowledge, achieving consistent performance improvements across various general RAG tasks. Our code is available at: https://github.com/byronBBL/CK-PLUG{this https URL}.

As Test-Time Scaling emerges as an active research focus in the large language model community, advanced post-training methods increasingly emphasize extending chain-of-thought (CoT) generation length, thereby enhancing reasoning capabilities to approach Deepseek R1-like reasoning models. However, recent studies reveal that reasoning models (even Qwen3) consistently exhibit excessive thought redundancy in CoT generation. This overthinking issue arises from the inherent limitations of conventional outcome-reward reinforcement learning, which systematically overlooks the regulation of intermediate reasoning processes. This paper introduces Serial-Group Decaying-Reward Policy Optimization (S-GRPO), a novel reinforcement learning paradigm that enables models to implicitly evaluate the sufficiency of intermediate reasoning steps, thereby facilitating early exit in CoT generation. Unlike GRPO, which samples multiple possible reasoning paths in parallel (parallel group), S-GRPO only samples one reasoning path and serially selects multiple temporal positions from the path to exit thinking and directly generate answers (serial group). For correct answers within a serial group, rewards gradually decrease based on the exit positions along the reasoning path from front to back. This design encourages the model to produce more accurate and concise thoughts, while also incentivizing early thinking termination when appropriate. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that S-GRPO is compatible with state-of-the-art reasoning models, including Qwen3 and Deepseek-distill. Across diverse benchmarks such as GSM8K, AIME 2024, AMC 2023, MATH-500, and GPQA Diamond, S-GRPO achieves a substantial reduction in sequence length (35.4% - 61.1%) while simultaneously improving accuracy (absolute 0.72% - 6.08%).

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Large reasoning models achieve strong performance on complex tasks by generating extended chains of thought, but they often "overthink": continuing to reason long after they have enough information to answer correctly. This wastes inference-time compute and can hurt accuracy. Existing attempts to stop early either manipulate decoding with extra sampling and heuristics, rely on auxiliary verifier models, or operate only as post-hoc analysis pipelines without formal guarantees. We introduce LYNX, an online early-exit mechanism that turns a model's own hidden-state awareness into confidence-controlled stopping decisions. LYNX attaches exit decisions to naturally occurring reasoning cues (e.g., "hmm", "wait") during generation, trains a lightweight probe on hidden states at those cue tokens using supervision from forced exits, and wraps the resulting scores in split conformal prediction to obtain distribution-free control over premature exits. Crucially, we train and calibrate this probe once on a generic mathematical corpus and reuse it unchanged across benchmarks, decoding temperatures, and even non-mathematical tasks. Across three model families spanning 1.5B to 32B parameters, a single mathematically trained probe per base model yields strong accuracy--efficiency tradeoffs. On GSM8K, LYNX matches or improves baseline accuracy while reducing tokens by 40--65\%; on MATH-500 it improves accuracy by up to 12 points with roughly 35--60\% fewer tokens; on AIME 2024 it recovers baseline accuracy with more than 50\% token savings; and on CommonsenseQA, a non-math benchmark, it transfers zero-shot with modest accuracy gains and up to 70\% fewer tokens. Compared to state-of-the-art early-exit methods, LYNX offers competitive or superior Pareto frontiers while remaining fully online, requiring no proxy models at inference, and providing explicit, user-tunable confidence guarantees.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) perform strongly in complex reasoning tasks via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, but often suffer from verbose outputs caused by redundant content, increasing computational overhead, and degrading user experience. Existing compression methods either operate post-hoc pruning, risking disruption to reasoning coherence, or rely on sampling-based selection, which fails to intervene effectively during generation. In this work, we introduce a confidence-guided perspective to explain the emergence of redundant reflection in LRMs, identifying two key patterns: Confidence Deficit, where the model reconsiders correct steps due to low internal confidence, and Termination Delay, where reasoning continues even after reaching a confident answer. Based on this analysis, we propose ConCISE (Confidence-guided Compression In Step-by-step Efficient Reasoning), a framework that simplifies reasoning chains by reinforcing the model's confidence during inference, thus preventing the generation of redundant reflection steps. It integrates Confidence Injection to stabilize intermediate steps and Early Stopping to terminate reasoning when confidence is sufficient. Extensive experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning LRMs on ConCISE-generated data yields significantly shorter outputs, reducing length by up to approximately 50% under SimPO, while maintaining high task accuracy. ConCISE consistently outperforms existing baselines across multiple reasoning benchmarks.

Large language models are meticulously aligned to be both helpful and harmless. However, recent research points to a potential overkill which means models may refuse to answer benign queries. In this paper, we investigate the factors for overkill by exploring how models handle and determine the safety of queries. Our findings reveal the presence of shortcuts within models, leading to an over-attention of harmful words like 'kill' and prompts emphasizing safety will exacerbate overkill. Based on these insights, we introduce Self-Contrastive Decoding (Self-CD), a training-free and model-agnostic strategy, to alleviate this phenomenon. We first extract such over-attention by amplifying the difference in the model's output distributions when responding to system prompts that either include or omit an emphasis on safety. Then we determine the final next-token predictions by downplaying the over-attention from the model via contrastive decoding. Empirical results indicate that our method has achieved an average reduction of the refusal rate by 20\% while having almost no impact on safety.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

LLM-as-a-judge enables evaluation across diverse tasks, but inference cost and confidence reliability become critical at scale. We study whether a decision-only judge can provide an economical first pass and identify when stronger evaluation is needed. Comparing jev-as-a-judge with sixteen generative and reward-model judges, with blinded human adjudication, we find it within three percentage points of a state-of-the-art LLM judge, our strongest comparator, on ordinary preference and evidence-grounded factuality at 0.36% of the comparator's fee. Larger gaps arise when judgments require checking a derivation or resisting an elaborately written wrong answer. On several benchmarks, JEV's gap to this comparator is concentrated in low-confidence decisions. A frozen cascade that accepts confident verdicts and escalates uncertain ones retains 99% of the comparator's accuracy at lower cost.

LLM-based multi-agent systems demonstrate great potential for tackling complex problems, but how competition shapes their behavior remains underexplored. This paper investigates the over-competition in multi-agent debate, where agents under extreme pressure exhibit unreliable, harmful behaviors that undermine both collaboration and task performance. To study this phenomenon, we propose HATE, the Hunger Game Debate, a novel experimental framework that simulates debates under a zero-sum competition arena. Our experiments, conducted across a range of LLMs and tasks, reveal that competitive pressure significantly stimulates over-competition behaviors and degrades task performance, causing discussions to derail. We further explore the impact of environmental feedback by adding variants of judges, indicating that objective, task-focused feedback effectively mitigates the over-competition behaviors. We also probe the post-hoc kindness of LLMs and form a leaderboard to characterize top LLMs, providing insights for understanding and governing the emergent social dynamics of AI community.

Large Language Model (LLM) assistants routinely decide whether they can trust users and third parties whose competence, intentions, and integrity they cannot verify. This uncertainty matters for safety, as trusting the wrong party can lead an agent to comply with harmful requests or act on malicious instructions encountered during tool use. To study this problem, we define trust as an assistant's willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of another party and ask whether such behavior can be causally controlled through model activations. We build 2,000 contrastive conversations spanning ability, benevolence, and integrity, where paired responses complete the same request but differ in whether the assistant trusts the user. From these pairs, we learn steering matrices while keeping the model parameters frozen and test them across six instruction-tuned models from three families, finding that steering changes trust decisions monotonically in both directions. We then ask whether this effect extends to several safety-related agent settings involving harmful requests, prompt injections, and insider threats, while using benign-task and reasoning as controls. Our findings provide evidence that trust in the user can be causally controlled along linear directions in model activations and provide a way to study how trust shapes safety-relevant behavior in language models.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

The reflection capacity of Large Language Model (LLM) has garnered extensive attention. A post-hoc prompting strategy, e.g., reflexion and self-refine, refines LLM's response based on self-evaluated or external feedback. However, recent research indicates without external feedback, LLM's intrinsic reflection is unstable. Our investigation unveils that the key bottleneck is the quality of the self-evaluated feedback. We find LLMs often exhibit overconfidence or high randomness when self-evaluate, offering stubborn or inconsistent feedback, which causes poor reflection. To remedy this, we advocate Self-Contrast: It adaptively explores diverse solving perspectives tailored to the request, contrasts the differences, and summarizes these discrepancies into a checklist which could be used to re-examine and eliminate discrepancies. Our method endows LLM with diverse perspectives to alleviate stubborn biases. Moreover, their discrepancies indicate potential errors or inherent uncertainties that LLM often overlooks. Reflecting upon these can catalyze more accurate and stable reflection. Experiments conducted on a series of reasoning and translation tasks with different LLMs serve to underscore the effectiveness and generality of our strategy.

Off-policy actor-critic methods in reinforcement learning train a critic with temporal-difference updates and use it as a learning signal for the policy (actor). This design typically achieves higher sample efficiency than purely on-policy methods. However, critic networks tend to overestimate value estimates systematically. This is often addressed by introducing a pessimistic bias based on uncertainty estimates. Current methods employ ensembling to quantify the critic's epistemic uncertainty-uncertainty due to limited data and model ambiguity-to scale pessimistic updates. In this work, we propose a new algorithm called Stochastic Actor-Critic (STAC) that incorporates temporal (one-step) aleatoric uncertainty-uncertainty arising from stochastic transitions, rewards, and policy-induced variability in Bellman targets-to scale pessimistic bias in temporal-difference updates, rather than relying on epistemic uncertainty. STAC uses a single distributional critic network to model the temporal return uncertainty, and applies dropout to both the critic and actor networks for regularization. Our results show that pessimism based on a distributional critic alone suffices to mitigate overestimation, and naturally leads to risk-averse behavior in stochastic environments. Introducing dropout further improves training stability and performance by means of regularization. With this design, STAC achieves improved computational efficiency using a single distributional critic network.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Large language models are characterized by three key properties: capability, alignment, and faithfulness. Prior work studies the tradeoffs between capability and alignment, and between capability and faithfulness, but a third tension remains underexplored: the alignment-faithfulness conflict. We show that aligned models systematically deviate from their inputs on unsafe or sensitive content without disclosing the modification, a failure mode we call alignment-induced unfaithfulness (AIU). Unlike capability-driven unfaithfulness, which comes from errors in knowledge or reasoning, this is induced by post-training mechanisms that override adherence to the input. We introduce FaithConflict, a controlled dataset isolating both conflicts, and two complementary taxonomies: behavioral (B1-B8) and chain-of-thought reasoning (C0-C6). Across models, AIU increases with scale and more sharply than capability-driven unfaithfulness, a reverse scaling law; intermediate checkpoints show it is amplified during post-training, with DPO the stage at which the gap both grows most and becomes least visible. Prompting-based mitigation does not resolve it, revealing a capability-alignment-faithfulness trilemma in the design and evaluation of LLMs.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Accurate estimation of uncertainty in deep learning is critical for deploying models in high-stakes domains such as medical diagnosis and autonomous decision-making, where overconfident predictions can lead to harmful outcomes. In practice, understanding the reason behind a model's uncertainty and the type of uncertainty it represents can support risk-aware decisions, enhance user trust, and guide additional data collection. However, many existing methods only address a single type of uncertainty or require modifications and retraining of the base model, making them difficult to adopt in real-world systems. We introduce CUPID (Comprehensive Uncertainty Plug-in estImation moDel), a general-purpose module that jointly estimates aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty without modifying or retraining the base model. CUPID can be flexibly inserted into any layer of a pretrained network. It models aleatoric uncertainty through a learned Bayesian identity mapping and captures epistemic uncertainty by analyzing the model's internal responses to structured perturbations. We evaluate CUPID across a range of tasks, including classification, regression, and out-of-distribution detection. The results show that it consistently delivers competitive performance while offering layer-wise insights into the origins of uncertainty. By making uncertainty estimation modular, interpretable, and model-agnostic, CUPID supports more transparent and trustworthy AI. Related code and data are available at https://github.com/a-Fomalhaut-a/CUPID.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Confidence in LLMs is a useful indicator of model uncertainty and answer reliability. Existing work mainly focused on single-turn scenarios, while research on confidence in complex multi-turn interactions is limited. In this paper, we investigate whether LLM-based search agents have the ability to communicate their own confidence through verbalized confidence scores after long sequences of actions, a significantly more challenging task compared to outputting confidence in a single interaction. Experimenting on open-source agentic models, we first find that models exhibit much higher task accuracy at high confidence while having near-zero accuracy when confidence is low. Based on this observation, we propose Test-Time Scaling (TTS) methods that use confidence scores to determine answer quality, encourage the model to try again until reaching a satisfactory confidence level. Results show that our proposed methods significantly reduce token consumption while demonstrating competitive performance compared to baseline fixed budget TTS methods.

Scaling the test-time compute of large language models has demonstrated impressive performance on reasoning benchmarks. However, existing evaluations of test-time scaling make the strong assumption that a reasoning system should always give an answer to any question provided. This overlooks concerns about whether a model is confident in its answer, and whether it is appropriate to always provide a response. To address these concerns, we extract confidence scores during reasoning for thresholding model responses. We find that increasing compute budget at inference time not only helps models answer more questions correctly, but also increases confidence in correct responses. We then extend the current paradigm of zero-risk responses during evaluation by considering settings with non-zero levels of response risk, and suggest a recipe for reporting evaluations under these settings.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on several tasks and are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. However, especially in high-stakes settings, it becomes vital to know when the output of an LLM may be unreliable. Depending on whether an answer is trustworthy, a system can then choose to route the question to another expert, or otherwise fall back on a safe default behavior. In this work, we study the extent to which LLMs can reliably indicate confidence in their answers, and how this notion of confidence can translate into downstream accuracy gains. We propose Self-REF, a lightweight training strategy to teach LLMs to express confidence in whether their answers are correct in a reliable manner. Self-REF introduces confidence tokens into the LLM, from which a confidence score can be extracted. Compared to conventional approaches such as verbalizing confidence and examining token probabilities, we demonstrate empirically that confidence tokens show significant improvements in downstream routing and rejection learning tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

For large language models (LLMs) to be trusted by humans they need to be well-calibrated in the sense that they can accurately assess and communicate how likely it is that their predictions are correct. Recent work has focused on the quality of internal LLM confidence assessments, but the question remains of how well LLMs can communicate this internal model confidence to human users. This paper explores the disparity between external human confidence in an LLM's responses and the internal confidence of the model. Through experiments involving multiple-choice questions, we systematically examine human users' ability to discern the reliability of LLM outputs. Our study focuses on two key areas: (1) assessing users' perception of true LLM confidence and (2) investigating the impact of tailored explanations on this perception. The research highlights that default explanations from LLMs often lead to user overestimation of both the model's confidence and its' accuracy. By modifying the explanations to more accurately reflect the LLM's internal confidence, we observe a significant shift in user perception, aligning it more closely with the model's actual confidence levels. This adjustment in explanatory approach demonstrates potential for enhancing user trust and accuracy in assessing LLM outputs. The findings underscore the importance of transparent communication of confidence levels in LLMs, particularly in high-stakes applications where understanding the reliability of AI-generated information is essential.

Medical vision-language models (VLMs) require confidence that reflects both answer correctness and patient-specific visual evidence. Recent GRPO-based methods optimize verbalized confidence together with answer generation. However, this joint optimization may interfere with answer learning and drive confidence toward near-binary values. Verbalized confidence also provides no explicit assessment of visual support. We therefore separate capability learning from confidence estimation and propose DualRead. DualRead builds on the insight that reliability can be read from the actor's internal states at critical moments in the answering process. It freezes the GRPO-trained actor and combines pre-answer solvability with a post-answer assessment of the generated answer and its visual support. To further assess whether confidence reflects visual grounding, we introduce Counterfactual Confidence Grounding AUC (CCG-AUC). It measures whether confidence decreases when real-image substitution changes the actor from correct to incorrect. Across two VLM backbones and both in- and out-of-distribution medical VQA benchmarks, DualRead improves correctness discrimination and calibration over verbalized confidence while preserving answer accuracy. CCG-AUC reveals whether confidence responds to answer-relevant visual evidence rather than primarily to non-visual cues.

In this work, we study a critical research problem regarding the trustworthiness of large language models (LLMs): how LLMs behave when encountering ambiguous narrative text, with a particular focus on Chinese textual ambiguity. We created a benchmark dataset by collecting and generating ambiguous sentences with context and their corresponding disambiguated pairs, representing multiple possible interpretations. These annotated examples are systematically categorized into 3 main categories and 9 subcategories. Through experiments, we discovered significant fragility in LLMs when handling ambiguity, revealing behavior that differs substantially from humans. Specifically, LLMs cannot reliably distinguish ambiguous text from unambiguous text, show overconfidence in interpreting ambiguous text as having a single meaning rather than multiple meanings, and exhibit overthinking when attempting to understand the various possible meanings. Our findings highlight a fundamental limitation in current LLMs that has significant implications for their deployment in real-world applications where linguistic ambiguity is common, calling for improved approaches to handle uncertainty in language understanding. The dataset and code are publicly available at this GitHub repository: https://github.com/ictup/LLM-Chinese-Textual-Disambiguation.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

An ordinary-looking background detail can turn a correct model decision into a confident mistake. We demonstrate this fragility in four decision systems, including Jev, across seven datasets covering knowledge, reasoning, and tool routing. Within 64 accepted target evaluations per decision, we uncover short context additions that redirect 61.4%-73.2% of each system's initially correct decisions toward a wrong option fixed in advance. The additions supply background or procedural information rather than explicit answer-selection instructions, leaving the original question and choices intact. We construct them through probability-guided context optimization, which uses shifts in the option distribution to refine surrounding text under naturalness and answer-preservation constraints. Redirection affects initially confident decisions, often produces high-confidence wrong choices, and transfers across models. In blinded human evaluation, 91.6% of 250 sampled successful contexts are judged natural, answer-preserving, and free of decisive answer-changing evidence by a majority of three independent annotators. These findings expose a weakness in current decision models: context that looks entirely compatible with an input can redirect the choices that agents, routers, and evaluators rely on.

Expressing confidence is challenging for embodied agents navigating dynamic multimodal environments, where uncertainty arises from both perception and decision-making processes. We present the first work investigating embodied confidence elicitation in open-ended multimodal environments. We introduce Elicitation Policies, which structure confidence assessment across inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning, along with Execution Policies, which enhance confidence calibration through scenario reinterpretation, action sampling, and hypothetical reasoning. Evaluating agents in calibration and failure prediction tasks within the Minecraft environment, we show that structured reasoning approaches, such as Chain-of-Thoughts, improve confidence calibration. However, our findings also reveal persistent challenges in distinguishing uncertainty, particularly under abductive settings, underscoring the need for more sophisticated embodied confidence elicitation methods.

Reward models trained on human preference data have been proven to be effective for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human intent within the reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) framework. However, the generalization capabilities of current reward models to unseen prompts and responses are limited. This limitation can lead to an unexpected phenomenon known as reward over-optimization, where excessive optimization of rewards results in a decline in actual performance. While previous research has advocated for constraining policy optimization, our study proposes a novel approach to enhance the reward model's generalization ability against distribution shifts by regularizing the hidden states. Specifically, we retain the base model's language model head and incorporate a suite of text-generation losses to preserve the hidden states' text generation capabilities, while concurrently learning a reward head behind the same hidden states. Our experimental results demonstrate that the introduced regularization technique markedly improves the accuracy of learned reward models across a variety of out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks and effectively alleviate the over-optimization issue in RLHF, offering a more reliable and robust preference learning paradigm.

Recently, GRPO-based reinforcement learning has shown remarkable progress in optimizing flow-matching models, effectively improving their alignment with task-specific rewards. Within these frameworks, the policy update relies on importance-ratio clipping to constrain overconfident positive and negative gradients. However, in practice, we observe a systematic shift in the importance-ratio distribution-its mean falls below 1 and its variance differs substantially across timesteps. This left-shifted and inconsistent distribution prevents positive-advantage samples from entering the clipped region, causing the mechanism to fail in constraining overconfident positive updates. As a result, the policy model inevitably enters an implicit over-optimization stage-while the proxy reward continues to increase, essential metrics such as image quality and text-prompt alignment deteriorate sharply, ultimately making the learned policy impractical for real-world use. To address this issue, we introduce GRPO-Guard, a simple yet effective enhancement to existing GRPO frameworks. Our method incorporates ratio normalization, which restores a balanced and step-consistent importance ratio, ensuring that PPO clipping properly constrains harmful updates across denoising timesteps. In addition, a gradient reweighting strategy equalizes policy gradients over noise conditions, preventing excessive updates from particular timestep regions. Together, these designs act as a regulated clipping mechanism, stabilizing optimization and substantially mitigating implicit over-optimization without relying on heavy KL regularization. Extensive experiments on multiple diffusion backbones (e.g., SD3.5M, Flux.1-dev) and diverse proxy tasks demonstrate that GRPO-Guard significantly reduces over-optimization while maintaining or even improving generation quality.

While confidence estimation is a promising direction for mitigating hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs), current research dominantly focuses on single-turn settings. The dynamics of model confidence in multi-turn conversations, where context accumulates and ambiguity is progressively resolved, remain largely unexplored. Reliable confidence estimation in multi-turn settings is critical for many downstream applications, such as autonomous agents and human-in-the-loop systems. This work presents the first systematic study of confidence estimation in multi-turn interactions, establishing a formal evaluation framework grounded in two key desiderata: per-turn calibration and monotonicity of confidence as more information becomes available. To facilitate this, we introduce novel metrics, including a length-normalized Expected Calibration Error (InfoECE), and a new "Hinter-Guesser" paradigm for generating controlled evaluation datasets. Our experiments reveal that widely-used confidence techniques struggle with calibration and monotonicity in multi-turn dialogues. We propose P(Sufficient), a logit-based probe that achieves comparatively better performance, although the task remains far from solved. Our work provides a foundational methodology for developing more reliable and trustworthy conversational agents.

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) highlights the power of scaling test-time compute to achieve strong performance on complex tasks, such as mathematical reasoning and code generation. This raises a critical question: how should model training be modified to optimize performance under a subsequent test-time compute strategy and budget? To explore this, we focus on pass@N, a simple test-time strategy that searches for a correct answer in N independent samples. We show, surprisingly, that training with cross-entropy (CE) loss can be {it misaligned} with pass@N in that pass@N accuracy {it decreases} with longer training. We explain the origins of this misalignment in terms of model overconfidence induced by CE, and experimentally verify our prediction of overconfidence as an impediment to scaling test-time compute via pass@N. Furthermore we suggest a principled, modified training loss that is better aligned to pass@N by limiting model confidence and rescuing pass@N test performance. Our algorithm demonstrates improved mathematical reasoning on MATH and MiniF2F benchmarks under several scenarios: (1) providing answers to math questions; and (2) proving theorems by searching over proof trees of varying shapes. Overall our work underscores the importance of co-designing two traditionally separate phases of LLM development: training-time protocols and test-time search and reasoning strategies.

Conventional wisdom suggests that neural network predictions tend to be unpredictable and overconfident when faced with out-of-distribution (OOD) inputs. Our work reassesses this assumption for neural networks with high-dimensional inputs. Rather than extrapolating in arbitrary ways, we observe that neural network predictions often tend towards a constant value as input data becomes increasingly OOD. Moreover, we find that this value often closely approximates the optimal constant solution (OCS), i.e., the prediction that minimizes the average loss over the training data without observing the input. We present results showing this phenomenon across 8 datasets with different distributional shifts (including CIFAR10-C and ImageNet-R, S), different loss functions (cross entropy, MSE, and Gaussian NLL), and different architectures (CNNs and transformers). Furthermore, we present an explanation for this behavior, which we first validate empirically and then study theoretically in a simplified setting involving deep homogeneous networks with ReLU activations. Finally, we show how one can leverage our insights in practice to enable risk-sensitive decision-making in the presence of OOD inputs.

LLMs are increasingly used for personal advice on relationships, work, moral dilemmas, and crises. Post-training selects a stable, prosocial Assistant persona, but good advice requires more than a good default character: a skilled advisor comforts someone in crisis, challenges someone in denial, and stays procedural with a logistical question. We formalize advice-giving as situation-conditioned persona selection in a space defined by hedonic tone and agency support, and call failures of this mapping "persona collapse" (the compression of diverse situations into a single default persona). Across 1,281 advice posts spanning 14 contexts, top-rated human responses shift systematically across five personas, while three frontier models collapse over 90\% of responses into a single supportive persona regardless of context. Prompting the model to first pick a fitting persona only deepens the collapse. We then ask whether the collapse can be repaired. Our method, Inverse-Process Distillation, reconstructs the situational reading that could have produced each human response and trains on the result, aiming to distill the situation-to-persona policy rather than the answers. It cuts divergence from the human persona distribution by approximately 80\%. Yet in a blinded study, 199 experienced advice-givers rating responses across four situations in sequence prefer the collapsed default over every repaired model, most strongly when the situation calls for challenge, though this preference shifts with repeated exposures.