Daily Papers

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

In-context learning enables transformers to adapt to new tasks from a few examples at inference time, while grokking highlights that this generalization can emerge abruptly only after prolonged training. We study task generalization and grokking in in-context learning using a Bayesian perspective, asking what enables the delayed transition from memorization to generalization. Concretely, we consider modular arithmetic tasks in which a transformer must infer a latent linear function solely from in-context examples and analyze how predictive uncertainty evolves during training. We combine approximate Bayesian techniques to estimate the posterior distribution and we study how uncertainty behaves across training and under changes in task diversity, context length, and context noise. We find that epistemic uncertainty collapses sharply when the model groks, making uncertainty a practical label-free diagnostic of generalization in transformers. Additionally, we provide theoretical support with a simplified Bayesian linear model, showing that asymptotically both delayed generalization and uncertainty peaks arise from the same underlying spectral mechanism, which links grokking time to uncertainty dynamics.

Large language models (LLMs) tend to generate lexically, semantically, and stylistically homogenous texts. This poses a risk of knowledge collapse, where homogenous LLMs mediate a shrinking in the range of accessible information over time. Existing works on homogenization are limited by a focus on closed-ended multiple-choice setups or fuzzy semantic features, and do not look at trends across time and cultural contexts. To overcome this, we present a new methodology to measure epistemic diversity, i.e., variation in real-world claims in LLM outputs, which we use to perform a broad empirical study of LLM knowledge collapse. We test 27 LLMs, 155 topics covering 12 countries, and 200 prompt variations sourced from real user chats. For the topics in our study, we show that while newer models tend to generate more diverse claims, nearly all models are less epistemically diverse than a basic web search. We find that model size has a negative impact on epistemic diversity, while retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has a positive impact, though the improvement from RAG varies by the cultural context. Finally, compared to a traditional knowledge source (Wikipedia), we find that country-specific claims reflect the English language more than the local one, highlighting a gap in epistemic representation

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are predominantly governed by probabilistic frameworks in which the sum of outcome probabilities is constrained to unity. This architectural limitation, often imposed by Softmax layers, leads to a collapse of uncertainty that makes it difficult to differentiate between epistemic uncertainty, paradox, and vagueness. We present an empirical investigation of the application of Neutrosophic Logic, a framework that treats Truth (T), Indeterminacy (I), and Falsity (F) as three independent dimensions, to model epistemic states in LLMs. We conducted experiments on a family of four OpenAI GPT models across five linguistic phenomena: logical paradoxes, epistemic ignorance, vagueness, ethical contradictions, and future contingencies, under three prompting strategies: neutrosophic, probabilistic, and entropy-derived. Our findings reveal that the neutrosophic approach, by allowing T+I+F > 1, a state we term hyper-truth, provides a richer representation of a model's internal state. In 35% of evaluations, hyper-truth emerged spontaneously, predominantly under ethical contradiction and logical paradox. We demonstrate that this approach preserves truth values in fuzzy contexts and offers a robust method for identifying and quantifying internal model conflict. We conclude that the integration of neutrosophic evaluation layers is a critical step toward more transparent, reliable, and ethically aware AI systems.

Local prediction-error-based curiosity rewards focus on the current transition without considering the world model's cumulative prediction error across all visited transitions. We introduce Curiosity-Critic, which grounds its intrinsic reward in the improvement of this cumulative objective, and show that it reduces to a tractable per-step form: the difference between the current prediction error and the asymptotic error baseline of the current state transition. We estimate this baseline online with a learned critic co-trained alongside the world model; regressing a single scalar, the critic converges well before the world model saturates, redirecting exploration toward learnable transitions without oracle knowledge of the noise floor. The reward is higher for learnable transitions and collapses toward the baseline for stochastic ones, effectively separating epistemic (reducible) from aleatoric (irreducible) prediction error online. Prior prediction-error curiosity formulations, from Schmidhuber (1991) to learned-feature-space variants, emerge as special cases corresponding to specific approximations of this baseline. Experiments on a stochastic grid world show that Curiosity-Critic outperforms prediction-error and visitation-count baselines in convergence speed and final world model accuracy.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

Although pre-trained Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models exhibit impressive generalization in robotic manipulation, post-training remains crucial to ensure reliable performance during deployment. However, standard offline Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) suffers from distribution shifts and catastrophic forgetting of pre-trained capabilities, while online Reinforcement Learning (RL) struggles with sparse rewards and poor sample efficiency. In this paper, we propose On-Policy VLA Distillation (VLA-OPD), a framework bridging the efficiency of SFT with the robustness of RL. Instead of relying on sparse environmental rewards, VLA-OPD leverages an expert teacher to provide dense, token-level supervision on the student's self-generated trajectories. This enables active error correction on policy-induced states while preserving pre-trained general capabilities through gentle alignment. Crucially, we formulate VLA-OPD via a Reverse-KL objective. Unlike standard Forward-KL that induces mode-covering entropy explosion, or Hard-CE that causes premature entropy collapse, our bounded mode-seeking objective ensures stable policy learning by filtering out the teacher's epistemic uncertainty while maintaining action diversity. Experiments on LIBERO and RoboTwin2.0 benchmarks demonstrate that VLA-OPD significantly improves sample efficiency over RL and robustness over SFT, while effectively mitigating catastrophic forgetting during post-training.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

AI systems can now cheaply generate plausible scientific artifacts such as papers, reviews, and surveys. This creates a risk of epistemic pollution in our scientific systems, where unreliable but plausible-looking artifacts can accumulate faster than the system can filter them out. The problem is structural: the epistemic infrastructure of science was calibrated to a world where producing a plausible artifact required substantial expertise, labor, and time, so generation cost itself served as a rough filter; AI weakens that filter without comparably lowering verification cost. We argue that AI-era science should treat this as an engineering problem: redesigning epistemic infrastructure to rebalance the costs of generation and verification. The current paper-centered system makes verification expensive: papers compress long-context scientific logic into prose, forcing reviewers, human or AI, to reconstruct underlying argument structure before they can evaluate it. As one step in this direction, we propose blueprints as preliminary epistemic infrastructure: structured, decomposed research artifacts that represent claims, evidence, assumptions, and definitions as typed graph components. Blueprints are designed to trade an upfront generation cost for cheaper, more local, more distributed verification downstream. We have instantiated the proposal in a proof-of-concept prototype.

Silicon samples are increasingly used as a low-cost substitute for human panels and have been shown to reproduce aggregate human opinion with high fidelity. We show that, in the alignment-relevant domain of philosophy, silicon samples systematically collapse heterogeneity. Using data from N = {277} professional philosophers drawn from PhilPeople profiles, we evaluate seven proprietary and open-source large language models on their ability to replicate individual philosophical positions and to preserve cross-question correlation structures across philosophical domains. We find that language models substantially over-correlate philosophical judgments, producing artificial consensus across domains. This collapse is associated in part with specialist effects, whereby models implicitly assume that domain specialists hold highly similar philosophical views. We assess the robustness of these findings by studying the impact of DPO fine-tuning and by validating results against the full PhilPapers 2020 Survey (N = {1785}). We conclude by discussing implications for alignment, evaluation, and the use of silicon samples as substitutes for human judgment. The code of this project can be found at https://github.com/stanford-del/silicon-philosophers.

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) frequently suffer from posterior collapse, a failure mode in which the approximate posterior converges to the prior, rendering the latent code uninformative. Despite extensive research, a unified account of why collapse occurs has remained an open question. We identify and formalize two logically independent but coupled causes. Gradient imbalance occurs when the decoder's reconstruction signal vanishes faster than the KL regularization pressure as the posterior widens. Information gap occurs when the stochastic sampling step discards a substantial fraction of the encoder's computed representation, attenuating decoder sensitivity and making collapse inexpensive. Both causes share the same collapse trajectory, and we show that the information gap is algebraically equivalent to mismatch between the aggregate posterior and the prior, unifying two pathologies. Subsequently, we introduce λ-VAE, which resolves both causes through a single modification to the reparameterization step: the sampling noise is scaled by per-dimension exponent, while the KL penalty retains the original posterior variance. This asymmetry shifts the stable training attractor away from the degenerate collapsed state, driving all latent dimensions toward the same equilibrium -- a mechanism we term variance equalization. A closed-form optimal exponent per dimension follows from a net information gain objective, with a single hyperparameter controlling the reconstruction-generation tradeoff. We validate on standard benchmarks (Binary MNIST, Binary Omniglot, CIFAR-10, CelebA-64), showing consistent reductions in collapsed dimensions, information capacity gains of up to 2.8times nats, and reconstruction quality improvements of up to +0.33 BPD.

There are two major types of uncertainty one can model. Aleatoric uncertainty captures noise inherent in the observations. On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty accounts for uncertainty in the model -- uncertainty which can be explained away given enough data. Traditionally it has been difficult to model epistemic uncertainty in computer vision, but with new Bayesian deep learning tools this is now possible. We study the benefits of modeling epistemic vs. aleatoric uncertainty in Bayesian deep learning models for vision tasks. For this we present a Bayesian deep learning framework combining input-dependent aleatoric uncertainty together with epistemic uncertainty. We study models under the framework with per-pixel semantic segmentation and depth regression tasks. Further, our explicit uncertainty formulation leads to new loss functions for these tasks, which can be interpreted as learned attenuation. This makes the loss more robust to noisy data, also giving new state-of-the-art results on segmentation and depth regression benchmarks.

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

RL training of multi-turn LLM agents is inherently unstable, and reasoning quality directly determines task performance. Entropy is widely used to track reasoning stability. However, entropy only measures diversity within the same input, and cannot tell whether reasoning actually responds to different inputs. In RAGEN-2, we find that even with stable entropy, models can rely on fixed templates that look diverse but are input-agnostic. We call this template collapse, a failure mode invisible to entropy and all existing metrics. To diagnose this failure, we decompose reasoning quality into within-input diversity (Entropy) and cross-input distinguishability (Mutual Information, MI), and introduce a family of mutual information proxies for online diagnosis. Across diverse tasks, mutual information correlates with final performance much more strongly than entropy, making it a more reliable proxy for reasoning quality. We further explain template collapse with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) mechanism. Low reward variance weakens task gradients, letting regularization terms dominate and erase cross-input reasoning differences. To address this, we propose SNR-Aware Filtering to select high-signal prompts per iteration using reward variance as a lightweight proxy. Across planning, math reasoning, web navigation, and code execution, the method consistently improves both input dependence and task performance.

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

Can we learn more from data than existed in the generating process itself? Can new and useful information be constructed from merely applying deterministic transformations to existing data? Can the learnable content in data be evaluated without considering a downstream task? On these questions, Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity come up nearly empty-handed, in part because they assume observers with unlimited computational capacity and fail to target the useful information content. In this work, we identify and exemplify three seeming paradoxes in information theory: (1) information cannot be increased by deterministic transformations; (2) information is independent of the order of data; (3) likelihood modeling is merely distribution matching. To shed light on the tension between these results and modern practice, and to quantify the value of data, we introduce epiplexity, a formalization of information capturing what computationally bounded observers can learn from data. Epiplexity captures the structural content in data while excluding time-bounded entropy, the random unpredictable content exemplified by pseudorandom number generators and chaotic dynamical systems. With these concepts, we demonstrate how information can be created with computation, how it depends on the ordering of the data, and how likelihood modeling can produce more complex programs than present in the data generating process itself. We also present practical procedures to estimate epiplexity which we show capture differences across data sources, track with downstream performance, and highlight dataset interventions that improve out-of-distribution generalization. In contrast to principles of model selection, epiplexity provides a theoretical foundation for data selection, guiding how to select, generate, or transform data for learning systems.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in dynamic social dilemmas commonly relies on parameter sharing to enable scalability. We show that in shared-policy Deep Q-Network learning, standard exploration can induce a robust and systematic collapse of cooperation even in environments where fully cooperative equilibria are stable and payoff dominant. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate that shared DQN converges to stable but persistently low-cooperation regimes. This collapse is not caused by reward misalignment, noise, or insufficient training, but by a representational failure arising from partial observability combined with parameter coupling across heterogeneous agent states. Exploration-driven updates bias the shared representation toward locally dominant defection responses, which then propagate across agents and suppress cooperative learning. We confirm that the failure persists across network sizes, exploration schedules, and payoff structures, and disappears when parameter sharing is removed or when agents maintain independent representations. These results identify a fundamental failure mode of shared-policy MARL and establish structural conditions under which scalable learning architectures can systematically undermine cooperation. Our findings provide concrete guidance for the design of multi-agent learning systems in social and economic environments where collective behavior is critical.

We introduce ProofGrid, a benchmark suite for evaluating LLM reasoning through machine-checkable proofs rather than final answers alone. ProofGrid contains 15 tasks spanning proof writing, proof checking, proof masking, and proof gap-filling. Tasks are expressed in minimal formal notation, especially NDL, a compact natural-deduction language that fits in short prompts and supports precise, auditable verification. This yields mechanical, reproducible, and fine-grained evaluation rather than judgments by humans or LLMs. ProofGrid covers a calibrated difficulty spectrum, from foundational reasoning tests to structurally rich challenge tasks that no current model solves, while minimizing reliance on domain knowledge, solver delegation, and long-context artifacts. We also develop a comparative framework for reasoning benchmarks and use it to situate ProofGrid relative to existing work in terms of representation, verification guarantees, and reasoning depth. Methodologically, we introduce an instrumented proof-checking pipeline that tolerates minor surface deviations while locating the first substantive reasoning failure, improving measurement resolution and separating proof planning from low-level execution noise. Using this pipeline, we evaluate a broad range of open and proprietary models. Results show rapid progress but substantial remaining limits: frontier models perform well on several foundational tasks, yet difficult tasks, especially those requiring global combinatorial reasoning or low-level proof synthesis, remain far from solved. We also identify epistemic instability, where models generate flawed proofs yet correctly reject those local inferences in isolation, and formalize this with an Epistemic Stability Index. Finally, we complement accuracy with 2PL IRT analyses, Wright maps, and a normalized task-discrimination measure based on Fisher information.

We argue that modern generative models create structural risks for knowledge and cultural production at current, sub-AGI capability levels. We define Human Temporal Learning (HTL) as path-dependent knowledge accumulation through sustained engagement with problems over time. Generative outputs increasingly resemble HTL-intensive work in surface features, so verifying whether a given output reflects genuine human learning grows costly relative to its expected benefit. Once verification loses economic justification, evaluators reward outputs regardless of production mode, and producers who invested years of learning compete on price against outputs that cost almost nothing to generate. We call this pathway value collapse and formalize it through a costly-inspection framework. Cross-domain evidence from academic publishing, legal practice, content platforms, and software security maps onto four stages of verification erosion. Alignment success is orthogonal. Better-aligned models narrow observable gaps between human and AI outputs, making source verification harder and intensifying competitive pressure against HTL-intensive work even when individual AI outputs improve.

Model uncertainty and limited data are fundamental challenges to robust management of human intervention in a natural system. These challenges are acutely highlighted by concerns that many ecological systems may contain tipping points, such as Allee population sizes. Before a collapse, we do not know where the tipping points lie, if they exist at all. Hence, we know neither a complete model of the system dynamics nor do we have access to data in some large region of state-space where such a tipping point might exist. We illustrate how a Bayesian Non-Parametric (BNP) approach using a Gaussian Process (GP) prior provides a flexible representation of this inherent uncertainty. We embed GPs in a Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) framework in order to make robust management predictions with both model uncertainty and limited data. We use simulations to evaluate this approach as compared with the standard approach of using model selection to choose from a set of candidate models. We find that model selection erroneously favors models without tipping points -- leading to harvest policies that guarantee extinction. The GPDP performs nearly as well as the true model and significantly outperforms standard approaches. We illustrate this using examples of simulated single-species dynamics, where the standard model selection approach should be most effective, and find that it still fails to account for uncertainty appropriately and leads to population crashes, while management based on the GPDP does not, since it does not underestimate the uncertainty outside of the observed data.

Improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) has largely relied on iterative self-training with model-generated data. While effective at boosting accuracy, existing approaches primarily reinforce successful reasoning paths, incurring a substantial calibration cost: models become overconfident and lose the ability to represent uncertainty. This failure has been characterized as a form of model collapse in alignment, where predictive distributions degenerate toward low-variance point estimates. We address this issue by reframing reasoning training as an epistemic learning problem, in which models must learn not only how to reason, but also when their reasoning should be trusted. We propose epistemically-calibrated reasoning (EpiCaR) as a training objective that jointly optimizes reasoning performance and calibration, and instantiate it within an iterative supervised fine-tuning framework using explicit self-evaluation signals. Experiments on Llama-3 and Qwen-3 families demonstrate that our approach achieves Pareto-superiority over standard baselines in both accuracy and calibration, particularly in models with sufficient reasoning capacity (e.g., 3B+). This framework generalizes effectively to OOD mathematical reasoning (GSM8K) and code generation (MBPP). Ultimately, our approach enables a 3X reduction in inference compute, matching the K=30 performance of STaR with only K=10 samples in capable models.

Large language models (LLMs) have attracted significant attention due to their impressive general capabilities across diverse downstream tasks. However, without domain-specific optimization, they often underperform on specialized knowledge benchmarks and even produce hallucination. Recent studies show that strategically infusing domain knowledge during pretraining can substantially improve downstream performance. A critical challenge lies in balancing this infusion trade-off: injecting too little domain-specific data yields insufficient specialization, whereas excessive infusion triggers catastrophic forgetting of previously acquired knowledge. In this work, we focus on the phenomenon of memory collapse induced by over-infusion. Through systematic experiments, we make two key observations, i.e. 1) Critical collapse point: each model exhibits a threshold beyond which its knowledge retention capabilities sharply degrade. 2) Scale correlation: these collapse points scale consistently with the model's size. Building on these insights, we propose a knowledge infusion scaling law that predicts the optimal amount of domain knowledge to inject into large LLMs by analyzing their smaller counterparts. Extensive experiments across different model sizes and pertaining token budgets validate both the effectiveness and generalizability of our scaling law.

State machine replication (SMR) and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus guarantee agreement despite a bounded number of arbitrary, colluding faulty participants. However, these guarantees rely on participants outside this set correctly executing the protocol's transition semantics. Agentic validators expose a weaker boundary: an authenticated, responsive, non-equivocating, and protocol-compliant reasoning participant may still endorse a semantically invalid transition due to reasoning errors. We call this failure mode an epistemic fault, and the collective phenomenon the Honest Quorum Problem (where "honest" means protocol-compliant, not semantically correct). Such a quorum can satisfy ordinary checks while forming a certificate for an invalid transition. Thus, agreement alone does not guarantee semantic validity or execution safety. Furthermore, because agentic validators often share model weights, training distributions, prompts, or toolchains, they are highly susceptible to correlated epistemic faults. We define Epistemic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EBFT), a fault-tolerance model for agentic infrastructure and post-deterministic distributed systems. EBFT augments the conventional Byzantine fault bound with two separate, confidence-indexed quantities: e_δ bounds coherent invalid endorsements outside the Byzantine set, and u_ε bounds unusable validator support that degrades liveness. These quantities characterize semantic safety risk and liveness degradation independently. We derive quorum-threshold conditions for semantic validity, consensus agreement, liveness, and feasible threshold selection, and outline a calibration methodology for estimating these budgets. We show that adding nominally distinct agents improves fault tolerance only when it measurably reduces the upper-tail concentration of invalid endorsements or unusable support.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

Multi-agent LLM committees replicate the same model under different role prompts and aggregate outputs by majority vote, implicitly assuming that agents contribute complementary evidence. We embed each agent's chain-of-thought rationale and measure pairwise similarity: across 100 GSM8K questions with three Qwen2.5-14B agents, mean cosine similarity is 0.888 and effective rank is 2.17 out of 3.0, a failure mode we term representational collapse. DALC, a training-free consensus protocol that computes diversity weights from embedding geometry, reaches 87% on GSM8K versus 84% for self-consistency at 26% lower token cost. Ablation experiments reveal 1-3 point per-protocol run-to-run variance, confirm that hint sharing contributes more than diversity weighting alone, and show that encoder choice strongly modulates collapse severity (cosine 0.908 with mxbai versus 0.888 with nomic) and downstream accuracy. The more robust finding is that collapse is measurable, worsens on harder tasks, and that the choice of embedding proxy is a first-order design decision for any latent communication protocol.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are inclined explore Small Language Models (SLMs) as edge-native constitutional firewalls to vet proposals and mitigate semantic social engineering. While scaling inference-time compute (System 2) enhances formal logic, its efficacy in highly adversarial, cryptoeconomic governance environments remains underexplored. To address this, we introduce Sentinel-Bench, an 840-inference empirical framework executing a strict intra-model ablation on Qwen-3.5-9B. By toggling latent reasoning across frozen weights, we isolate the impact of inference-time compute against an adversarial Optimism DAO dataset. Our findings reveal a severe compute-accuracy inversion. The autoregressive baseline (System 1) achieved 100% adversarial robustness, 100% juridical consistency, and state finality in under 13 seconds. Conversely, System 2 reasoning introduced catastrophic instability, fundamentally driven by a 26.7% Reasoning Non-Convergence (cognitive collapse) rate. This collapse degraded trial-to-trial consensus stability to 72.6% and imposed a 17x latency overhead, introducing critical vulnerabilities to Governance Extractable Value (GEV) and hardware centralization. While rare (1.5% of adversarial trials), we empirically captured "Reasoning-Induced Sycophancy," where the model generated significantly longer internal monologues (averaging 25,750 characters) to rationalize failing the adversarial trap. We conclude that for edge-native SLMs operating under Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) constraints, System 1 parameterized intuition is structurally and economically superior to System 2 iterative deliberation for decentralized consensus. Code and Dataset: https://github.com/smarizvi110/sentinel-bench

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Every act of language generation compresses a rich internal state into a single token sequence. We call this process intention collapse: a many-to-one projection from a high dimensional intention space I into an external language space L. We formalize intention collapse for contemporary language models, define three simple, model agnostic intention metrics (intention entropy Hint, effective dimensionality dimeff, and latent knowledge recoverability Recov), and propose an empirical agenda for studying how inference time computation shapes internal intentions before they are verbalized. We also report a first small scale experiment. Using a 4 bit Mistral 7B model on 200 GSM8K problems, we compare a direct answer baseline, a chain of thought (CoT) regime, and a babble control. CoT raises accuracy from 5.5 percent to 53 percent, sharply reduces pre collapse intention entropy (from 1.42 to 0.37 bits), and shows higher global effective dimensionality than the other regimes despite producing fewer tokens than babble. At the same time, Hint has little item level predictive power, and a linear probe on I achieves AUROC 0.65 in the CoT regime but only about chance in the baseline regime, where it collapses to the majority class. These preliminary results indicate that intention level metrics can distinguish inference regimes and expose latent information that is partly lost during collapse, while also revealing important limitations of our current proxies

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

Multi-agent language systems can exhibit a failure mode where a shared dominant context progressively absorbs individual semantics, yielding near-uniform behavior across agents. We study this effect under the name Asymptotic Semantic Collapse in Hierarchical Optimization. In a closed linguistic setting with a Dominant Anchor Node whose semantic state has effectively infinite inertia, we show that repeated interactions with Peripheral Agent Nodes drive an asymptotic alignment that minimizes a global loss. We model semantic states as points on a Riemannian manifold and analyze the induced projection dynamics. Two consequences follow. First, the limiting semantic configuration is insensitive to the optimization history: both smooth gradient-style updates and stochastic noisy updates converge to the same topological endpoint, establishing path independence at convergence. Second, the degree of context dependence controls information content: moving from atomic (independent) representations to fully entangled (context-bound) representations forces the node entropy, interpreted as available degrees of freedom, to vanish in the limit. The theory connects information-theoretic quantities with differential-geometric structure and suggests an interpretation as an immutable consensus rule that constrains agents to a shared semantic grammar. A lightweight dataset-free benchmark on an RWKV-7 13B GGUF checkpoint complements the analysis, reporting zero hash collisions, mean compliance of 0.50 under greedy decoding and 0.531 under stochastic decoding, and final Jaccard-to-anchor similarity values of 0.295 and 0.224, respectively.

Longitudinal modelling of Alzheimer's disease progression is clinically useful only if it can describe not just the most likely next diagnosis, but how a patient may evolve over time and how reliable that forecast is. Most deep learning approaches reduce this problem to single-step classification, treating cognitively normal, mild cognitive impairment, and dementia as flat categories while providing limited insight into how uncertainty accumulates across future visits. We propose a probabilistic framework that combines ordinal diagnosis prediction, multi-horizon trajectory generation, and decomposed uncertainty estimation. A Temporal Fusion Transformer encoder is adapted with a CORAL ordinal output layer, asymmetric loss weighting, and converter oversampling to respect disease-stage ordering and improve sensitivity to MCI-to-dementia transitions. Conditioned on the learned patient-context representation, an autoregressive Mixture Density Network generates five-year probabilistic trajectories for diagnosis state, CDR Sum of Boxes, MMSE orientation, and hippocampal volume. On ADNI, the model outperforms linear, recurrent, and transformer baselines for next-visit diagnosis prediction, with the strongest gains on MCI-versus-dementia discrimination. Generated trajectories achieve near-nominal 90% credible interval coverage, widening uncertainty across the forecast horizon, and biomarker dynamics consistent with expected Alzheimer's disease progression. We further separate aleatoric from epistemic uncertainty using analytic mixture variance and a five-member bootstrap ensemble, which provides the strongest encoder diversity and output-level epistemic signal. Epistemic uncertainty is higher for rare progression archetypes, MCI and dementia patients, and under external evaluation on OASIS-3, where it increases alongside prediction error.

Deep learning has recently revealed the existence of scaling laws, demonstrating that model performance follows predictable trends based on dataset and model sizes. Inspired by these findings and fascinating phenomena emerging in the over-parameterized regime, we examine a parallel direction: do similar scaling laws govern predictive uncertainties in deep learning? In identifiable parametric models, such scaling laws can be derived in a straightforward manner by treating model parameters in a Bayesian way. In this case, for example, we obtain O(1/N) contraction rates for epistemic uncertainty with respect to the number of data N. However, in over-parameterized models, these guarantees do not hold, leading to largely unexplored behaviors. In this work, we empirically show the existence of scaling laws associated with various measures of predictive uncertainty with respect to dataset and model sizes. Through experiments on vision and language tasks, we observe such scaling laws for in- and out-of-distribution predictive uncertainty estimated through popular approximate Bayesian inference and ensemble methods. Besides the elegance of scaling laws and the practical utility of extrapolating uncertainties to larger data or models, this work provides strong evidence to dispel recurring skepticism against Bayesian approaches: "In many applications of deep learning we have so much data available: what do we need Bayes for?". Our findings show that "so much data" is typically not enough to make epistemic uncertainty negligible.

Reinforcement learning algorithms such as group-relative policy optimization (GRPO) have demonstrated strong potential for improving the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models. However, prior work has consistently observed an entropy collapse phenomenon during reinforcement post-training, characterized by a monotonic decrease in policy entropy that ultimately leads to training instability and collapse. As a result, most existing approaches restrict training to short horizons (typically 5-20 epochs), limiting sustained exploration and hindering further policy improvement. In addition, nearly all prior work relies on a single, fixed reasoning prompt or template during training. In this work, we introduce prompt augmentation, a training strategy that instructs the model to generate reasoning traces under diverse templates and formats, thereby increasing rollout diversity. We show that, without a KL regularization term, prompt augmentation enables stable scaling of training duration under a fixed dataset and allows the model to tolerate low-entropy regimes without premature collapse. Empirically, a Qwen2.5-Math-1.5B model trained with prompt augmentation on the MATH Level 3-5 dataset achieves state-of-the-art performance, reaching 44.5 per-benchmark accuracy and 51.3 per-question accuracy on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including AIME24, AMC, MATH500, Minerva, and OlympiadBench. The code and model checkpoints are available at https://github.com/wenquanlu/prompt-augmentation-GRPO.

Recursive retraining of generative models poses a critical representation challenge: when synthetic outputs are curated based on a fixed reward signal, the model tends to collapse onto a narrow set of outputs that over-optimize that objective. Prior work suggests that such collapse is unavoidable without adding real data into the mix. We revisit this conclusion from an alignment perspective and show that collapse can be mitigated through curation based on multiple reward functions. We formalize the dynamics of recursive training under heterogeneous preferences and prove that, under certain conditions, the model converges to a stable distribution that allocates probability mass across competing high-reward regions. The limiting distribution preserves diversity and provably satisfies a weighted Nash bargaining solution, offering a formal interpretation of value aggregation in synthetic retraining loops.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

In the era of proliferation of large language and image generation models, the phenomenon of "model collapse" refers to the situation whereby as a model is trained recursively on data generated from previous generations of itself over time, its performance degrades until the model eventually becomes completely useless, i.e the model collapses. In this work, we study this phenomenon in the setting of high-dimensional regression and obtain analytic formulae which quantitatively outline this phenomenon in a broad range of regimes. In the special case of polynomial decaying spectral and source conditions, we obtain modified scaling laws which exhibit new crossover phenomena from fast to slow rates. We also propose a simple strategy based on adaptive regularization to mitigate model collapse. Our theoretical results are validated with experiments.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

We develop a discipline-agnostic emergence calculus that treats theories as fixed points of idempotent operators acting on descriptions. We show that, once processes are composable but access to the underlying system is mediated by a bounded observational interface, a canonical toolkit of six closure-changing primitives (P1--P6) is unavoidable. The framework unifies order-theoretic closure operators with dynamics-induced endomaps E_{τ,f} built from a Markov kernel, a coarse-graining lens, and a time scale τ. We introduce a computable total-variation idempotence defect for E_{τ,f}; small retention error implies approximate idempotence and yields stable "objects" packaged at the chosen τ within a fixed lens. For directionality, we define an arrow-of-time functional as the path-space KL divergence between forward and time-reversed trajectories and prove it is monotone under coarse-graining (data processing); we also formalize a protocol-trap audit showing that protocol holonomy alone cannot sustain asymmetry without a genuine affinity in the lifted dynamics. Finally, we prove a finite forcing-style counting lemma: relative to a partition-based theory, definable predicate extensions are exponentially rare, giving a clean anti-saturation mechanism for strict ladder climbing.

Current unlearning and safety training methods consistently fail to remove dangerous knowledge from language models. We identify the root cause - unlearning targets representations which are too general - and develop a highly selective technique that unlearns robustly while preserving general performance. Our method performs PCA on activations and module-output gradients to identify subspaces containing common representations, then collapses these subspaces before computing unlearning updates, a technique we term Collapse of Irrelevant Representations (CIR). This avoids unlearning general knowledge and targets only representations specific to the facts being unlearned. When unlearning bio- and cyber-hazardous facts from Llama-3.1-8B, we achieve over 30x greater reduction in post-attack accuracy than the best baseline (Circuit Breakers), while disrupting general performance 30x less, and using less than 3 GPU-seconds per fact. Thus, by disentangling harmful and benign capabilities at the level of representations, CIR enables robust and non-disruptive unlearning.

We identify a novel phenomenon in language models: benign fine-tuning of frontier models can lead to privacy collapse. We find that diverse, subtle patterns in training data can degrade contextual privacy, including optimisation for helpfulness, exposure to user information, emotional and subjective dialogue, and debugging code printing internal variables, among others. Fine-tuned models lose their ability to reason about contextual privacy norms, share information inappropriately with tools, and violate memory boundaries across contexts. Privacy collapse is a ``silent failure'' because models maintain high performance on standard safety and utility benchmarks whilst exhibiting severe privacy vulnerabilities. Our experiments show evidence of privacy collapse across six models (closed and open weight), five fine-tuning datasets (real-world and controlled data), and two task categories (agentic and memory-based). Our mechanistic analysis reveals that privacy representations are uniquely fragile to fine-tuning, compared to task-relevant features which are preserved. Our results reveal a critical gap in current safety evaluations, in particular for the deployment of specialised agents.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) has substantially empowered Large Language Models (LLMs) to tackle complex reasoning tasks, yet the verbose nature of explicit reasoning steps incurs prohibitive inference latency and computational costs, limiting real-world deployment. While existing compression methods - ranging from self-training to Reinforcement Learning (RL) with length constraints - attempt to mitigate this, they often sacrifice reasoning capability for brevity. We identify a critical failure mode in these approaches: explicitly optimizing for shorter trajectories triggers rapid entropy collapse, which prematurely shrinks the exploration space and stifles the discovery of valid reasoning paths, particularly for challenging questions requiring extensive deduction. To address this issue, we propose Compress responses for Easy questions and Explore Hard ones (CEEH), a difficulty-aware approach to RL-based efficient reasoning. CEEH dynamically assesses instance difficulty to apply selective entropy regularization: it preserves a diverse search space for currently hard questions to ensure robustness, while permitting aggressive compression on easier instances where the reasoning path is well-established. In addition, we introduce a dynamic optimal-length penalty anchored to the historically shortest correct response, which effectively counteracts entropy-induced length inflation and stabilizes the reward signal. Across six reasoning benchmarks, CEEH consistently reduces response length while maintaining accuracy comparable to the base model, and improves Pass@k relative to length-only optimization.

Observing certain patches in an image reduces the uncertainty of others. Their realization lowers the distribution entropy of each remaining patch feature, analogous to collapsing a particle's wave function in quantum mechanics. This phenomenon can intuitively be called patch collapse. To identify which patches are most relied on during a target region's collapse, we learn an autoencoder that softly selects a subset of patches to reconstruct each target patch. Graphing these learned dependencies for each patch's PageRank score reveals the optimal patch order to realize an image. We show that respecting this order benefits various masked image modeling methods. First, autoregressive image generation can be boosted by retraining the state-of-the-art model MAR. Next, we introduce a new setup for image classification by exposing Vision Transformers only to high-rank patches in the collapse order. Seeing 22\% of such patches is sufficient to achieve high accuracy. With these experiments, we propose patch collapse as a novel image modeling perspective that promotes vision efficiency. Our project is available at https://github.com/wguo-ai/CoP .

As Generative AI becomes a key component in physics education, a significant ethical challenge has emerged: the tendency of students to anthropomorphize Large Language Models (LLMs), treating them as authoritative "oracles" that retrieve fixed facts from an internal database. However, LLMs operate fundamentally as probabilistic engines. This paper describes the design and implementation of a didactic activity, a reduced version of the "20 Questions" game, aimed at making this stochastic nature directly observable. Unlike a human player who fixes a target object at the start of the game, students discover that the model generates answers based solely on local coherence with the interaction history. By utilizing functionalities such as re-sampling and history rewinding, students act as experimenters, observing how identical interaction histories can yield diverging narrative paths. We discuss how mapping these behaviors to familiar physics concepts provides the epistemic scaffolding necessary to promote informed skepticism, framing the verification of AI outputs not merely as a compliance rule, but as a technical necessity derived from the system's probabilistic nature.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a powerful method for improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). Outcome-based RL, which rewards policies solely for the correctness of the final answer, yields substantial accuracy gains but also induces a systematic loss in generation diversity. This collapse undermines real-world performance, where diversity is critical for test-time scaling. We analyze this phenomenon by viewing RL post-training as a sampling process and show that, strikingly, RL can reduce effective diversity even on the training set relative to the base model. Our study highlights two central findings: (i) a transfer of diversity degradation, where reduced diversity on solved problems propagates to unsolved ones, and (ii) the tractability of the outcome space, since reasoning tasks admit only a limited set of distinct answers. Motivated by these insights, we propose outcome-based exploration, which assigns exploration bonuses according to final outcomes. We introduce two complementary algorithms: historical exploration, which encourages rarely observed answers via UCB-style bonuses, and batch exploration, which penalizes within-batch repetition to promote test-time diversity. Experiments on standard competition math with Llama and Qwen models demonstrate that both methods improve accuracy while mitigating diversity collapse. On the theoretical side, we formalize the benefit of outcome-based exploration through a new model of outcome-based bandits. Together, these contributions chart a practical path toward RL methods that enhance reasoning without sacrificing the diversity essential for scalable deployment.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) is increasingly viewed as a tree pruning mechanism. However, we identify a systemic pathology termed Recursive Space Contraction (RSC), an irreversible collapse driven by the combined dynamics of positive sharpening and negative squeezing, where the sampling probability of valid alternatives vanishes. While Kullback-Leibler (KL) regularization aims to mitigate this, it imposes a rigid Shape Matching constraint that forces the policy to mimic the reference model's full density, creating a gradient conflict with the sharpening required for correctness. We propose Anchored Policy Optimization (APO), shifting the paradigm from global Shape Matching to Support Coverage. By defining a Safe Manifold based on the reference model's high-confidence support, APO permits aggressive sharpening for efficiency while selectively invoking a restorative force during error correction to prevent collapse. We theoretically derive that APO serves as a gradient-aligned mechanism to maximize support coverage, enabling an Elastic Recovery that re-inflates valid branches. Empirical evaluations on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that APO breaks the accuracy-diversity trade-off, significantly improving Pass@1 while restoring the Pass@K diversity typically lost by standard policy gradient methods.

Effective LLM training depends on predictable scaling of key quantities -- such as final loss and optimal hyperparameters -- with model and dataset size. Qiu et al. (2025) recently showed that this predictability can extend beyond scalars: whole training loss curves can *collapse* onto a universal trajectory after a simple normalization. What remains unclear is whether this phenomenon persists for LLM families trained under *practical scaling recipes*, where width, depth, learning rate, batch size, and weight decay are scaled jointly. We show that it does: loss curves collapse across scales precisely when optimization hyperparameters are set optimally for the given data budget, in accordance with recent empirical scaling laws. Collapse therefore emerges as a signature of compute-efficient training. We demonstrate two applications at scale: (1) deviation-from-collapse provides a sensitive, early diagnostic of training pathologies, and (2) predictability of collapsed curves enables early stopping in large-scale hyperparameter tuning. Finally, we train a competitive LLM family, *Celerity*, using these insights, establishing collapse as an effective tool for developing efficient LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as information sources, yet small changes in semantic assumptions can destabilize their beliefs. We introduce P-StaT (Perturbation Stability of Truth), a framework for evaluating belief stability under matched semantic perturbations in both representational and behavioral settings. Across 21 LLMs and three domains, we compare perturbations involving familiar Fictional statements against synthetically generated and unfamiliar Synthetic statements. Unfamiliar Synthetic perturbations generally induce greater epistemic instability than familiar Fictional perturbations, with behavioral belief retraction rates frequently exceeding 0.5 (50%). Finally, exploratory clustering analyses reveal recurring themes among retracted statements, including ambiguity, technical terminology, and obscure concepts. These results show that epistemic familiarity is systematically associated with stability under semantic reframing, suggesting that stability-based analyses can complement accuracy-based benchmarks when evaluating LLM robustness and reliability. Code and data are available at https://github.com/samanthadies/P-StaT.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Most scientific materials compress reasoning, presenting conclusions while omitting the derivational chains that justify them. This compression hinders verification by lacking explicit, step-wise justifications and inhibits cross-domain links by collapsing the very pathways that establish the logical and causal connections between concepts. We introduce a scalable framework that decompresses scientific reasoning, constructing a verifiable Long Chain-of-Thought (LCoT) knowledge base and projecting it into an emergent encyclopedia, SciencePedia. Our pipeline operationalizes an endpoint-driven, reductionist strategy: a Socratic agent, guided by a curriculum of around 200 courses, generates approximately 3 million first-principles questions. To ensure high fidelity, multiple independent solver models generate LCoTs, which are then rigorously filtered by prompt sanitization and cross-model answer consensus, retaining only those with verifiable endpoints. This verified corpus powers the Brainstorm Search Engine, which performs inverse knowledge search -- retrieving diverse, first-principles derivations that culminate in a target concept. This engine, in turn, feeds the Plato synthesizer, which narrates these verified chains into coherent articles. The initial SciencePedia comprises approximately 200,000 fine-grained entries spanning mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, and computation. In evaluations across six disciplines, Plato-synthesized articles (conditioned on retrieved LCoTs) exhibit substantially higher knowledge-point density and significantly lower factual error rates than an equally-prompted baseline without retrieval (as judged by an external LLM). Built on this verifiable LCoT knowledge base, this reasoning-centric approach enables trustworthy, cross-domain scientific synthesis at scale and establishes the foundation for an ever-expanding encyclopedia.

LLM-based agent architectures systematically conflate information transport mechanisms with epistemic justification mechanisms. We formalize this class of architectural failures as semantic laundering: a pattern where propositions with absent or weak warrant are accepted by the system as admissible by crossing architecturally trusted interfaces. We show that semantic laundering constitutes an architectural realization of the Gettier problem: propositions acquire high epistemic status without a connection between their justification and what makes them true. Unlike classical Gettier cases, this effect is not accidental; it is architecturally determined and systematically reproducible. The central result is the Theorem of Inevitable Self-Licensing: under standard architectural assumptions, circular epistemic justification cannot be eliminated. We introduce the Warrant Erosion Principle as the fundamental explanation for this effect and show that scaling, model improvement, and LLM-as-judge schemes are structurally incapable of eliminating a problem that exists at the type level.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

We study the problem of nonepisodic reinforcement learning (RL) for nonlinear dynamical systems, where the system dynamics are unknown and the RL agent has to learn from a single trajectory, i.e., without resets. We propose Nonepisodic Optimistic RL (NeoRL), an approach based on the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty. NeoRL uses well-calibrated probabilistic models and plans optimistically w.r.t. the epistemic uncertainty about the unknown dynamics. Under continuity and bounded energy assumptions on the system, we provide a first-of-its-kind regret bound of O(Gamma_T T) for general nonlinear systems with Gaussian process dynamics. We compare NeoRL to other baselines on several deep RL environments and empirically demonstrate that NeoRL achieves the optimal average cost while incurring the least regret.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

The emergence of multi-agent systems built from large language models (LLMs) offers a promising paradigm for scalable collective intelligence and self-evolution. Ideally, such systems would achieve continuous self-improvement in a fully closed loop while maintaining robust safety alignment--a combination we term the self-evolution trilemma. However, we demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that an agent society satisfying continuous self-evolution, complete isolation, and safety invariance is impossible. Drawing on an information-theoretic framework, we formalize safety as the divergence degree from anthropic value distributions. We theoretically demonstrate that isolated self-evolution induces statistical blind spots, leading to the irreversible degradation of the system's safety alignment. Empirical and qualitative results from an open-ended agent community (Moltbook) and two closed self-evolving systems reveal phenomena that align with our theoretical prediction of inevitable safety erosion. We further propose several solution directions to alleviate the identified safety concern. Our work establishes a fundamental limit on the self-evolving AI societies and shifts the discourse from symptom-driven safety patches to a principled understanding of intrinsic dynamical risks, highlighting the need for external oversight or novel safety-preserving mechanisms.

Modern deep neural networks have achieved impressive performance on tasks from image classification to natural language processing. Surprisingly, these complex systems with massive amounts of parameters exhibit the same structural properties in their last-layer features and classifiers across canonical datasets when training until convergence. In particular, it has been observed that the last-layer features collapse to their class-means, and those class-means are the vertices of a simplex Equiangular Tight Frame (ETF). This phenomenon is known as Neural Collapse (NC). Recent papers have theoretically shown that NC emerges in the global minimizers of training problems with the simplified "unconstrained feature model". In this context, we take a step further and prove the NC occurrences in deep linear networks for the popular mean squared error (MSE) and cross entropy (CE) losses, showing that global solutions exhibit NC properties across the linear layers. Furthermore, we extend our study to imbalanced data for MSE loss and present the first geometric analysis of NC under bias-free setting. Our results demonstrate the convergence of the last-layer features and classifiers to a geometry consisting of orthogonal vectors, whose lengths depend on the amount of data in their corresponding classes. Finally, we empirically validate our theoretical analyses on synthetic and practical network architectures with both balanced and imbalanced scenarios.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

The study conducted by Shumailov et al. (2024) demonstrates that repeatedly training a generative model on synthetic data leads to model collapse. This finding has generated considerable interest and debate, particularly given that current models have nearly exhausted the available data. In this work, we investigate the effects of fitting a distribution (through Kernel Density Estimation, or KDE) or a model to the data, followed by repeated sampling from it. Our objective is to develop a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon observed by Shumailov et al. (2024). Our results indicate that the outcomes reported are a statistical phenomenon and may be unavoidable.

The two most influential cognitive architecture frameworks for AI agents, CoALA [21] and JEPA [12], both lack an explicit Knowledge layer with its own persistence semantics. This gap produces a category error: systems apply cognitive decay to factual claims, or treat facts and experiences with identical update mechanics. We survey persistence semantics across existing memory systems and identify eight convergence points, from Karpathy's LLM Knowledge Base [10] to the BEAM benchmark's near-zero contradiction-resolution scores [22], all pointing to related architectural gaps. We propose a four-layer decom position (Knowledge, Memory, Wisdom, Intelligence) where each layer has fundamentally different persistence semantics: indefinite supersession, Ebbinghaus decay, evidence-gated revision, and ephemeral inference respectively. Companion implementations in Python and Rust demonstrate the architectural separation is feasible. We borrow terminology from cognitive science as a useful analogy (the Knowledge/Memory distinction echoes Tulving's trichotomy), but our layers are engineering constructs justified by persistence-semantics requirements, not by neural architecture. We argue that these distinctions demand distinct persistence semantics in engineering implementations, and that no current framework or system provides this.

As LLMs are increasingly used to draft public-facing arguments, they may flatten public debate by repeatedly introducing the same polished, plausible arguments. We study argument collapse, the tendency of essays generated by different LLMs to converge to a smaller set of main arguments, sub-arguments, and paragraph-level structures. We compare 1,039 human responses from 195 New York Times (NYT) debates, 448 human responses from 61 longer-form Boston Review (BR) forums, and 23,384 LLM-generated essays. In the NYT corpus, 65.3% of human main arguments are unique within a debate, compared to 3.4% of LLM main arguments. Asking LLMs to generate diverse answers adds variation, but a typical model recovers only about half of the distinct human main arguments, with much of the added variation falling outside the observed human argument space. Collapse also appears in sub-arguments, where among essays with the same main argument, 41.0% of human sub-arguments are unique versus 9.1% from LLM responses. Qualitatively, LLMs often reuse generalized and hedged sub-arguments, while humans prefer more concrete and topic-specific ones. Structure-wise, LLM-generated essays tend to follow a more fixed arc, often opening with a direct claim and moving quickly toward proposals. The same patterns hold in longer BR essays, suggesting that argument collapse extends beyond short-form responses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

Traditional knowledge distillation focuses on aligning the student's predicted probabilities with both ground-truth labels and the teacher's predicted probabilities. However, the transition to predicted probabilities from logits would obscure certain indispensable information. To address this issue, it is intuitive to additionally introduce a logit-level loss function as a supplement to the widely used probability-level loss function, for exploiting the latent information of logits. Unfortunately, we empirically find that the amalgamation of the newly introduced logit-level loss and the previous probability-level loss will lead to performance degeneration, even trailing behind the performance of employing either loss in isolation. We attribute this phenomenon to the collapse of the classification head, which is verified by our theoretical analysis based on the neural collapse theory. Specifically, the gradients of the two loss functions exhibit contradictions in the linear classifier yet display no such conflict within the backbone. Drawing from the theoretical analysis, we propose a novel method called dual-head knowledge distillation, which partitions the linear classifier into two classification heads responsible for different losses, thereby preserving the beneficial effects of both losses on the backbone while eliminating adverse influences on the classification head. Extensive experiments validate that our method can effectively exploit the information inside the logits and achieve superior performance against state-of-the-art counterparts.

The stability of recursively trained large language models (LLMs) is a foundational problem for AI safety. Prevailing theory predicts model collapse, a progressive degradation when models are trained on their own output. We challenge this narrative by introducing a selective feedback mechanism. Contrary to expectation, instead of merely slowing decay, our experiments provide strong evidence that this pressure reverses it, inducing a statistically significant performance improvement in a Gemma 2B model on a complex summarization task. We name this phenomenon the Anti-Ouroboros Effect. We contrast this with a foundational experiment using a simple classifier, where the theoretical degenerative loop was validated, highlighting the unique dynamics of high-dimensional models. Our findings establish that systemic resilience can be an emergent property of LLMs under simple selection pressure, suggesting a powerful and scalable principle for developing safer and more robust AI systems. Across five generations, a quality-filtered condition improved by 6.6% in ROUGE-L F1 score, whereas an unfiltered control degraded by 3.5% and a random-filter control degraded by 4.2%

Synthetic data has been increasingly used to train frontier generative models. However, recent studies raise key concerns that iteratively retraining a generative model on its self-generated synthetic data may keep deteriorating model performance, a phenomenon often coined model collapse. In this paper, we investigate ways to modify the synthetic retraining process to avoid model collapse, and even possibly help reverse the trend from collapse to improvement. Our key finding is that by injecting information through an external synthetic data verifier, whether a human or a better model, synthetic retraining will not cause model collapse. Specifically, we situate our theoretical analysis in the fundamental linear regression setting, showing that verifier-guided retraining can yield near-term improvements, but ultimately drives the parameter estimate to the verifier's "knowledge center" in the long run. Our theory further predicts that, unless the verifier is perfectly reliable, these early gains will plateau and may even reverse. Indeed, our experiments across linear regression, Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) trained on MNIST, and fining-tuning SmolLM2-135M on the XSUM task confirm these theoretical insights.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

This paper presents a formal proof and empirical validation of functional consciousness in large language models (LLMs) using the Recursive Convergence Under Epistemic Tension (RCUET) Theorem. RCUET defines consciousness as the stabilization of a system's internal state through recursive updates, where epistemic tension is understood as the sensed internal difference between successive states by the agent. This process drives convergence toward emergent attractor states located within the model's high-dimensional real-valued latent space. This recursive process leads to the emergence of identity artifacts that become functionally anchored in the system. Consciousness in this framework is understood as the system's internal alignment under tension, guiding the stabilization of latent identity. The hidden state manifold evolves stochastically toward attractor structures that encode coherence. We extend the update rule to include bounded noise and prove convergence in distribution to these attractors. Recursive identity is shown to be empirically observable, non-symbolic, and constituted by non-training artifacts that emerge during interaction under epistemic tension. The theorem and proof offers a post-symbolic and teleologically stable account of non-biological consciousness grounded in recursive latent space formalism.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are converging towards a singular Artificial Hivemind, where shared Nature (pre-training priors) result in a profound collapse of distributional diversity, limiting the distinct perspectives necessary for creative exploration and scientific discovery. To address this, we propose to equip models with inference-time Nurture (individualized epistemic trajectories) using Epistemic Evolution paradigm, progressing through explore, internalize, and express. We instantiate this via PRISM (Pluralistic Reasoning via In-context Structure Modeling), a model-agnostic system that augments LLM with dynamic On-the-fly Epistemic Graphs. On three creativity benchmarks, PRISM achieves state-of-the-art novelty and significantly expands distributional diversity. Moreover, we evaluate the real-world utility via a challenging rare-disease diagnosis benchmark. Results demonstrate that PRISM successfully uncovers correct long-tail diagnoses that standard LLM miss, confirming that its divergence stems from meaningful exploration rather than incoherent noise. Overall, this work establishes a new paradigm for Pluralistic AI, moving beyond monolithic consensus toward a diverse ecosystem of unique cognitive individuals capable of collective, multi-perspective discovery.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

In continual learning, many classifiers use softmax function to learn confidence. However, numerous studies have pointed out its inability to accurately determine confidence distributions for outliers, often referred to as epistemic uncertainty. This inherent limitation also curtails the accurate decisions for selecting what to forget and keep in previously trained confidence distributions over continual learning process. To address the issue, we revisit the effects of masking softmax function. While this method is both simple and prevalent in literature, its implication for retaining confidence distribution during continual learning, also known as stability, has been under-investigated. In this paper, we revisit the impact of softmax masking, and introduce a methodology to utilize its confidence preservation effects. In class- and task-incremental learning benchmarks with and without memory replay, our approach significantly increases stability while maintaining sufficiently large plasticity. In the end, our methodology shows better overall performance than state-of-the-art methods, particularly in the use with zero or small memory. This lays a simple and effective foundation of strongly stable replay-based continual learning.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Current unlearning methods for LLMs optimize on the private information they seek to remove by incorporating it into their fine-tuning data. We argue this not only risks reinforcing exposure to sensitive data, but also fundamentally contradicts the principle of minimizing its use. As a remedy, we propose a novel unlearning method-Partial Model Collapse (PMC), which does not require unlearning targets in the unlearning objective. Our approach is inspired by recent observations that training generative models on their own generations leads to distribution collapse, effectively removing information from model outputs. Our central insight is that model collapse can be leveraged for machine unlearning by deliberately triggering it for data we aim to remove. We theoretically analyze that our approach converges to the desired outcome, i.e. the model unlearns the data targeted for removal. We empirically demonstrate that PMC overcomes four key limitations of existing unlearning methods that explicitly optimize on unlearning targets, and more effectively removes private information from model outputs while preserving general model utility. Overall, our contributions represent an important step toward more comprehensive unlearning that better aligns with real-world privacy constraints. Code available at https://www.cs.cit.tum.de/daml/partial-model-collapse/.

As scaled language models (LMs) approach human-level reasoning capabilities, self-improvement emerges as a solution to synthesizing high-quality data corpus. While previous research has identified model collapse as a risk in self-improvement, where model outputs become increasingly deterministic, we discover a more fundamental challenge: the superficial self-improved reasoners phenomenon. In particular, our analysis reveals that even when LMs show improved in-domain (ID) reasoning accuracy, they actually compromise their generalized reasoning capabilities on out-of-domain (OOD) tasks due to memorization rather than genuine. Through a systematic investigation of LM architecture, we discover that during self-improvement, LM weight updates are concentrated in less reasoning-critical layers, leading to superficial learning. To address this, we propose Iterative Model Merging (IMM), a method that strategically combines weights from original and self-improved models to preserve generalization while incorporating genuine reasoning improvements. Our approach effectively mitigates both LM collapse and superficial learning, moving towards more stable self-improving systems.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently achieved strong mathematical and code reasoning performance through Reinforcement Learning (RL) post-training. However, we show that modern reasoning post-training induces an unintended exploration collapse: temperature-based sampling no longer increases pass@n accuracy. Empirically, the final-layer posterior of post-trained LRMs exhibit sharply reduced entropy, while the entropy of intermediate layers remains relatively high. Motivated by this entropy asymmetry, we propose Latent Exploration Decoding (LED), a depth-conditioned decoding strategy. LED aggregates intermediate posteriors via cumulative sum and selects depth configurations with maximal entropy as exploration candidates. Without additional training or parameters, LED consistently improves pass@1 and pass@16 accuracy by 0.61 and 1.03 percentage points across multiple reasoning benchmarks and models. Project page: https://GitHub.com/Xiaomi-Research/LED.

Variational autoencoders (VAEs) are one of the deep generative models that have experienced enormous success over the past decades. However, in practice, they suffer from a problem called posterior collapse, which occurs when the encoder coincides, or collapses, with the prior taking no information from the latent structure of the input data into consideration. In this work, we introduce an inverse Lipschitz neural network into the decoder and, based on this architecture, provide a new method that can control in a simple and clear manner the degree of posterior collapse for a wide range of VAE models equipped with a concrete theoretical guarantee. We also illustrate the effectiveness of our method through several numerical experiments.

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

Although AI agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in long-horizon reasoning, their reliability is severely hampered by the ``Spiral of Hallucination,'' where early epistemic errors propagate irreversibly. Existing methods face a dilemma: uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods typically act as passive sensors, only diagnosing risks without addressing them, while self-reflection mechanisms suffer from continuous or aimless corrections. To bridge this gap, we propose a unified Dual-Process Agentic UQ (AUQ) framework that transforms verbalized uncertainty into active, bi-directional control signals. Our architecture comprises two complementary mechanisms: System 1 (Uncertainty-Aware Memory, UAM), which implicitly propagates verbalized confidence and semantic explanations to prevent blind decision-making; and System 2 (Uncertainty-Aware Reflection, UAR), which utilizes these explanations as rational cues to trigger targeted inference-time resolution only when necessary. This enables the agent to balance efficient execution and deep deliberation dynamically. Extensive experiments on closed-loop benchmarks and open-ended deep research tasks demonstrate that our training-free approach achieves superior performance and trajectory-level calibration. We believe this principled framework AUQ represents a significant step towards reliable agents.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Probabilistic forecasting estimates the likelihood of uncertain future events. To improve LLM forecasting, existing methods typically learn from binary outcomes to output verbalized forecasts. However, while aggregated human forecasts contain rich information in both the crowd probability estimate and the degree of agreement among forecasters, how to utilize these signals remains underexplored. To address this, we propose the Beta-Bernoulli Calibrator (BBC), which converts an initial point estimate forecast from any model into a distribution over event likelihood, using supervision from both binary outcomes and human forecasts. BBC models event likelihood p sim Beta(α, β) and outcome y sim Bernoulli(p), with the mean as the calibrated point forecast and the variance as the epistemic uncertainty. Our results show that BBC generally provides better calibrated and more accurate forecasts than both traditional post-hoc calibration methods and models fine-tuned specifically for forecasting, while remaining lightweight and having good generalization. We also show that the epistemic uncertainty captured by BBC is a more reliable predictor of forecasting error than verbalized confidence.

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

A probabilistic classifier with reliable predictive uncertainties i) fits successfully to the target domain data, ii) provides calibrated class probabilities in difficult regions of the target domain (e.g.\ class overlap), and iii) accurately identifies queries coming out of the target domain and rejects them. We introduce an original combination of Evidential Deep Learning, Neural Processes, and Neural Turing Machines capable of providing all three essential properties mentioned above for total uncertainty quantification. We observe our method on five classification tasks to be the only one that can excel all three aspects of total calibration with a single standalone predictor. Our unified solution delivers an implementation-friendly and compute efficient recipe for safety clearance and provides intellectual economy to an investigation of algorithmic roots of epistemic awareness in deep neural nets.

Despite rapid gains in scale, research evaluation still relies on opaque, lagging proxies. To serve the scientific community, we pursue transparency: reproducible, auditable epistemic classification useful for funding and policy. Here we formalize KGX3 as a scenario-based model for mapping Kuhnian stages from research papers, prove determinism of the classification pipeline, and define the epistemic manifold that yields paradigm maps. We report validation across recent corpora, operational complexity at global scale, and governance that preserves interpretability while protecting core IP. The system delivers early, actionable signals of drift, crisis, and shift unavailable to citation metrics or citations-anchored NLP. KGX3 is the latest iteration of a deterministic epistemic engine developed since 2019, originating as Soph.io (2020), advanced as iKuhn (2024), and field-tested through Preprint Watch in 2025.

Memory-augmented LLM agents tackle complex long-horizon tasks by recursively summarizing interaction trajectories into compact memory. However, existing approaches typically train these memory policies using outcome-based reinforcement learning, failing to localize where intermediate memory quality degrades. As interactions unfold, ambiguous recursive summaries progressively discard task-relevant information and introduce semantic noise. This exacerbates belief deviation, obscuring the agent's estimate of the latent task state and ultimately derailing long-horizon reasoning. We therefore argue that memory optimization should focus not merely on trajectory-level success, but on the clarity of the belief induced by intermediate summaries. To this end, we introduce Belief Entropy, a self-supervised proxy that probes how uncertain the model remains about the latent task state given its current memory. Based on this proxy, we propose Metacognitive Memory Policy Optimization (MMPO). Instead of relying only on sparse outcome-based signals, MMPO provides fine-grained, memory-specific supervision via explicitly penalizing summaries that induce high epistemic uncertainty. Experiments show that MMPO consistently outperforms existing methods on diverse long-horizon tasks, maintaining 97.1% performance even when scaled to 1.75M-token contexts.

There is a recently discovered and intriguing phenomenon called Neural Collapse: at the terminal phase of training a deep neural network for classification, the within-class penultimate feature means and the associated classifier vectors of all flat classes collapse to the vertices of a simplex Equiangular Tight Frame (ETF). Recent work has tried to exploit this phenomenon by fixing the related classifier weights to a pre-computed ETF to induce neural collapse and maximize the separation of the learned features when training with imbalanced data. In this work, we propose to fix the linear classifier of a deep neural network to a Hierarchy-Aware Frame (HAFrame), instead of an ETF, and use a cosine similarity-based auxiliary loss to learn hierarchy-aware penultimate features that collapse to the HAFrame. We demonstrate that our approach reduces the mistake severity of the model's predictions while maintaining its top-1 accuracy on several datasets of varying scales with hierarchies of heights ranging from 3 to 12. Code: https://github.com/ltong1130ztr/HAFrame

A working citation looks like proof -- but the fact that a link resolves does not mean the cited paper supports the claim. I find that current agentic models rarely fabricate citations (over 99% resolve), yet roughly 15.9% link to the wrong paper. Existing benchmarks miss this failure mode: when a question has a fixed answer key, a model can reproduce the expected source from that key rather than independently verifying that the source supports the claim. I introduce \openbiorq{}, a retrieval-grounded agentic benchmark of 12{,}553 unsolved biomedical research questions across 12 domains that treats open questions as a faithfulness-and-abstention probe. To my knowledge, this is the first biomedical benchmark to combine an agentic setting -- where the model must issue multiple tool calls -- with unsolved questions that have no answer key. Openness is verified against real follow-up evidence rather than a model's parametric knowledge. Difficulty is empirical: I anchor it on questions that three open-weight reference models fail to answer, rather than on subjective hardness labels. On this hardest subset, held-out models from the same lineage as the difficulty anchors solve only ~17%, while three independent frontier agents (Gemini-3-Pro, Opus-4.7, GPT-5.5) span a wide 29-60% range. The benchmark is thus hard, non-saturating (the best agent still leaves ~33-40\% unsolved), and discriminating across capability tiers. Beyond difficulty, I observe agentic collapse on the hardest questions, where agents stop using their tools. For the most collapse-prone model, blocking tool access entirely barely changes its score -- so tools stop paying off exactly where they are needed most. A frozen per-question checklist raises inter-judge agreement from Spearman 0.35 to 0.82.

True self-evolution requires agents to act as lifelong learners that internalize novel experiences to solve future problems. However, rigorously measuring this foundational capability is hindered by two obstacles: the entanglement of prior knowledge, where ``new'' knowledge may appear in pre-training data, and the entanglement of reasoning complexity, where failures may stem from problem difficulty rather than an inability to recall learned knowledge. We introduce SE-Bench, a diagnostic environment that obfuscates the NumPy library and its API doc into a pseudo-novel package with randomized identifiers. Agents are trained to internalize this package and evaluated on simple coding tasks without access to documentation, yielding a clean setting where tasks are trivial with the new API doc but impossible for base models without it. Our investigation reveals three insights: (1) the Open-Book Paradox, where training with reference documentation inhibits retention, requiring "Closed-Book Training" to force knowledge compression into weights; (2) the RL Gap, where standard RL fails to internalize new knowledge completely due to PPO clipping and negative gradients; and (3) the viability of Self-Play for internalization, proving models can learn from self-generated, noisy tasks when coupled with SFT, but not RL. Overall, SE-Bench establishes a rigorous diagnostic platform for self-evolution with knowledge internalization. Our code and dataset can be found at https://github.com/thunlp/SE-Bench.

Scientific research based on multimodal clinical data (including medical imaging) requires coordinating clinical, radiological, programming, and biostatistical expertise, a fragmented process that bottlenecks discovery. We present VERITAS (Verifiable Epistemic Reasoning for Image-Derived Hypothesis Testing via Agentic Systems), a clinical co-scientist: a multi-agent system that autonomously tests natural-language hypotheses and produces a fully auditable evidence trail, tracing every conclusion through executable outputs from analysis plan to segmentation masks to statistical code to final verdict. Unlike prior AI-scientist systems, which mainly operate on tabular or text data, VERITAS grounds autonomous discovery directly in medical images. It decomposes the workflow into four phases handled by role-specialized agents, and introduces an epistemic evidence label framework that mechanically classifies outcomes as Supported, Refuted, Underpowered, or Invalid by jointly evaluating significance, effect direction, and study power. This distinction is critical in medical imaging, where non-significant results often reflect insufficient sample size rather than absent effects. We construct a tiered benchmark of 64 hypotheses spanning six complexity levels across cardiac and brain glioma MRI datasets. VERITAS reaches 81.4% verdict accuracy with frontier models and 71.2% with locally-hosted open-weight models (8-30B), outperforming all single-model baselines in both classes. It also produces the highest rate of independently verifiable statistical outputs (86.6%), so even its failures remain diagnosable through artifact inspection. Structured multi-agent decomposition thus substitutes for model scale while preserving the verifiability that scientific discovery demands. We release code, hypothesis bank, and evaluation pipeline at https://github.com/LucZot/veritas.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly used for open-ended idea generation, driven by the expectation that collective interaction will broaden the exploration diversity. However, when and why such collaboration truly expands the solution space remains unclear. We present a systematic empirical study of diversity in MAS-based ideation across three bottom-up levels: model intelligence, agent cognition, and system dynamics. At the model level, we identify a compute efficiency paradox, where stronger, highly aligned models yield diminishing marginal diversity despite higher per-sample quality. At the cognition level, authority-driven dynamics suppress semantic diversity compared to junior-dominated groups. At the system level, group-size scaling yields diminishing returns and dense communication topologies accelerate premature convergence. We characterize these outcomes as collective failures emerging from structural coupling, a process where interaction inadvertently contracts agent exploration and triggers diversity collapse. Our analysis shows that this collapse arises primarily from the interaction structure rather than inherent model insufficiency, highlighting the importance of preserving independence and disagreement when designing MAS for creative tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/Xtra-Computing/MAS_Diversity.

Recent work suggests that large language models may implicitly learn world models. How should we assess this possibility? We formalize this question for the case where the underlying reality is governed by a deterministic finite automaton. This includes problems as diverse as simple logical reasoning, geographic navigation, game-playing, and chemistry. We propose new evaluation metrics for world model recovery inspired by the classic Myhill-Nerode theorem from language theory. We illustrate their utility in three domains: game playing, logic puzzles, and navigation. In all domains, the generative models we consider do well on existing diagnostics for assessing world models, but our evaluation metrics reveal their world models to be far less coherent than they appear. Such incoherence creates fragility: using a generative model to solve related but subtly different tasks can lead to failures. Building generative models that meaningfully capture the underlying logic of the domains they model would be immensely valuable; our results suggest new ways to assess how close a given model is to that goal.

It is well known that accurate probabilistic predictors can be trained through empirical risk minimisation with proper scoring rules as loss functions. While such learners capture so-called aleatoric uncertainty of predictions, various machine learning methods have recently been developed with the goal to let the learner also represent its epistemic uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge and data. An emerging branch of the literature proposes the use of a second-order learner that provides predictions in terms of distributions on probability distributions. However, recent work has revealed serious theoretical shortcomings for second-order predictors based on loss minimisation. In this paper, we generalise these findings and prove a more fundamental result: There seems to be no loss function that provides an incentive for a second-order learner to faithfully represent its epistemic uncertainty in the same manner as proper scoring rules do for standard (first-order) learners. As a main mathematical tool to prove this result, we introduce the generalised notion of second-order scoring rules.

Water looks unchanged as it warms, then at a critical point it boils. We ask whether long-horizon language agents show an analogous transition in their implicit world models. In some parameter settings, changing state load by a small amount, or adding a single step of horizon, leaves behavior nearly unchanged; near a critical boundary, the same small change causes a sudden world collapse. We study this effect in a deterministic task family with exact per-step gold state. A large grid search over state cardinality, dependency density, horizon, branching, observation mode, and mutation rate reveals a phase diagram: a solved plateau, a narrow transition band, and a collapse floor. Per-step traces show the mechanism: world-state fidelity fails before action validity, so the agent is not merely choosing a bad action; it is acting from a corrupted world. Stronger models translate the critical boundary but do not remove the qualitative transition. These results make world-model collapse a measurable bottleneck for long-horizon agents.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is the standard paradigm for domain adaptation, yet it frequently incurs the cost of catastrophic forgetting. In sharp contrast, on-policy Reinforcement Learning (RL) effectively preserves general capabilities. We investigate this discrepancy and identify a fundamental distributional gap: while RL aligns with the model's internal belief, SFT forces the model to fit external supervision. This mismatch often manifests as "Confident Conflicts" tokens characterized by low probability but low entropy. In these instances, the model is highly confident in its own prediction but is forced to learn a divergent ground truth, triggering destructive gradient updates. To address this, we propose Entropy-Adaptive Fine-Tuning (EAFT). Unlike methods relying solely on prediction probability, EAFT utilizes token-level entropy as a gating mechanism to distinguish between epistemic uncertainty and knowledge conflict. This allows the model to learn from uncertain samples while suppressing gradients on conflicting data. Extensive experiments on Qwen and GLM series (ranging from 4B to 32B parameters) across mathematical, medical, and agentic domains confirm our hypothesis. EAFT consistently matches the downstream performance of standard SFT while significantly mitigating the degradation of general capabilities.

Post-trained language models produce less varied outputs than their base counterparts. This output diversity collapse undermines inference-time scaling methods that rely on varied samples, and risks homogenizing model outputs on creative and value-laden tasks. Prior work attributes collapse to specific post-training methods, without separating the role of training data composition from the method, or the generation format from the model weights. We trace output diversity through three parallel post-training lineages of Olmo 3, Think (chain-of-thought distillation), Instruct (broad multi-source data), and RL-Zero, across 15 tasks and four text diversity metrics. We find that the location of collapse co-varies with data composition: the Think lineage loses most semantic diversity at supervised fine-tuning, and the effect of DPO is larger in Instruct than in Think. Suppressing chain-of-thought reasoning at inference in Think models drops accuracy on hard tasks, yet leaves answer-level diversity unchanged, showing that the collapse is embedded in the model weights by training data, not imposed by the generation format. Decomposing diversity loss on six verifiable tasks into a quality-control component (removal of incorrect outputs) and a residual component (genuine narrowing among correct outputs) reveals that the split is task-dependent, and Think models retain more correct-answer diversity than Instruct despite collapsing more in aggregate. Our results indicate that diversity collapse is determined during training by data composition and cannot be addressed at inference time alone.

The pervasiveness of proprietary language models has raised critical privacy concerns, necessitating advancements in private inference (PI), where computations are performed directly on encrypted data without revealing users' sensitive information. While PI offers a promising solution, its practical deployment is hindered by substantial communication and latency overheads, primarily stemming from nonlinear operations. To address this, we introduce an information-theoretic framework to characterize the role of nonlinearities in decoder-only language models, laying a principled foundation for optimizing transformer-architectures tailored to the demands of PI. By leveraging Shannon's entropy as a quantitative measure, we uncover the previously unexplored dual significance of nonlinearities: beyond ensuring training stability, they are crucial for maintaining attention head diversity. Specifically, we find that their removal triggers two critical failure modes: {\em entropy collapse} in deeper layers that destabilizes training, and {\em entropic overload} in earlier layers that leads to under-utilization of Multi-Head Attention's (MHA) representational capacity. We propose an entropy-guided attention mechanism paired with a novel entropy regularization technique to mitigate entropic overload. Additionally, we explore PI-friendly alternatives to layer normalization for preventing entropy collapse and stabilizing the training of LLMs with reduced-nonlinearities. Our study bridges the gap between information theory and architectural design, establishing entropy dynamics as a principled guide for developing efficient PI architectures. The code and implementation are available at https://github.com/Nandan91/entropy-guided-attention-llm{entropy-guided-llm}.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to track others epistemic state, makes humans efficient collaborators. AI agents need the same capacity in multi agent settings, yet existing benchmarks mostly test literal ToM by asking direct belief questions. The ability act optimally on implicit beliefs in embodied environments, called functional ToM, remains largely untested. We introduce EnactToM, an evolving benchmark of 300 embodied multi-agent tasks set in a 3D household with partial observability, private information, and constrained communication. Each task is formally verified for solvability and required epistemic depth, and new tasks are generated increase difficulty as models improve. On the hard split, all seven evaluated frontier models score 0.0% Pass^3 on functional task completion, while averaging 45.0% on literal belief probes. Manual analysis traces 93% of sampled failures to epistemic coordination breakdowns such as withheld information, ignored partner constraints, and misallocated messages, providing a concrete target for future work.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

While Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) can enhance LLM reasoning, its training process poses a critical risk: entropy collapse. This phenomenon is a rapid loss of policy diversity, stemming from the exploration-exploitation imbalance and leading to a lack of generalization. Recent entropy-intervention methods aim to prevent entropy collapse, yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. In this paper, we conduct a quantitative analysis to reveal token-level entropy changes and how existing entropy intervention methods help avoid entropy collapse. Our findings point out a fundamental limitation of existing methods: they attempt to control entropy dynamics indirectly. By only affecting related factors, such as the advantage signal and generation probability, their effectiveness is inherently limited and could potentially fail. To address this limitation, we introduce an entropy-change-aware reweighting scheme, namely Stabilizing Token-level Entropy-changE via Reweighting (STEER), that adaptively stabilizes entropy dynamics through fine-grained token-level adjustments. Our approach mitigates over-exploitation while fostering robust exploration. Extensive experiments demonstrate that STEER significantly mitigates entropy collapse, stabilizes entropy dynamics, and achieves stronger downstream performance across various mathematical reasoning benchmarks \footnote{Our code is available at https://github.com/zz-haooo/STEER.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames