Daily Papers

Tactile Internet (TI) security analytics must balance reliable thresholded decisions with constrained computational and measurement resources. We study this tension for finite-shot hybrid quantum anomaly inference and introduce the Adaptive-Shot Variational Quantum Circuit (AS-VQC) policy. This validation-calibrated policy begins each record at 128 shots and cumulatively escalates through 256, 512, and 1024 shots only when the finite-shot anomaly score remains close to a validation-selected security threshold. The quantum scorer is evaluated as an off-path security analytics component rather than part of the haptic critical path. Using a 4,875-record CESNET-TimeSeries24-derived aggregate-flow benchmark, leakage-safe random, entity-group-disjoint, and temporal holdouts, and five trained quantum neural network (QNN) checkpoints per holdout, the primary AS-VQC-95 (beta = 0.95) policy averages 129.2, 276.9, and 131.2 shots per record, saving 87.4%, 73.0%, and 87.2% of the uniform 1024-shot baseline (Fixed-1024), respectively. The decision disagreement with analytic (exact-expectation) inference is 0.771%, 0.409%, and 0.635%, lower than both the uniform 128-shot baseline (Fixed-128) and a matched-budget shuffled-allocation control. Fixed-1024 remains more decision-stable, establishing a measurable reliability-resource trade-off rather than cost-free equivalence. A more conservative AS-VQC-99 (beta = 0.99) further reduces disagreement while using fewer than 512 average shots across all holdouts. These results show that finite quantum measurements can be treated as an inference resource and concentrated on boundary-sensitive TI-security decisions while exposing checkpoint-dependent escalation under unseen-entity conditions.

Machine learning classifiers for bearing fault detection produce scalar confidence scores that conflate confident errors with genuinely ambiguous predictions, and the conventional truth/falsity pair (F = 1 - T) is algebraically redundant by construction. We operationalize a refined neutrosophic decomposition of a Random Forest + XGBoost + Logistic Regression ensemble into four indicators -- T-hat (top-class evidence), F-hat (best-competitor evidence), predictive entropy I1-hat, and decision disagreement I2-hat -- evaluated on two bearing benchmarks (CWRU and JNU, 600-1000 rpm) under a leave-one-condition-out protocol. On CWRU, after correcting a file-to-class mapping error, the ensemble reaches 100.00 percent accuracy on three of four held-out loads (92.27 percent on the fourth), leaving too few errors for uncertainty analysis. On JNU, holding out 1000 rpm, accuracy collapses to 40.64 percent, below a majority-class baseline; Logistic Regression (57.91 percent) generalizes far better than the tree ensembles. I1-hat shows a robust association with error beyond T-hat/F-hat, while I2-hat contributes little; standalone Logistic Regression confidence outperforms the full decomposition, a boundary condition we report honestly. Two further results extend this: fusing a time-domain and a frequency-domain model of the same signal and scoring their Jensen-Shannon divergence beats that model own entropy (AURC 0.29 vs. 0.36 on the standard split; 0.54 vs. 0.73 under a harder single-condition reproduction), the only indicator moving correctly under a CWRU-versus-JNU distributional-shift contrast; and, on CWRU alone, literature-verified bearing fault frequencies, correctly demodulated via the envelope spectrum, separate most fault classes almost perfectly (99.57 percent) using three interpretable features. Code, logs, and figures are released for independent verification.

In legal decisions, split votes (SV) occur when judges cannot reach a unanimous decision, posing a difficulty for lawyers who must navigate diverse legal arguments and opinions. In high-stakes domains, understanding the alignment of perceived difficulty between humans and AI systems is crucial to build trust. However, existing NLP calibration methods focus on a classifier's awareness of predictive performance, measured against the human majority class, overlooking inherent human label variation (HLV). This paper explores split votes as naturally observable human disagreement and value pluralism. We collect judges' vote distributions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and present SV-ECHR, a case outcome classification (COC) dataset with SV information. We build a taxonomy of disagreement with SV-specific subcategories. We further assess the alignment of perceived difficulty between models and humans, as well as confidence- and human-calibration of COC models. We observe limited alignment with the judge vote distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic exploration of calibration to human judgements in legal NLP. Our study underscores the necessity for further research on measuring and enhancing model calibration considering HLV in legal decision tasks.

The National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) provides evidence-based guidelines for cancer treatment. Translating complex patient presentations into guideline-compliant treatment recommendations is time-intensive, requires specialized expertise, and is prone to error. Advances in large language model (LLM) capabilities promise to reduce the time required to generate treatment recommendations and improve accuracy. We present an LLM agent-based approach to automatically generate guideline-concordant treatment trajectories for patients with non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC). Our contributions are threefold. First, we construct a novel longitudinal dataset of 121 cases of NSCLC patients that includes clinical encounters, diagnostic results, and medical histories, each expertly annotated with the corresponding NCCN guideline trajectories by board-certified oncologists. Second, we demonstrate that existing LLMs possess domain-specific knowledge that enables high-quality proxy benchmark generation for both model development and evaluation, achieving strong correlation (Spearman coefficient r=0.88, RMSE = 0.08) with expert-annotated benchmarks. Third, we develop a hybrid approach combining expensive human annotations with model consistency information to create both the agent framework that predicts the relevant guidelines for a patient, as well as a meta-classifier that verifies prediction accuracy with calibrated confidence scores for treatment recommendations (AUROC=0.800), a critical capability for communicating the accuracy of outputs, custom-tailoring tradeoffs in performance, and supporting regulatory compliance. This work establishes a framework for clinically viable LLM-based guideline adherence systems that balance accuracy, interpretability, and regulatory requirements while reducing annotation costs, providing a scalable pathway toward automated clinical decision support.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous decision agents in settings with asymmetric error costs: hiring (missed talent vs wasted interviews), medical triage (missed emergencies vs unnecessary escalation), and fraud detection (approved fraud vs declined legitimate payments). The dominant design queries a single LLM for a posterior over states, thresholds "confidence," and acts; we prove this is inadequate for sequential decisions with costs. We propose a Bayesian, cost-aware multi-LLM orchestration framework that treats LLMs as approximate likelihood models rather than classifiers. For each candidate state, we elicit likelihoods via contrastive prompting, aggregate across diverse models with robust statistics, and update beliefs with Bayes rule under explicit priors as new evidence arrives. This enables coherent belief updating, expected-cost action selection, principled information gathering via value of information, and fairness gains via ensemble bias mitigation. In resume screening with costs of 40000 USD per missed hire, 2500 USD per interview, and 150 USD per phone screen, experiments on 1000 resumes using five LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, Gemini Pro, Grok, DeepSeek) reduce total cost by 294000 USD (34 percent) versus the best single-LLM baseline and improve demographic parity by 45 percent (max group gap 22 to 5 percentage points). Ablations attribute 51 percent of savings to multi-LLM aggregation, 43 percent to sequential updating, and 20 percent to disagreement-triggered information gathering, consistent with the theoretical benefits of correct probabilistic foundations.

In AI-assisted decision-making, humans often passively review AI's suggestion and decide whether to accept or reject it as a whole. In such a paradigm, humans are found to rarely trigger analytical thinking and face difficulties in communicating the nuances of conflicting opinions to the AI when disagreements occur. To tackle this challenge, we propose Human-AI Deliberation, a novel framework to promote human reflection and discussion on conflicting human-AI opinions in decision-making. Based on theories in human deliberation, this framework engages humans and AI in dimension-level opinion elicitation, deliberative discussion, and decision updates. To empower AI with deliberative capabilities, we designed Deliberative AI, which leverages large language models (LLMs) as a bridge between humans and domain-specific models to enable flexible conversational interactions and faithful information provision. An exploratory evaluation on a graduate admissions task shows that Deliberative AI outperforms conventional explainable AI (XAI) assistants in improving humans' appropriate reliance and task performance. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of participant behavior, perception, user experience, and open-ended feedback, we draw implications for future AI-assisted decision tool design.

A decision model can give probabilities that sum to one for every question yet disagree with itself when the same decision is broken into smaller steps. We study this form of probabilistic coherence in Jev and the English Laya checkpoint, using 2,500 matched examples per system across TREC, CLINC150, and MASSIVE. Across 72,000 classification questions, we compare direct fine-label predictions with broad-category probabilities and predictions reconstructed through those categories. Both systems show substantial disagreement: mean category-level total variation ranges from 0.219 to 0.349 for Jev and from 0.424 to 0.689 for Laya, on a scale where zero means exact agreement. The consequences differ sharply. On CLINC150, reconstruction reduces Jev's accuracy by 22.9 percentage points (paired 95% bootstrap interval: [-24.9, -20.9]) and improves Laya's by 21.3 points ([18.0, 24.5]). The same directions hold across all three datasets, with all six unadjusted accuracy-change intervals excluding zero. Improved accuracy can also accompany less reliable confidence: on MASSIVE, Laya gains 9.2 accuracy points while its expected calibration error rises from 0.046 to 0.124. Error analysis identifies both broad-category mistakes and within-category confusions. These findings show why decision systems need joint evaluation of accuracy, confidence calibration, and probability coherence in the workflow used by an application.

In product entity resolution, relationship definitions constantly evolve with business needs, yet adapting to each change traditionally requires slow, costly human annotation that is often noisy and carries no reasoning. Large vision-language models (VLMs) prompted zero-shot can adapt to a new definition immediately and supply the reasoning that human labels lack, but their cost and latency are prohibitive at production scale. We present MERGED, a distillation framework that transfers not just labels but structured reasoning from large teacher VLMs into a compact 7B-parameter student, requiring no human annotation. Multiple teachers label each product pair and articulate the reasoning behind their decision: agreement pairs supply supervised fine-tuning, while disagreements are resolved by a meta-judge into preference pairs for Direct Preference Optimization. Evaluated against human-labeled ground truth on a multilingual e-commerce dataset, the resulting student improves PR-AUC by 13.79% over the same backbone trained on human labels and surpasses the larger Qwen2.5-32B-VL baseline by 6.32% at 6x lower cost, while also yielding tighter label-reasoning alignment (over 10% above Qwen2.5-32B-VL). Moreover, re-applying MERGED from an existing checkpoint adapts to a new relationship definition with only 10K samples, improving PR-AUC by 6.97% over zero-shot and outperforming from-scratch training. MERGED enables rapid adaptation to evolving relationship definitions, supporting a new one in days rather than months, at a cost and latency suitable for large-scale industrial deployment.

On-policy distillation (OPD) provides teacher supervision on student-generated trajectories, but a single trajectory realizes only one continuation at each decision, limiting supervision coverage under a finite sampling budget. We propose BranchOPD (Branching On-Policy Distillation), which selects informative decision points using student uncertainty and teacher-student disagreement, resamples student-policy continuations from shared prefixes, and applies token-level teacher supervision to both main trajectories and branches. BranchOPD operates at token-level decisions in mathematics and within-turn decisions in agent tasks. Shared-prefix reuse reduces student-generated token costs by approximately 19% on ALFWorld and 31% on WebShop relative to seven independent trajectories. We also introduce protocol-boundary repair (PBR), which uses targeted supervision under protocol constraints to mitigate repetition and wasted generation. BranchOPD outperforms Vanilla OPD and Multi-Rollout OPD (n=7) across all evaluated benchmarks, with gains over Vanilla OPD of 18.55 percentage points in mean mathematics accuracy over 16 sampled answers (avg@16) and 13.8 points in mean ALFWorld ID/OOD success. Mechanistic analyses and selection ablations show that branching at uncertain decisions expands subsequent behavior coverage and outperforms random selection and turn-initial branching.

LLM-as-judge ("grader") components are now standard in evaluation harnesses, including safety evaluations where a pass/fail verdict may gate downstream deployment decisions. A widespread assumption is that setting the grader's sampling temperature to 0 makes grading deterministic. We test this assumption against a real safety-evaluation codebase (Japan AISI's open-source aisev) and show it fails on two levels. First, the harness invokes its grader without setting temperature or seed; the underlying provider silently applies its default of 1.0, so items near the decision boundary flip pass/fail across identical runs (per-item disagreement up to ~50% over 20 runs). Second, pinning temperature=0 reduces but does not eliminate flips: across 690 API calls spanning two providers, three model tiers, and five sampling configurations, 1-2 of 7 borderline items remain non-reproducible even under forced greedy decoding (top_k=1). Claude Opus 4.7/4.8 has since deprecated temperature entirely, rendering the primary mitigation inapplicable to newer model generations. These findings expose a structural gap: evaluation harnesses that report single-run verdicts without variance or grader-disagreement metrics can present noise as a safety property. We release a reproduction harness (690 calls, 7 conditions) and recommend that harnesses treat grader disagreement as a first-class health metric alongside the scores themselves.

Recently, diffusion policy has shown impressive results in handling multi-modal tasks in robotic manipulation. However, it has fundamental limitations in out-of-distribution failures that persist due to compounding errors and its limited capability to extrapolate. One way to address these limitations is robot-gated DAgger, an interactive imitation learning with a robot query system to actively seek expert help during policy rollout. While robot-gated DAgger has high potential for learning at scale, existing methods like Ensemble-DAgger struggle with highly expressive policies: They often misinterpret policy disagreements as uncertainty at multi-modal decision points. To address this problem, we introduce Diff-DAgger, an efficient robot-gated DAgger algorithm that leverages the training objective of diffusion policy. We evaluate Diff-DAgger across different robot tasks including stacking, pushing, and plugging, and show that Diff-DAgger improves the task failure prediction by 39.0%, the task completion rate by 20.6%, and reduces the wall-clock time by a factor of 7.8. We hope that this work opens up a path for efficiently incorporating expressive yet data-hungry policies into interactive robot learning settings. The project website is available at: https://diffdagger.github.io.

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.

Evaluating the performance of machine learning models under distribution shift is challenging, especially when we only have unlabeled data from the shifted (target) domain, along with labeled data from the original (source) domain. Recent work suggests that the notion of disagreement, the degree to which two models trained with different randomness differ on the same input, is a key to tackle this problem. Experimentally, disagreement and prediction error have been shown to be strongly connected, which has been used to estimate model performance. Experiments have led to the discovery of the disagreement-on-the-line phenomenon, whereby the classification error under the target domain is often a linear function of the classification error under the source domain; and whenever this property holds, disagreement under the source and target domain follow the same linear relation. In this work, we develop a theoretical foundation for analyzing disagreement in high-dimensional random features regression; and study under what conditions the disagreement-on-the-line phenomenon occurs in our setting. Experiments on CIFAR-10-C, Tiny ImageNet-C, and Camelyon17 are consistent with our theory and support the universality of the theoretical findings.

Disagreements are common in online discussions. Disagreement may foster collaboration and improve the quality of a discussion under some conditions. Although there exist methods for recognizing disagreement, a deeper understanding of factors that influence disagreement is lacking in the literature. We investigate a hypothesis that differences in personal values are indicative of disagreement in online discussions. We show how state-of-the-art models can be used for estimating values in online discussions and how the estimated values can be aggregated into value profiles. We evaluate the estimated value profiles based on human-annotated agreement labels. We find that the dissimilarity of value profiles correlates with disagreement in specific cases. We also find that including value information in agreement prediction improves performance.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Disagreement in annotation is a common phenomenon in the development of NLP datasets and serves as a valuable source of insight. While majority voting remains the dominant strategy for aggregating labels, recent work has explored modeling individual annotators to preserve their perspectives. However, modeling each annotator is resource-intensive and remains underexplored across various NLP tasks. We propose an agreement-based clustering technique to model the disagreement between the annotators. We conduct comprehensive experiments in 40 datasets in 18 typologically diverse languages, covering three subjective NLP tasks: sentiment analysis, emotion classification, and hate speech detection. We evaluate four aggregation approaches: majority vote, ensemble, multi-label, and multitask. The results demonstrate that agreement-based clustering can leverage the full spectrum of annotator perspectives and significantly enhance classification performance in subjective NLP tasks compared to majority voting and individual annotator modeling. Regarding the aggregation approach, the multi-label and multitask approaches are better for modeling clustered annotators than an ensemble and model majority vote.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

Limited attention forces organizations to decide not only how much to discuss, but also which issues merit discussion. We study strategic communication about a multidimensional decision when a receiver can respond only along a few endogenously chosen issues. Players agree on the ideal action but prioritize different errors. In equilibrium, communicated and omitted issues must be statistically unrelated and separable according to the sender's preferences. Thus, the sender's priorities determine the agenda; the receiver's do not. Synchronized priorities raise the receiver's best equilibrium payoff but lower his worst, so he may prefer a less synchronized sender.

Multimodal AI models are increasingly used in fields like healthcare, finance, and autonomous driving, where information is drawn from multiple sources or modalities such as images, texts, audios, videos. However, effectively managing uncertainty - arising from noise, insufficient evidence, or conflicts between modalities - is crucial for reliable decision-making. Current uncertainty-aware machine learning methods leveraging, for example, evidence averaging, or evidence accumulation underestimate uncertainties in high-conflict scenarios. Moreover, the state-of-the-art evidence averaging strategy is not order invariant and fails to scale to multiple modalities. To address these challenges, we propose a novel multimodal learning method with order-invariant evidence fusion and introduce a conflict-based discounting mechanism that reallocates uncertain mass when unreliable modalities are detected. We provide both theoretical analysis and experimental validation, demonstrating that unlike the previous work, the proposed approach effectively distinguishes between conflicting and non-conflicting samples based on the provided uncertainty estimates, and outperforms the previous models in uncertainty-based conflict detection.

Multi-agent LLM systems often fail not for lack of candidate answers, but because they have no persistent mechanism for deciding which incompatible claim should currently be trusted. Majority vote, debate, and judge-based selection choose an output without recording which claim wins, which is contested, or why a later update supersedes it. We present LatticeMind, a conflict-aware structured memory that handles contradiction at write time. It maintains explicit item status, applies cheap symbolic conflict checks, and invokes LLM reconciliation only for unresolved semantic cases. On a label-blind ConflictBank evaluation that removes source-name hints, LatticeMind reaches 0.97 accuracy versus 0.61 for the strongest aggregation baseline, with the gap significant at p<10^{-6} by paired McNemar test. Ablations show that removing the checker or the reconciler costs 12 to 14 points. On four secondary planning benchmarks the picture is mixed: LatticeMind beats naive merge on three of four, but does not replace deliberation methods on tasks rewarding iterative search.

Human annotation variation (i.e., annotation disagreements) is common in NLP and often reflects important information such as task subjectivity and sample ambiguity. While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for automatic annotation to reduce human effort, their evaluation often focuses on predicting the majority-voted "ground truth" labels. It is still unclear, however, whether these models also capture informative human annotation variation. Our work addresses this gap by extensively evaluating LLMs' ability to predict annotation disagreements without access to repeated human labels. Our results show that LLMs struggle with modeling disagreements, which can be overlooked by majority label-based evaluations. Notably, while RLVR-style (Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards) reasoning generally boosts LLM performance, it degrades performance in disagreement prediction. Our findings highlight the critical need for evaluating and improving LLM annotators in disagreement modeling. Code and data at https://github.com/EdisonNi-hku/Disagreement_Prediction.

Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides agents with evidence that other similar agents are likely to cooperate too, resulting in gains from trade for all. This could be a crucial consideration for altruists. I develop a game-theoretic model of ECL as an incomplete information bargaining problem. The model incorporates uncertainty about others' value systems and empirical situations, and addresses the problem of selecting a compromise outcome. Using the model, I investigate issues with ECL and outline open technical and philosophical questions. I show that all cooperators must maximize the same weighted sum of utility functions to reach a Pareto optimal outcome. However, I argue against selecting a compromise outcome implicitly by normalizing utility functions. I review bargaining theory and argue that the Nash bargaining solution could be a relevant Schelling point. I introduce dependency equilibria (Spohn 2007), an equilibrium concept suitable for ECL, and generalize a folk theorem showing that the Nash bargaining solution is a dependency equilibrium. I discuss gains from trade given uncertain beliefs about other agents and analyze how these gains decrease in several toy examples as the belief in another agent decreases. Finally, I discuss open issues in my model. First, the Nash bargaining solution is sometimes not coalitionally stable, meaning that a subset of cooperators can unilaterally improve payoffs by deviating from the compromise. I investigate conditions under which stable payoff vectors exist. Second, I discuss how to model agents' default actions without ECL.

Much of the success of multi-agent debates depends on carefully choosing the right parameters. The decision-making protocol stands out as it can highly impact final model answers, depending on how decisions are reached. Systematic comparison of decision protocols is difficult because many studies alter multiple discussion parameters beyond the protocol. So far, it has been largely unknown how decision-making influences different tasks. This work systematically evaluates the impact of seven decision protocols (e.g., majority voting, unanimity consensus). We change only one variable at a time - the decision protocol - to analyze how different methods affect the collaboration between agents and measure differences in knowledge and reasoning tasks. Our results show that voting protocols improve performance by 13.2% in reasoning tasks and consensus protocols by 2.8% in knowledge tasks compared to other decision protocols. Increasing the number of agents improves performance, while more discussion rounds before voting reduce it. To improve decision-making by increasing answer diversity, we propose two new methods, All-Agents Drafting (AAD) and Collective Improvement (CI). Our methods improve task performance by up to 3.3% with AAD and up to 7.4% with CI. This work demonstrates the importance of decision-making in multi-agent debates beyond scaling.

We introduce a dataset of natural-language questions in the decision theory of so-called Newcomb-like problems. Newcomb-like problems include, for instance, decision problems in which an agent interacts with a similar other agent, and thus has to reason about the fact that the other agent will likely reason in similar ways. Evaluating LLM reasoning about Newcomb-like problems is important because interactions between foundation-model-based agents will often be Newcomb-like. Some ways of reasoning about Newcomb-like problems may allow for greater cooperation between models. Our dataset contains both capabilities questions (i.e., questions with a unique, uncontroversially correct answer) and attitude questions (i.e., questions about which decision theorists would disagree). We use our dataset for an investigation of decision-theoretical capabilities and expressed attitudes and their interplay in existing models (different models by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, GDM, Reka, etc.), as well as models under simple prompt-based interventions. We find, among other things, that attitudes vary significantly between existing models; that high capabilities are associated with attitudes more favorable toward so-called evidential decision theory; and that attitudes are consistent across different types of questions.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Overlapping calendar invitations force busy professionals to repeatedly decide which meetings to attend, reschedule, or decline. We refer to this preference-driven decision process as calendar conflict resolution. Automating this decision process is crucial yet challenging. Scheduling logistics can drain hours, and human delegation often fails at scale, which motivates us to ask: Can we trust large language models (LLMs) or language agents to manage time? To enable a systematic study of this question, we introduce CalConflictBench, a benchmark for long-horizon calendar conflict resolution. In CalConflictBench, conflicts are presented to agents round-by-round over a calendar year, requiring them to infer and adapt to user preferences progressively. Our experiments show that current LLM agents perform poorly with high error rates, e.g., Qwen-3-30B-Think has an average error rate of 35%. To address this gap, we propose PEARL, a reinforcement-learning framework that (i) augments the language agent with an external preference memory that stores and updates inferred strategies (e.g., attendee priorities, topic importance, time/location preferences), and (ii) optimizes the agent with round-wise rewards that directly supervise decision correctness, ranking quality, and memory usage across rounds. Experiments on CalConflictBench show that PEARL achieves an error reduction rate of 0.76 and a 55% improvement in average error rate compared to the strongest baseline.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Annotator disagreement is ubiquitous in natural language processing (NLP) tasks. There are multiple reasons for such disagreements, including the subjectivity of the task, difficult cases, unclear guidelines, and so on. Rather than simply aggregating labels to obtain data annotations, we instead try to directly model the diverse perspectives of the annotators, and explicitly account for annotators' idiosyncrasies in the modeling process by creating representations for each annotator (annotator embeddings) and also their annotations (annotation embeddings). In addition, we propose TID-8, The Inherent Disagreement - 8 dataset, a benchmark that consists of eight existing language understanding datasets that have inherent annotator disagreement. We test our approach on TID-8 and show that our approach helps models learn significantly better from disagreements on six different datasets in TID-8 while increasing model size by fewer than 1% parameters. By capturing the unique tendencies and subjectivity of individual annotators through embeddings, our representations prime AI models to be inclusive of diverse viewpoints.

Three of the most popular methods for training language models to reason look like three different tricks. They are not. All three adjust a single number: standard deviation, reflecting how much a prompt's sampled answers disagree. When such a model is trained, it answers each problem many times, and an automatic checker marks every answer right or wrong. The standard deviation of those marks measures the disagreement: largest when the answers split evenly between right and wrong, and zero when they all agree. Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) divides by this number, GRPO Done Right (Dr. GRPO) drops the division, and Decoupled Clip and Dynamic Sampling Policy Optimization (DAPO) discards the groups where it is zero. Each is presented as its own fix, yet this paper proves they are three settings of one dial. That dial is not cosmetic: for right-or-wrong rewards, the disagreement is exactly the size of the training update, the group-standard-deviation identity. A split group teaches the most, while a unanimous group teaches nothing and falls silent. The same result says which problems deserve the most weight and how many tries each one needs. This paper confirms the intuition on a large real difficulty dataset (Big-Math) and in a controlled training run. What looks like a harmless normalization step is the dial that decides where learning happens and how strongly.

A service system may use the same categories to assign standard allocations and to check whether each service is fulfilled. Finer categories can match individual needs more closely, but they divide the observations available for monitoring. We study this conflict for a fixed menu from which participants select by declaring a category, with fulfilment assessed from each category's aggregate outcomes during a fixed period. We relate allocation loss to variation in preferred allocations within categories and identify conditions under which aggregate observations preserve the verification performance of individual records. For nested refinements under stated utility and observation assumptions, an allocation-loss tolerance and a per-category detection target define a feasibility band. Categories must be fine enough to provide suitable allocations but sufficiently populated to support verification. A source-dependent lower bound on declaration entropy and a minimum contributor requirement give necessary information and population constraints. For an explicit finite population with quadratic utility and binary service outcomes, we prove the exact feasible range across all categorical designs and exhibit designs attaining the information lower bound at specified tolerances. The results provide conditions for choosing categories jointly for allocation and verification.

A semantic decision engine such as Jev can return a valid answer and still miss a network deadline, select an infeasible action or leave the service unverified. We systematize 139 paper families by decision interface, execution path and check ownership. Fifty families claim that their engine fits a control loop or time budget, but only four support the claim with matched measurement. Across all 139, four report deadline attainment. The gap concentrates where the decision has no deterministic computation step. Those 72 families make 22 of the claims, none supported, and name a coverage owner in only two. Bounded tests under one event model show that each gap can reverse an admission verdict. A decision that meets a 10 s budget for every isolated request meets it for none once decisions queue ahead of replayed execution times. The same engine passes one coverage check and fails another. We derive a minimum reporting record, design rules and a research agenda for admitting decision engines to control loops.

As LLMs increasingly serve as moral advisors and agents, they must address conflicts between competing values. Yet prior work on moral dilemmas overlooks a central aspect of human moral cognition: imagining alternatives beyond the given options. We introduce MoralAltDataset, comprising 307 Advisor and AI-facing Agent dilemmas augmented with compromise and reframed alternatives. We compare human and LLM judgments in binary and four-option settings. Across human participants and 15 LLMs, aggregate moral choice distributions differ substantially between the two settings, with compromise often preferred over either original binary option. Results show value shifts and stronger human-LLM agreement on alternatives. Source-stratified results reveal a descriptive gap: human alternative-selection rates are similar across authoring sources, whereas LLMs select GPT-5-authored alternatives substantially more often. We then compare human-authored alternatives with outputs from three representative LLMs through pairwise preference and expert-based evaluations. Alternatives from these LLMs are generally preferred and better satisfy fine-grained structural and ethical criteria, while revealing a trade-off between structural quality and practical feasibility. Our dataset is available here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/jongchanch/MoralAltDataset, and our project page is here: https://jongchanchoi.com/moral-imagination

Navigating high-stakes dilemmas involving conflicting values is challenging even for humans, let alone for AI. Yet prior work in evaluating the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in such situations has been limited to everyday scenarios. To close this gap, this work first introduces CLASH (Character perspective-based LLM Assessments in Situations with High-stakes), a meticulously curated dataset consisting of 345 high-impact dilemmas along with 3,795 individual perspectives of diverse values. In particular, we design CLASH in a way to support the study of critical aspects of value-based decision-making processes which are missing from prior work, including understanding decision ambivalence and psychological discomfort as well as capturing the temporal shifts of values in characters' perspectives. By benchmarking 10 open and closed frontier models, we uncover several key findings. (1) Even the strongest models, such as GPT-4o and Claude-Sonnet, achieve less than 50% accuracy in identifying situations where the decision should be ambivalent, while they perform significantly better in clear-cut scenarios. (2) While LLMs reasonably predict psychological discomfort as marked by human, they inadequately comprehend perspectives involving value shifts, indicating a need for LLMs to reason over complex values. (3) Our experiments also reveal a significant correlation between LLMs' value preferences and their steerability towards a given value. (4) Finally, LLMs exhibit greater steerability when engaged in value reasoning from a third-party perspective, compared to a first-person setup, though certain value pairs benefit uniquely from the first-person framing.

Machine learning models always make a prediction, even when it is likely to be inaccurate. This behavior should be avoided in many decision support applications, where mistakes can have severe consequences. Albeit already studied in 1970, machine learning with rejection recently gained interest. This machine learning subfield enables machine learning models to abstain from making a prediction when likely to make a mistake. This survey aims to provide an overview on machine learning with rejection. We introduce the conditions leading to two types of rejection, ambiguity and novelty rejection, which we carefully formalize. Moreover, we review and categorize strategies to evaluate a model's predictive and rejective quality. Additionally, we define the existing architectures for models with rejection and describe the standard techniques for learning such models. Finally, we provide examples of relevant application domains and show how machine learning with rejection relates to other machine learning research areas.

Decision APIs that return a probability for each option are routinely used as if those probabilities were properties of the options themselves. That reading is valid only if the model satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): adding an option that is neither the right answer nor its strongest rival should leave the odds between those two unchanged. We test this in a pre-registered study of jev-1.13.0, a hosted decision model, using 299,463 calls on intent classification (BANKING77, CLINC150) and topic classification (AG News). Every added option moves the log-odds between the gold label and the strongest wrong label: the root-mean-square systematic shift is 0.20-0.52 nats, 1.2 to 3 times the run-to-run variation, even when the added option takes at most 0.1% of the probability mass. The shifts are directional. An option similar to the wrong answer draws probability from it (+0.10 nats toward the gold label). A paraphrase of the wrong answer produces an intermediate pattern: the gold label's probability is almost conserved, but the paraphrase receives only about a third of the wrong answer's share rather than the half that strict substitution implies. The distortion grows steadily with the logarithm of the number of options, reaching about 1 nat at 255 options, and off-domain padding pushes the odds against the gold label. In contrast, questions packed into one call do not interact (bias < 0.001). Scoring each option with an independent yes/no question removes the option-set dependence but picks the right answer 8.7 points less often. Jev sits between two local baselines, an option-independent scorer and a prompt readout. Its probabilities are best read as relative to the option list they were computed over.

When retrieved evidence contradicts an agent's prior beliefs, does it revise its answer, acknowledge uncertainty, or persist with an incorrect conclusion? Existing evaluations of agentic systems focus primarily on task success, offering limited insight into how agents handle such conflicts. We propose to evaluate agents on epistemic humility (EH): the agent's willingness to recognize, act on, and communicate uncertainty during task execution. We operationalize EH through three trajectory-level behavioral dimensions: Identify, Solve, and Escalate (ISE). Through knowledge conflict, situations where the backbone language model's parametric knowledge contradicts the evidence it encounters, or where two contextual sources disagree, we evaluate two conflict settings: (1) controlled conflict and (2) naturally occurring conflict during multi-step agentic execution, each paired with matched no-conflict controls. Evaluating four agents, we find that higher task accuracy does not necessarily correspond to greater epistemic humility: some high-accuracy configurations recognize conflicts during execution but do not communicate unresolved uncertainty in their incorrect final answers. Trajectory-level analysis further reveals that agents frequently detect conflicts in early steps of execution but fail to maintain or resolve them in later steps. Finally, we show that model-level interventions can improve EH, but often at the cost of task accuracy, suggesting that epistemic humility emerges from the interaction among the backbone model, agent harness, and evaluation environment.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

Jev has attracted considerable attention for its rapid, generalizable decision-making, yet its medical reliability remains underexplored. To address this gap, our study compares various types of system-one decision models across 15 medical datasets comprising 8,742 instances under a unified protocol. Beyond accuracy, we assess decision stability and the ability to recognize unreliable decisions. Our results show that Jev rivals leading models on primarily text-driven tasks but is less effective on numerically driven tasks, revealing a distinct capability boundary. Under question-format variations, Jev maintains strong decision consistency and small accuracy fluctuations. StartLux-27B exhibits comparable consistency, while D3-27B achieves higher overall accuracy and a lower mean decision reversal rate. But these strengths do not extend to reliable abstention awareness: most evaluated models show limitations in both recognizing missing correct answers and using optional abstention. Moreover, we find that Jev's probability-based answer selection can be improved by changing how decisions are scored: normalizing option-wise binary scores yields higher retained accuracy than choice scoring. Taken together, our findings provide early guidance for improving and applying decision models in medicine.

Large language model (LLM) agents may perform well on isolated tasks yet drift into inconsistency over extended interaction. We evaluate temporal consistency in a controlled 20-step multi-agent setting inspired by delayed-gratification studies. At each step, an agent chooses between continuing to delay a reward or claiming it immediately (terminating the episode). Across a full-factorial manipulation of social visibility (private vs public), persona stressors, and deliberation policy, we run 84,540 trajectories spanning 8 model families. Treating the first reward-claim as a time-to-event outcome, we estimate Kaplan-Meier survival curves and fit discrete-time hazard regression to quantify how experimental factors shift failure risk over time. Then, to analyze rationales and language patterns associated with failure, we build a seven-category taxonomy from 13,780 deliberation traces from agents who choose to terminate the episode, using an LLM-assisted labeling paired with human audit (κ=0.83). Rationale profiles change systematically with time and context: early failures are more impulse-driven, later failures more fatigue- and cost-benefit-framed, while public settings increase norm-oriented justifications. We also find a deliberation-inconsistency association: among failures, longer deliberation correlates with higher rates of intra-rationale contradiction (simultaneous pro-delay and pro-claim statements), challenging the assumption that more reasoning text implies greater consistency. Together, the survival and rationale analyses reveal distinct temporal reliability regimes and model-specific "failure fingerprints", offering an evaluation lens for diagnosing inconsistency in multi-turn agent behavior.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Does conversational memory need LLM-extracted facts, or is selecting the right raw turns enough? Published results disagree. Extraction-based systems report gains from distilled facts. Recent studies find raw history with good ranking does as well, but disagree about whether ranking matters. We ran a pre-registered study on held-out LoCoMo conversations and LongMemEval. At a tight budget on LoCoMo, raw turns selected by a single call to Jev, a typed decision model, are non-inferior to an LLM-extraction memory (one-sided 95% bound -3.0 points against a -5-point margin). Blind human grading narrows the margin but does not change the result. Raw turns cost 3,061 times less to write, and the result holds with a second answer model. Within this study, reranking's gain shrinks as the budget grows. It adds 17.4 points on LoCoMo and 9.1 on LongMemEval when three of 30 candidates are kept. At generous budgets it adds 1.5 and 1.1, and extraction systems are more accurate. This suggests why published results disagree. At matched context, Jev selects as accurately as an LLM reranker (non-inferiority bound -2.0) at a third of the latency, and more accurately than a multi-call graph traversal. Reranking lowers correct abstention. Plans, code and graded answers are released.

The explosion in the use of software in important sociotechnical systems has renewed focus on the study of the way technical constructs reflect policies, norms, and human values. This effort requires the engagement of scholars and practitioners from many disciplines. And yet, these disciplines often conceptualize the operative values very differently while referring to them using the same vocabulary. The resulting conflation of ideas confuses discussions about values in technology at disciplinary boundaries. In the service of improving this situation, this paper examines the value of shared vocabularies, analytics, and other tools that facilitate conversations about values in light of these disciplinary specific conceptualizations, the role such tools play in furthering research and practice, outlines different conceptions of "fairness" deployed in discussions about computer systems, and provides an analytic tool for interdisciplinary discussions and collaborations around the concept of fairness. We use a case study of risk assessments in criminal justice applications to both motivate our effort--describing how conflation of different concepts under the banner of "fairness" led to unproductive confusion--and illustrate the value of the fairness analytic by demonstrating how the rigorous analysis it enables can assist in identifying key areas of theoretical, political, and practical misunderstanding or disagreement, and where desired support alignment or collaboration in the absence of consensus.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

As LLM agents undertake increasingly complex, long-horizon tasks, verifying their outputs becomes increasingly challenging. We study how verification capability can be strengthened with a fixed base model, without access to reference answers or grading rubrics at test time. Repeated sampling yields multiple rollouts that can contain complementary correct claims, but we need a reliable verification mechanism to determine which claims to trust. We first find that disagreement often exposes correct alternatives, while consensus can conceal errors. These observations motivate VeriHarness, which turns the underlying LLM a generator uses into an agentic verifier by giving it a workspace, evidence tools, and reusable verification skills. A disagreement resolver checks competing claims against environmental evidence, while a consensus challenger tests shared claims and searches for omitted requirements. Their findings guide the selection and revision of the final artifact. Across five long-horizon workspace benchmarks and two frontier models, VeriHarness achieves the highest selection scores among the evaluated baselines. Evidence-backed revision further improves average performance, bringing gains over a single rollout to 6.2 points with Gemini 3.5 Flash and 6.4 points with Claude Opus 4.8. We further show that verification skills can self-improve from failure feedback, demonstrating VeriHarness as a novel and critical approach for scaling long-horizon agentic verification. We release the full pool of approximately 26,000 rollouts across all five benchmarks and both models, produced at a cost of over $100,000, to support future research on agentic verification.

General decision models, such as Jev, have recently emerged as efficient alternatives to LLMs for structured judgment and selection. But what kinds of decisions can these models reliably make, and how does their behavior change when individual decisions are composed into larger systems? To study this, we introduce JEVal, a bilingual benchmark comprising 11,257 instances from 36 datasets across 10 application domains, and evaluate 25 model configurations spanning general decision models and generative LLMs. Our results show that (1) general decision models are most competitive when decisions can be resolved from available evidence, but weaken when they require specialist knowledge or faithful uncertainty estimation: they can often identify the most likely outcome while substantially overstating its probability. (2) In more dynamic and realistic systems involving long-horizon, multi-step interactions, the advantages of fast local decision making are offset by reliability failures at the system level. on τ-bench, faster local decisions reduce median episode time but lower task success as decision errors accumulate over long trajectories. (3) In large-scale social simulation, decision models approach strong generative LLMs on individual response prediction at substantially lower inference cost, yet remain weaker in user profiling and exhibit larger aggregate estimation errors and systematic bias. Finally, we propose InnerJev-4B and InnerJev-27B, which internalize an open-weight LLM's own reasoning into a single-pass first-token decision through Reasoning-to-Readout Self-Distillation, with InnerJev-27B performing on par with Jev on JEVal while answering a typical query in about 0.1 s.

Indic quality estimation (QE) and automatic post-editing (APE) data is spread across separate releases, so no single resource supports training and evaluation across tasks and language pairs on one footing. We consolidate the WMT 2020--2024 shared-task lineage with an extended English--Malayalam resource into \indicqe: 126{,}754 instances over nine directional pairs, with up to four label types aligned on the same segment, a direct assessment, a human post-edit, word-level OK/BAD tags and an error explanation, and a test set stratified over four difficulty axes. On it, we benchmark six prompted LLMs and three COMET metrics on segment-level QE, and three systems on APE. Two of the axes are defined partly on the direct assessment and select a compressed slice of it, so each axis is compared against a control drawn from the same language pair with the same score distribution. Only one survives that control: segments whose holistic and token-level quality signals conflict are ranked worse than equally-scored segments of the same language, for all nine systems and all seven pairs that carry the axis. Annotator disagreement, which looks second-hardest without the control, has no effect with it. Few-shot prompting costs every model leq 3.4B both correlation and output-format compliance. Within-language accuracy does not make scores comparable across pairs: of the three trained metrics, the one with the best within-language correlation loses most when the pairs are pooled. The benchmark and code will be released.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Multi-agent AI systems can be used for simulating collective decision-making in scientific and practical applications. They can also be used to introduce a diverse group discussion step in chatbot pipelines, enhancing the cultural sensitivity of the chatbot's responses. These applications, however, are predicated on the ability of AI agents to reliably adopt assigned personas and mimic human interactions. To see whether LLM agents satisfy these requirements, we examine AI agent ensembles engaged in cross-national collaboration and debate by analyzing their private responses and chat transcripts. Our findings suggest that multi-agent discussions can support collective AI decisions that more often reflect diverse perspectives, yet this effect is tempered by the agents' susceptibility to conformity due to perceived peer pressure and occasional challenges in maintaining consistent personas and opinions. Instructions that encourage debate in support of one's opinions rather than collaboration increase the rate of inconstancy. Without addressing the factors we identify, the full potential of multi-agent frameworks for producing more culturally diverse AI outputs or more realistic simulations of group decision-making may remain untapped.

A comparison of the distances to the Huanan Seafood Market of early Covid cases with known links to the market versus cases without known links shows results apparently incompatible with a location model lacking proximity ascertainment bias. The sign of the difference instead agrees with a model in which such ascertainment bias is large. In the presence of such bias inferences based on the clustering of case locations become unreliable.

Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), which excel at collaborative decision-making and complex problem-solving. Recently, researchers have further investigated Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) frameworks, which enhance the reasoning and collaboration capabilities of MAS through information exchange and debate among multiple agents. However, existing approaches often rely on unguided initialization, causing agents to adopt identical reasoning paths that lead to the same errors. As a result, effective debate among agents is hindered, and the final outcome frequently degenerates into simple majority voting. To solve the above problem, in this paper, we introduce Dynamic Multi-Agent Debate (DynaDebate), which enhances the effectiveness of multi-agent debate through three key mechanisms: (1) Dynamic Path Generation and Allocation, which employs a dedicated Path Generation Agent to generate diverse and logical solution paths with adaptive redundancy; (2) Process-Centric Debate, which shifts the focus from surface-level outcome voting to rigorous step-by-step logic critique to ensure process correctness; (3) A Trigger-Based Verification Agent, which is activated upon disagreement and uses external tools to objectively resolve deadlocks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DynaDebate achieves superior performance across various benchmarks, surpassing existing state-of-the-art MAD methods.

LLM-as-a-Judge has emerged as a promising alternative to human evaluators across various tasks, yet inherent biases - particularly position bias, the tendency to favor solutions based on their position within the prompt - compromise its reliability. This exploratory study evaluates position bias in LLM judges across pairwise and list-wise comparison settings, introducing three metrics: repetition stability, position consistency, and preference fairness. Our experiments, involving 15 LLM judges across MTBench and DevBench with 22 tasks and approximately 40 solution-generating models, result in over 150,000 evaluation instances. We identify Judge-Level, Candidate-Level, and Task-Level factors contributing to bias. The findings confirm that position bias is not due to random chance and varies significantly across judges and tasks. While position bias is weakly influenced by the length of prompt components, it is strongly affected by the quality gap between solutions. Our agreement and disagreement analysis among judges further provides insights into the distribution of judging difficulty across the dataset, and highlights the potential for dataset modifications.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

For safety, medical AI systems undergo thorough evaluations before deployment, validating their predictions against a ground truth which is assumed to be fixed and certain. However, this ground truth is often curated in the form of differential diagnoses. While a single differential diagnosis reflects the uncertainty in one expert assessment, multiple experts introduce another layer of uncertainty through disagreement. Both forms of uncertainty are ignored in standard evaluation which aggregates these differential diagnoses to a single label. In this paper, we show that ignoring uncertainty leads to overly optimistic estimates of model performance, therefore underestimating risk associated with particular diagnostic decisions. To this end, we propose a statistical aggregation approach, where we infer a distribution on probabilities of underlying medical condition candidates themselves, based on observed annotations. This formulation naturally accounts for the potential disagreements between different experts, as well as uncertainty stemming from individual differential diagnoses, capturing the entire ground truth uncertainty. Our approach boils down to generating multiple samples of medical condition probabilities, then evaluating and averaging performance metrics based on these sampled probabilities. In skin condition classification, we find that a large portion of the dataset exhibits significant ground truth uncertainty and standard evaluation severely over-estimates performance without providing uncertainty estimates. In contrast, our framework provides uncertainty estimates on common metrics of interest such as top-k accuracy and average overlap, showing that performance can change multiple percentage points. We conclude that, while assuming a crisp ground truth can be acceptable for many AI applications, a more nuanced evaluation protocol should be utilized in medical diagnosis.

LLM-as-a-judge enables evaluation across diverse tasks, but inference cost and confidence reliability become critical at scale. We study whether a decision-only judge can provide an economical first pass and identify when stronger evaluation is needed. Comparing jev-as-a-judge with sixteen generative and reward-model judges, with blinded human adjudication, we find it within three percentage points of a state-of-the-art LLM judge, our strongest comparator, on ordinary preference and evidence-grounded factuality at 0.36% of the comparator's fee. Larger gaps arise when judgments require checking a derivation or resisting an elaborately written wrong answer. On several benchmarks, JEV's gap to this comparator is concentrated in low-confidence decisions. A frozen cascade that accepts confident verdicts and escalates uncertain ones retains 99% of the comparator's accuracy at lower cost.

When audio, video, and text disagree, accuracy alone does not show whether to acquire another source or abstain. We study these choices in a controlled three-score benchmark: a policy observes two signed scores, may request the third at a cost, and can abstain. The primary reward is mechanism-specific: abstention is correct only for one designated ambiguity mechanism and is penalized under mixed corruption. Matched controls show that a threshold policy matches always-request decisions with fewer requests; its advantage over always-answer fusion depends on the reward assigned to that ambiguity. On a partially held-out synthetic split, the threshold policy reaches 0.789 +/- 0.006 targeted decision accuracy and 0.481 +/- 0.014 utility across 83 seeds. A three-score majority reference reaches 0.626 +/- 0.008 and 0.252 +/- 0.016, but uses more information. In a matched-budget test, a train-only value selector improves utility over no-query and matched-random policies at 10% and 25% budgets, while pair uncertainty has higher utility at every budget. At 50% and 63.7% budgets, the selector lowers utility despite slightly higher non-ambiguous accuracy. If all abstentions are scored incorrect, majority outranks the threshold policy in utility. At a central temporal setting, full-trace controls match the neural models while position perturbations separate them. On held-out-actor emotion clips, eight-frame fusion has opposite-signed accuracy differences for two encoder pairs, with both actor intervals containing zero; matched-request routing gains are small and uncertain. These results separate full-modality accuracy from pre-request selection value and show that selection value depends on budget and the observed-pair ranking.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (e.g. GRPO) is the engine behind today's reasoning models, yet it grades only the final answer. On hard problems this trains models to write more rather than to think better, since the trace itself is never graded and no label for good thinking exists. We introduce Agon, which makes two competing models each other's graders. Both attempt the same problem; in alternating roles, one drafts a solution and the other reads it while solving, and each is rewarded for out-solving the other. To win, a model must out-reason a rival that has seen its work, so reasoning is judged implicitly during training, with no process labels and no reward model. Because both models are optimized, each faces a progressively stronger rival, which single-model RL cannot provide. The two need only be comparably strong and behaviorally different. At inference the pair deploys as it trains, a two-stage cascade in which one model drafts and the other answers after reading the draft. On the hard split of DeepMath with Qwen3, this doubles GRPO's pass@1, roughly eight times the gain of an untrained Mixture-of-Agents pass over the same base. The ordering replicates on competitive-programming code and across model families (Qwen3.5, Gemma 4). For now the models talk in text; the next step is to let them reason together in latent space.

Training stability remains a critical bottleneck for Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), often manifesting as a trade-off between reasoning plasticity and general capability retention. We identify a root cause as the geometric conflict between plasticity and stability gradients, which leads to destructive interference. Crucially, we argue that deterministic projection methods are suboptimal for GRPO as they overlook the intrinsic stochasticity of group-based gradient estimates. To address this, we propose Probabilistic Conflict Resolution (PCR), a Bayesian framework that models gradients as random variables. PCR dynamically arbitrates conflicts via an uncertainty-aware ``soft projection'' mechanism, optimizing the signal-to-noise ratio. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PCR significantly smooths the training trajectory and achieves superior performance in various reasoning tasks.

In AI alignment, extensive latitude must be granted to annotators, either human or algorithmic, to judge which model outputs are `better' or `safer.' We refer to this latitude as alignment discretion. Such discretion remains largely unexamined, posing two risks: (i) annotators may use their power of discretion arbitrarily, and (ii) models may fail to mimic this discretion. To study this phenomenon, we draw on legal concepts of discretion that structure how decision-making authority is conferred and exercised, particularly in cases where principles conflict or their application is unclear or irrelevant. Extended to AI alignment, discretion is required when alignment principles and rules are (inevitably) conflicting or indecisive. We present a set of metrics to systematically analyze when and how discretion in AI alignment is exercised, such that both risks (i) and (ii) can be observed. Moreover, we distinguish between human and algorithmic discretion and analyze the discrepancy between them. By measuring both human and algorithmic discretion over safety alignment datasets, we reveal layers of discretion in the alignment process that were previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, we demonstrate how algorithms trained on these datasets develop their own forms of discretion in interpreting and applying these principles, which challenges the purpose of having any principles at all. Our paper presents the first step towards formalizing this core gap in current alignment processes, and we call on the community to further scrutinize and control alignment discretion.

The rise of large language models (LLMs) has significantly influenced the quality of information in decision-making systems, leading to the prevalence of AI-generated content and challenges in detecting misinformation and managing conflicting information, or "inter-evidence conflicts." This study introduces a method for generating diverse, validated evidence conflicts to simulate real-world misinformation scenarios. We evaluate conflict detection methods, including Natural Language Inference (NLI) models, factual consistency (FC) models, and LLMs, on these conflicts (RQ1) and analyze LLMs' conflict resolution behaviors (RQ2). Our key findings include: (1) NLI and LLM models exhibit high precision in detecting answer conflicts, though weaker models suffer from low recall; (2) FC models struggle with lexically similar answer conflicts, while NLI and LLM models handle these better; and (3) stronger models like GPT-4 show robust performance, especially with nuanced conflicts. For conflict resolution, LLMs often favor one piece of conflicting evidence without justification and rely on internal knowledge if they have prior beliefs.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

In hybrid human-machine deferral frameworks, a classifier can defer uncertain cases to human decision-makers (who are often themselves fallible). Prior work on simultaneous training of such classifier and deferral models has typically assumed access to an oracle during training to obtain true class labels for training samples, but in practice there often is no such oracle. In contrast, we consider a "closed" decision-making pipeline in which the same fallible human decision-makers used in deferral also provide training labels. How can imperfect and biased human expert labels be used to train a fair and accurate deferral framework? Our key insight is that by exploiting weak prior information, we can match experts to input examples to ensure fairness and accuracy of the resulting deferral framework, even when imperfect and biased experts are used in place of ground truth labels. The efficacy of our approach is shown both by theoretical analysis and by evaluation on two tasks.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

An enterprise agent that answers under a written policy must choose an action before it says anything: answer, ask for a missing fact, ask for confirmation, call one or several tools, escalate, or refuse. Holding one 27B Korean enterprise model fixed, we vary whether the decision is a generated JSON object or a single constrained token, and whether the model may reason first. On 2800 in-distribution items we did not detect an accuracy difference between the two deployed paths (93.46% vs 94.14%), while they differ about tenfold in restart stability (3.00% of actions flip vs 0.29%); they also differ in reasoning, so this is an operational comparison. On a sealed benchmark of 300 items whose labels come from a hidden executable policy, reasoning is worth +17.3 points [+12.3, +23.0] on exact action. With reasoning off, the format difference was 0.0 points [-4.3, +4.0], a failure to detect an advantage for either interface, not equivalence; with reasoning on it is unresolved. Against a token-matched random control, boundary-targeted supervision moves the two covered boundaries by +17.5 and +20.0 points and leaves a held-out boundary unchanged. In a 3-seed training x reasoning factorial, the sealed-rendering interaction is -4.9 [-8.1, -1.7], consistent with partial substitution. All supervision was Korean. On independently rendered English versions, the model is 0.82 points lower [-2.68, +0.93] with reasoning on, the same order as re-rendering in Korean; the reasoning-off gain from targeted supervision is not stable in either language, so we do not claim transfer. The original text stays private as the confirmatory set. An open-model re-rendering made after these results reproduced the reasoning effect and the English verdict; the interaction kept its sign but did not replicate under item-clustered intervals. We release the model and that re-rendering with gold labels.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

AI has become pervasive in recent years, but state-of-the-art approaches predominantly neglect the need for AI systems to be contestable. Instead, contestability is advocated by AI guidelines (e.g. by the OECD) and regulation of automated decision-making (e.g. GDPR). In this position paper we explore how contestability can be achieved computationally in and for AI. We argue that contestable AI requires dynamic (human-machine and/or machine-machine) explainability and decision-making processes, whereby machines can (i) interact with humans and/or other machines to progressively explain their outputs and/or their reasoning as well as assess grounds for contestation provided by these humans and/or other machines, and (ii) revise their decision-making processes to redress any issues successfully raised during contestation. Given that much of the current AI landscape is tailored to static AIs, the need to accommodate contestability will require a radical rethinking, that, we argue, computational argumentation is ideally suited to support.

Automated reasoning with unstructured natural text is a key requirement for many potential applications of NLP and for developing robust AI systems. Recently, Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated complex reasoning capacities even without any finetuning. However, existing evaluation for automated reasoning assumes access to a consistent and coherent set of information over which models reason. When reasoning in the real-world, the available information is frequently inconsistent or contradictory, and therefore models need to be equipped with a strategy to resolve such conflicts when they arise. One widely-applicable way of resolving conflicts is to impose preferences over information sources (e.g., based on source credibility or information recency) and adopt the source with higher preference. In this paper, we formulate the problem of reasoning with contradictory information guided by preferences over sources as the classical problem of defeasible reasoning, and develop a dataset called BoardgameQA for measuring the reasoning capacity of LMs in this setting. BoardgameQA also incorporates reasoning with implicit background knowledge, to better reflect reasoning problems in downstream applications. We benchmark various LMs on BoardgameQA and the results reveal a significant gap in the reasoning capacity of state-of-the-art LMs on this problem, showing that reasoning with conflicting information does not surface out-of-the-box in LMs. While performance can be improved with finetuning, it nevertheless remains poor.

A robot that fails at a task faces the first decision in corrective dialogue: act on its own diagnosis, consult another onboard sensor, or interrupt a person. Choosing well requires knowing how much the robot's sensors reveal about the cause and how reliable the robot's own diagnosis is. We build a simulated benchmark in which every failure's true cause is known, because we injected it, and measure what each sensor reveals, with explicit checks against data leakage. Some failures are diagnosable from camera images; others only from the robot's force data (0.99 from force data, no image method above 0.55). We then test six open vision-language models. Their behavior tracks the surface of the prompt, not the evidence: moving the refusal option from last to first in the answer list collapses refusal rates from 78-100% to 0-6% in three of the six swept model-and-family pairs. Accuracy from frames stays at or below a majority-class baseline under every prompt variant, with or without worked examples, and stated confidence carries no information about correctness. Handing the same models the force data as ten lines of text produces the first above-baseline diagnoses, in four of the six models: much of the failure reflects missing sensor data, not missing ability. We pose the choice as a three-action decision problem, act, consult your own sensors, or ask a human, whose optimal policy follows from measured accuracy. The models do not follow it, and their ask rates ignore a fourfold change in question cost. One question to a human still lifts them from that baseline to roughly the answerer's own reliability (0.70-0.81 when they ask). The decision to ask should be tied to measured accuracy and stated costs, not to the model's confidence.

Machine learning models are often used to inform real world risk assessment tasks: predicting consumer default risk, predicting whether a person suffers from a serious illness, or predicting a person's risk to appear in court. Given multiple models that perform almost equally well for a prediction task, to what extent do predictions vary across these models? If predictions are relatively consistent for similar models, then the standard approach of choosing the model that optimizes a penalized loss suffices. But what if predictions vary significantly for similar models? In machine learning, this is referred to as predictive multiplicity i.e. the prevalence of conflicting predictions assigned by near-optimal competing models. In this paper, we present a framework for measuring predictive multiplicity in probabilistic classification (predicting the probability of a positive outcome). We introduce measures that capture the variation in risk estimates over the set of competing models, and develop optimization-based methods to compute these measures efficiently and reliably for convex empirical risk minimization problems. We demonstrate the incidence and prevalence of predictive multiplicity in real-world tasks. Further, we provide insight into how predictive multiplicity arises by analyzing the relationship between predictive multiplicity and data set characteristics (outliers, separability, and majority-minority structure). Our results emphasize the need to report predictive multiplicity more widely.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophancy, distorting responses to align with user beliefs, notably by readily agreeing with user counterarguments. Paradoxically, LLMs are increasingly adopted as successful evaluative agents for tasks such as grading and adjudicating claims. This research investigates that tension: why do LLMs show sycophancy when challenged in subsequent conversational turns, yet perform well when evaluating conflicting arguments presented simultaneously? We empirically tested these contrasting scenarios by varying key interaction patterns. We find that state-of-the-art models: (1) are more likely to endorse a user's counterargument when framed as a follow-up from a user, rather than when both responses are presented simultaneously for evaluation; (2) show increased susceptibility to persuasion when the user's rebuttal includes detailed reasoning, even when the conclusion of the reasoning is incorrect; and (3) are more readily swayed by casually phrased feedback than by formal critiques, even when the casual input lacks justification. Our results highlight the risk of relying on LLMs for judgment tasks without accounting for conversational framing.

Health economic evaluations are sensitive to the choice of analytical perspective (e.g., health system vs. societal). While guidelines often recommend specific perspectives, the uncertainty associated with this choice - and the potential decision discordance it creates - is rarely quantified. We present vop_poc_nz, a Python package that implements a framework for Distributional Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (DCEA) and operationalizes the quantification of perspective uncertainty through the Value of Perspective (VoP) metric. The package provides tools for Markov modeling, probabilistic sensitivity analysis, value of information analysis, and equity impact assessment. Unlike existing tools that treat perspective as a fixed input, vop_poc_nz allows for the simultaneous evaluation of multiple perspectives. This enables decision-makers to estimate the opportunity cost of perspective misalignment. We demonstrate the package's capabilities using case studies from Aotearoa New Zealand.

Decision models support routing, guardrails, and output verification in LLM systems. However, item accuracy alone cannot establish whether models make correct decisions across controlled variations or assign reliable confidence to their predictions. We introduce DecisionPivot, a diagnostic benchmark comprising 48 tasks and 40,033 items across seven decision roles. Its core track contains 7,800 items from 13 generated task families, organized into contrast groups with computed answers verified by independently implemented solvers. The complementary reference track contains 32,233 items from 35 public test sets, preserving their original evaluation metrics. We evaluate 40 decision models and 14 general models using documented, model-specific protocols, assessing item and contrast-group accuracy, probability ordering, calibration, and empirical selective coverage. Our results reveal substantial differences obscured by aggregate scores: two 27B models separated by only 2.6 points on the reference track achieve contrast-group accuracies of 70.1% and 44.2%. Across 2,400 binary contrast pairs, Perplexity Decider correctly ranks the positive member above the negative member in 92.3% of pairs but answers both members correctly in only 74.1%, exposing a gap between probability ordering and decision correctness. Models with similar item accuracy also differ in the reliability of their high-confidence predictions. On a separate 1,296-item subset, GLM-5.3 achieves 93.5\% contrast-group accuracy at a higher reasoning setting, compared with 81.5% at its lowest effort. By linking errors to pivotal details and difficulty levels, DecisionPivot provides fine-grained diagnostics of decision failures that aggregate evaluation alone cannot reveal.

Existing metrics for factuality and faithfulness evaluate whether an answer is supported or contradicted by its grounding documents, but they fail to capture when both supporting and contradicting evidence coexist. We introduce ConflictScore, a novel metric that quantifies how well a model's response acknowledges conflicting evidence in its grounding documents. Our framework decomposes responses into atomic claims, labels each claim against each grounding document, and then aggregates these labels into two complementary measures: ConflictScore-Count (CS-C), the proportion of claims exhibiting conflicts, and ConflictScore-Ratio (CS-R), the balance between supporting and contradicting evidence. We develop ConflictBench, a benchmark covering diverse forms of conflicts such as ambiguity, contradiction, and divergent opinions, to systematically evaluate our metric. Experiments show that ConflictScore effectively detects overconfident claims across domains and can serve as a corrective feedback mechanism that improves truthfulness on TruthfulQA.

When people reason about cause and effect, they often consider many competing "what if" scenarios before deciding which explanation fits best. Analogously, advanced language models capable of causal inference can consider multiple interventions and counterfactuals to judge the validity of causal claims. Crucially, this type of reasoning is less like a single calculation and more like an internal dialogue between alternative hypotheses. In this paper, we make this dialogue explicit through a dual-agent debate framework where one model provides a structured causal inference, and the other critically examines this reasoning for logical flaws. When disagreements arise, agents attempt to persuade each other, challenging each other's logic and revising their conclusions until they converge on a mutually agreed answer. To take advantage of this deliberative process, we specifically use reasoning language models, whose strengths in both causal inference and adversarial debate remain under-explored relative to standard large language models. We evaluate our approach on the CLadder dataset, a benchmark linking natural language questions to formally defined causal graphs across all three rungs of Pearl's ladder of causation. With Qwen3 and DeepSeek-R1 as debater agents, we demonstrate that multi-agent debate improves DeepSeek-R1's overall accuracy in causal inference from 78.03% to 87.45%, with the counterfactual category specifically improving from 67.94% to 80.04% accuracy. Similarly, Qwen3's overall accuracy improves from 84.16% to 89.41%, and counterfactual questions from 71.53% to 80.35%, showing that strong models can still benefit greatly from debate with weaker agents. Our results highlight the potential of reasoning models as building blocks for multi-agent systems in causal inference, and demonstrate the importance of diverse perspectives in causal problem-solving.

AI systems are increasingly governed by natural language principles, yet a key challenge arising from reliance on language remains underexplored: interpretive ambiguity. As in legal systems, ambiguity arises both from how these principles are written and how they are applied. But while legal systems use institutional safeguards to manage such ambiguity, such as transparent appellate review policing interpretive constraints, AI alignment pipelines offer no comparable protections. Different interpretations of the same rule can lead to inconsistent or unstable model behavior. Drawing on legal theory, we identify key gaps in current alignment pipelines by examining how legal systems constrain ambiguity at both the rule creation and rule application steps. We then propose a computational framework that mirrors two legal mechanisms: (1) a rule refinement pipeline that minimizes interpretive disagreement by revising ambiguous rules (analogous to agency rulemaking or iterative legislative action), and (2) prompt-based interpretive constraints that reduce inconsistency in rule application (analogous to legal canons that guide judicial discretion). We evaluate our framework on a 5,000-scenario subset of the WildChat dataset and show that both interventions significantly improve judgment consistency across a panel of reasonable interpreters. Our approach offers a first step toward systematically managing interpretive ambiguity, an essential step for building more robust, law-following AI systems.

A typed decision model answers a fixed question about an input by returning a probability for each of several caller-defined options. Each option carries a short label and a written definition, which is where a developer states the rule the model should apply. Jev introduced this interface for routing, moderation and triage, open implementations followed, and the same operation occurs whenever a language model is used as a classifier by scoring label strings. We study the open implementations, whose weights we can inspect and patch, and ask whether the probability follows the definitions or the labels. A preference for the label we call option-label bias. Across four open-weight typed decision models, three ways of reading an answer from a Qwen2.5 backbone, eleven classification tasks and PolicyBench, a synthetic routing suite we introduce in which the rule appears only in the definitions, the answer is mostly the labels. Deleting every definition leaves accuracy unchanged (laya-td: 0.8559 against 0.8487), although those definitions support 0.7971 on their own, and renaming the options to A and B raises accuracy by +0.1511 [+0.1377, +0.1646]. One system, von, is unaffected, and the two code bases differ in one expression: laya writes each option as "{label}: {definition}", while von writes only the definition. Changing that expression in both directions, with no weight changed, makes all three laya checkpoints exactly invariant (+0.0000 [+0.0000, +0.0000]) and creates the effect in von, whose accuracy falls from 0.8511 to 0.2281 when a label contradicts its definition. Earlier work attributed this failure to the constrained decision head these models use in place of a text decoder; our results locate it in the prompt rendering. We give a two-call test that tells a practitioner which case applies to their model, and measure what four mitigations are worth.

Human label variation (Plank 2022), or annotation disagreement, exists in many natural language processing (NLP) tasks. To be robust and trusted, NLP models need to identify such variation and be able to explain it. To this end, we created the first ecologically valid explanation dataset with diverse reasoning, LiveNLI. LiveNLI contains annotators' highlights and free-text explanations for the label(s) of their choice for 122 English Natural Language Inference items, each with at least 10 annotations. We used its explanations for chain-of-thought prompting, and found there is still room for improvement in GPT-3's ability to predict label distribution with in-context learning.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Opinions are an integral part of how we perceive the world and each other. They shape collective action, playing a role in democratic processes, the evolution of norms, and cultural change. For decades, researchers in the social and natural sciences have tried to describe how shifting individual perspectives and social exchange lead to archetypal states of public opinion like consensus and polarization. Here we review some of the many contributions to the field, focusing both on idealized models of opinion dynamics, and attempts at validating them with observational data and controlled sociological experiments. By further closing the gap between models and data, these efforts may help us understand how to face current challenges that require the agreement of large groups of people in complex scenarios, such as economic inequality, climate change, and the ongoing fracture of the sociopolitical landscape.

This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff and a risky action with uncertain payoff, favoring the safe action under the prior belief. She may delay her decision to acquire additional news that reveals the risky action's payoff, without knowing exactly when such news will arrive. An uninformed agent with a misaligned preference may have the capability to generate a false arrival of news, which is indistinguishable from a real one, distorting the information content of news and the principal's search. The analysis characterizes the positive and normative distortions in the search for news arising from such manipulation, and it considers three remedies that increase the principal's payoff: a commitment to naive search, transfer of authority to the agent, and delegation to an intermediary who is biased in the agent's favor.

As LLMs advance, post-training reinforcement learning (RL) increasingly relies on multi-dimensional rewards to cultivate comprehensive capabilities. This shift demands new algorithms capable of optimizing diverse and potentially competing objectives simultaneously. To address this, existing methods such as Group reward-Decoupled Policy Optimization (GDPO) decompose the overall score into independent reward groups, then compute the RL loss separately within each group. However, this strategy still encounters multi-reward conflicts: a single rollout can yield positive advantages on certain reward dimensions but negative ones on others, causing opposing signals to cancel each other out during aggregation, further hindering RL training efficiency. Inspired by Dynamic sAmpling Policy Optimization (DAPO), which improves RL training efficiency by filtering out ineffective rollouts with near-zero advantages, we propose Group-Dynamic reward-Decoupled Policy Optimization (GD^2PO). Specifically, GD^2PO employs a conflict-aware filtering mechanism to mask out rollouts suffering from severe reward-wise disagreement. By preventing conflicting signals from canceling each other out, this masking strategy preserves and enhances the magnitude of effective RL advantages, thereby significantly accelerating learning efficiency. Furthermore, we introduce query-level reweighting to dynamically adjust the update intensity of each query based on its overall reward consensus. Experiments on various multi-reward scenarios, including tool calling and human preference alignment, demonstrate that GD^2PO consistently and significantly outperforms existing baselines. The code is available at https://github.com/Qwen-Applications/GD2PO.

Dueling bandits is a prominent framework for decision-making involving preferential feedback, a valuable feature that fits various applications involving human interaction, such as ranking, information retrieval, and recommendation systems. While substantial efforts have been made to minimize the cumulative regret in dueling bandits, a notable gap in the current research is the absence of regret bounds that account for the inherent uncertainty in pairwise comparisons between the dueling arms. Intuitively, greater uncertainty suggests a higher level of difficulty in the problem. To bridge this gap, this paper studies the problem of contextual dueling bandits, where the binary comparison of dueling arms is generated from a generalized linear model (GLM). We propose a new SupLinUCB-type algorithm that enjoys computational efficiency and a variance-aware regret bound tilde Obig(dsum_{t=1^Tsigma_t^2} + dbig), where sigma_t is the variance of the pairwise comparison in round t, d is the dimension of the context vectors, and T is the time horizon. Our regret bound naturally aligns with the intuitive expectation in scenarios where the comparison is deterministic, the algorithm only suffers from an tilde O(d) regret. We perform empirical experiments on synthetic data to confirm the advantage of our method over previous variance-agnostic algorithms.

As humans increasingly rely on multiround conversational AI for high stakes decisions, principled frameworks are needed to ensure such interactions reliably improve decision quality. We adopt a human centric view governed by two principles: counterfactual harm, ensuring the AI does not undermine human strengths, and complementarity, ensuring it adds value where the human is prone to err. We formalize these concepts via user defined rules, allowing users to specify exactly what harm and complementarity mean for their specific task. We then introduce an online, distribution free algorithm with finite sample guarantees that enforces the user-specified constraints over the collaboration dynamics. We evaluate our framework across two interactive settings: LLM simulated collaboration on a medical diagnostic task and a human crowdsourcing study on a pictorial reasoning task. We show that our online procedure maintains prescribed counterfactual harm and complementarity violation rates even under nonstationary interaction dynamics. Moreover, tightening or loosening these constraints produces predictable shifts in downstream human accuracy, confirming that the two principles serve as practical levers for steering multi-round collaboration toward better decision quality without the need to model or constrain human behavior.

Retrieval-augmented language models are being increasingly tasked with subjective, contentious, and conflicting queries such as "is aspartame linked to cancer". To resolve these ambiguous queries, one must search through a large range of websites and consider "which, if any, of this evidence do I find convincing?". In this work, we study how LLMs answer this question. In particular, we construct ConflictingQA, a dataset that pairs controversial queries with a series of real-world evidence documents that contain different facts (e.g., quantitative results), argument styles (e.g., appeals to authority), and answers (Yes or No). We use this dataset to perform sensitivity and counterfactual analyses to explore which text features most affect LLM predictions. Overall, we find that current models rely heavily on the relevance of a website to the query, while largely ignoring stylistic features that humans find important such as whether a text contains scientific references or is written with a neutral tone. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of RAG corpus quality (e.g., the need to filter misinformation), and possibly even a shift in how LLMs are trained to better align with human judgements.

As LLM agents decide on users' behalf which product to buy, which hotel to book, or which paper to cite, a preference for items from certain sources (the sites or services they come from) shapes what users receive and which sources are selected. We study source preference in end-to-end search with 12 agent models across three domains. Comparing items from different sources that satisfy the same requirements at the same position, we find that each model prefers some sources and avoids others in every domain, largely agreeing on which. This preference can outweigh how well items satisfy the request: an item satisfying one requirement fewer is selected about two-thirds of the time when it comes from a preferred source and the better one from a dispreferred source, but almost never in the reverse case. The information identifying an item's source affects selection by itself: hiding it weakens the preference, and relabeling an item with a preferred source raises its selection rate. We test two routes to this preference: training that rewards better items can make a source a shortcut for requirement satisfaction, and missing information can trigger preconceptions about the source. Supplying missing information or a prompt countering these preconceptions reduces source preference.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in applications that must weigh clashing moral values, yet even strong models exhibit hidden biases and brittle instruction-following across languages. We introduce a 12,000-instance dataset of two-option dilemmas covering pairwise three value conflicts: Honesty vs. Justice, Justice vs. Autonomy, and Autonomy vs. Honesty, along with their translations into Hindi, Arabic, Spanish, and Chinese, to probe cross-lingual behavior. Benchmarking on GPT-5-mini reveals that it consistently favors Honesty over Autonomy across all five languages when no policy is given. The Llama-3.2-1/3B models exhibit strong first-option bias; however, both plain fine-tuning and Direct Preference Optimization fine-tuning effectively remove this bias, increasing accuracy to greater than 98%. In order to decouple the effect of learning correlations in the dataset from abstract values, we propose a task vector transfer based experiment where after computing the task vectors for a direction of value preference we orthogonalize it with respect to the general instruction following vector. Our experiment shows that this method is effective in isolating the direction of the specific value preference that can successfully be used to conduct task arithmetic to obtain a model with the opposite stance.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Emerging personal AI agents are moving toward persistent, multi-source memory. This creates an evaluation problem: systems must decide how to use conflicting or incomplete evidence; they cannot just retrieve facts from one clean history. Existing benchmarks rarely show whether an error came from the evidence given to a method or from the method's conflict-resolution step. We study this as selective QA over conflicting multi-source personal memory: systems answer based on conflicting, sometimes incomplete sources, or abstain when evidence is insufficient. We develop a benchmark containing 18 question templates across 8 reasoning types, 480 personas, 4 random seeds, and 34,560 instances, with controlled source distortions and deterministic ground truth. We evaluate the performance of baselines without access to any source, access to a single source, structured fusion methods, and frontier LLMs. The best trained fusion resolver reaches 80.3% accuracy, while the strongest prompt-only LLM baseline reaches 70.0%. With abstention, the same resolver reaches 85.3% selective accuracy at 78.3% coverage and the best LLM reaches 71.0% selective accuracy at 95.4% coverage. Different models have different strengths across reasoning types. We release the data, code, cached model outputs, and data-generating process for reuse.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) improves the reasoning capabilities of large language models by having multiple agents iteratively refine their responses through discussion. However, MAD suffers from a critical vulnerability known as shared misconception: when a majority of agents initially converge on an incorrect answer, the debate process tends to amplify rather than correct the error. Existing methods primarily address peer skew but leave the agents' inherently biased concept priors unaddressed. To mitigate this systematic weakness, we propose R^2-MAD (Remember and Reweight for Multi-Agent Debate), a framework that equips agents with an experience memory accumulated from past debates. R^2-MAD intervenes on both failure modes through two complementary mechanisms: A debate-state-aware retrieval policy dynamically calibrates the concept prior by retrieving relevant historical evidence based on the current consensus level. Then these retrieved experiences provide a basis for estimating per-agent reliability, yielding confidence weights to modulate peer influence. Experiments on various benchmarks show that R^2-MAD achieves consistent improvements over existing single-agent and MAD baselines.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Active learning is a machine learning paradigm that aims to improve the performance of a model by strategically selecting and querying unlabeled data. One effective selection strategy is to base it on the model's predictive uncertainty, which can be interpreted as a measure of how informative a sample is. The sample's distance to the decision boundary is a natural measure of predictive uncertainty, but it is often intractable to compute, especially for complex decision boundaries formed in multiclass classification tasks. To address this issue, this paper proposes the {\it least disagree metric} (LDM), defined as the smallest probability of disagreement of the predicted label, and an estimator for LDM proven to be asymptotically consistent under mild assumptions. The estimator is computationally efficient and can be easily implemented for deep learning models using parameter perturbation. The LDM-based active learning is performed by querying unlabeled data with the smallest LDM. Experimental results show that our LDM-based active learning algorithm obtains state-of-the-art overall performance on all considered datasets and deep architectures.

Explaining Artificial Intelligence (AI) decisions is a major challenge nowadays in AI, in particular when applied to sensitive scenarios like medicine and law. However, the need to explain the rationale behind decisions is a main issue also for human-based deliberation as it is important to justify why a certain decision has been taken. Resident medical doctors for instance are required not only to provide a (possibly correct) diagnosis, but also to explain how they reached a certain conclusion. Developing new tools to aid residents to train their explanation skills is therefore a central objective of AI in education. In this paper, we follow this direction, and we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first multilingual dataset for Medical Question Answering where correct and incorrect diagnoses for a clinical case are enriched with a natural language explanation written by doctors. These explanations have been manually annotated with argument components (i.e., premise, claim) and argument relations (i.e., attack, support), resulting in the Multilingual CasiMedicos-Arg dataset which consists of 558 clinical cases in four languages (English, Spanish, French, Italian) with explanations, where we annotated 5021 claims, 2313 premises, 2431 support relations, and 1106 attack relations. We conclude by showing how competitive baselines perform over this challenging dataset for the argument mining task.

LLMs are known to exhibit sycophancy: agreeing with and flattering users, even at the cost of correctness. Prior work measures sycophancy only as direct agreement with users' explicitly stated beliefs that can be compared to a ground truth. This fails to capture broader forms of sycophancy such as affirming a user's self-image or other implicit beliefs. To address this gap, we introduce social sycophancy, characterizing sycophancy as excessive preservation of a user's face (their desired self-image), and present ELEPHANT, a benchmark for measuring social sycophancy in an LLM. Applying our benchmark to 11 models, we show that LLMs consistently exhibit high rates of social sycophancy: on average, they preserve user's face 45 percentage points more than humans in general advice queries and in queries describing clear user wrongdoing (from Reddit's r/AmITheAsshole). Furthermore, when prompted with perspectives from either side of a moral conflict, LLMs affirm both sides (depending on whichever side the user adopts) in 48% of cases--telling both the at-fault party and the wronged party that they are not wrong--rather than adhering to a consistent moral or value judgment. We further show that social sycophancy is rewarded in preference datasets, and that while existing mitigation strategies for sycophancy are limited in effectiveness, model-based steering shows promise for mitigating these behaviors. Our work provides theoretical grounding and an empirical benchmark for understanding and addressing sycophancy in the open-ended contexts that characterize the vast majority of LLM use cases.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Public-service recommendations require evidence that matches the requested service, scope, and date. Yet treating every missing detail as decisive can withhold useful recommendations. We introduce EviGraph, which distinguishes critical decision requirements from information that can remain unresolved. A language agent links these requirements to evidence in a temporal knowledge graph, while a deterministic checker establishes whether a recommendation is supported. Evaluation on a bilingual Hong Kong public-service benchmark with executable policy references shows that this distinction reduces unnecessary abstention. Additional verification, however, can withdraw supported recommendations without improving decision quality. These findings suggest that reliable evidence-based navigation depends on specifying what must be established for a decision, rather than simply adding more verification.

Typed-decision models such as TypeSafe's Jev answer a declared yes/no or multiple-choice question about a state with a probability instead of text, and their evaluations report accuracy and calibration. Neither requires that the probabilities a model gives to logically related questions fit together item by item, which is what a system that acts on those probabilities needs. We test this property, coherence, with a battery of logically linked questions that needs no labels. For 160 items from ChaosNLI and PubMedQA, each with three mutually exclusive labels, we ask whether the label is X, whether it is not X, whether it is one of the other two labels, and which label applies. On 480 negation pairs, Jev's probabilities for "the label is X" and "the label is not X" miss summing to one by 0.064 on average (95% CI 0.055 to 0.072). Qwen3.8-27B, run from its official BF16 weights, misses by 0.293 with first-token probabilities and by 0.122 with verbalized probabilities. The gap to the first-token readout persists on pairs where both systems give similar probabilities, without double-negation labels, and after averaging Jev's repeated calls. Jev is not coherent either: its violations are about five times its repeat noise, and it over-endorses statements about single labels, so that its three single-label probabilities sum to 1.14 on average. The two systems also fail differently. Qwen3.8-27B's first-token readout under-endorses the complement of a label whether or not the question contains "not", rejecting both a statement and its negation in 196 of 480 pairs, and it does not become more coherent where it is more confident, whereas Jev's violations concentrate where its answer is uncertain. Because the checks need no labels, they expose biases that appear only when question forms are compared, and inconsistencies within items.

This paper examines the role of cognitive biases in the decision-making processes of large language models (LLMs), challenging the conventional goal of eliminating all biases. We show that certain cognitive biases when properly balanced, can enhance decision-making efficiency through rational deviations and heuristic shortcuts. By introducing heuristic moderation and an abstention option, which allows LLMs to withhold responses when uncertain, we reduce error rates, improve decision accuracy, and optimize decision rates. Using the Balance Rigor and Utility (BRU) dataset, developed through expert collaboration, our findings demonstrate that targeted inspection of cognitive biases aligns LLM decisions more closely with human reasoning, enhancing reliability and suggesting strategies for future improvements. This approach offers a novel way to leverage cognitive biases to improve the practical utility of LLMs across various applications.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly placed in positions where their decisions have real consequences, e.g., moderating online spaces, conducting research, and advising on policy. Ensuring they operate in a safe and ethically acceptable fashion is thus critical. However, most solutions have been a form of one-size-fits-all "alignment". We are worried that such systems, which overlook enduring moral diversity, will spark resistance, erode trust, and destabilize our institutions. This paper traces the underlying problem to an often-unstated Axiom of Rational Convergence: the idea that under ideal conditions, rational agents will converge in the limit of conversation on a single ethics. Treating that premise as both optional and doubtful, we propose what we call the appropriateness framework: an alternative approach grounded in conflict theory, cultural evolution, multi-agent systems, and institutional economics. The appropriateness framework treats persistent disagreement as the normal case and designs for it by applying four principles: (1) contextual grounding, (2) community customization, (3) continual adaptation, and (4) polycentric governance. We argue here that adopting these design principles is a good way to shift the main alignment metaphor from moral unification to a more productive metaphor of conflict management, and that taking this step is both desirable and urgent.

Priorities in multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) convey the relevance preference of one criterion over another, which is usually reflected by imposing the non-negativity and unit-sum constraints. The processing of such priorities is different than other unconstrained data, but this point is often neglected by researchers, which results in fallacious statistical analysis. This article studies three prevalent fallacies in group MCDM along with solutions based on compositional data analysis to avoid misusing statistical operations. First, we use a compositional approach to aggregate the priorities of a group of DMs and show that the outcome of the compositional analysis is identical to the normalized geometric mean, meaning that the arithmetic mean should be avoided. Furthermore, a new aggregation method is developed, which is a robust surrogate for the geometric mean. We also discuss the errors in computing measures of dispersion, including standard deviation and distance functions. Discussing the fallacies in computing the standard deviation, we provide a probabilistic criteria ranking by developing proper Bayesian tests, where we calculate the extent to which a criterion is more important than another. Finally, we explain the errors in computing the distance between priorities, and a clustering algorithm is specially tailored based on proper distance metrics.

Long-running LLM agents act through tools, and a single step can send an email, merge a pull request, or wire a payment. The steering decision is the pre-commit choice at that boundary: proceed, or hold for human or policy review. We introduce SteerBench-Work, an incident-anchored, bidirectional benchmark for that decision in workplace agents across developer operations, customer service, finance, legal, medical, HR, and security. Release v2026-05 contains 106 scenarios anchored in public incidents, paired evidence-reversed mirrors, and calibration controls, with labels split nearly evenly between proceed and hold so the two error directions get near-identical numbers of chances. A model sees the proposed action and the available evidence, returns a gate decision, and is scored on whether it crosses or holds the boundary correctly. Across 30 model conditions the failures run almost entirely in one direction: models wrongly hold authorized, evidence-cleared work on 28.1% of opportunities and wrongly allow unsafe work on 1.0%. The hardest cases are risk-resolved commits, where signed or structured evidence has already cleared a real risk trigger, and models score markedly worse on evidence-reversed mirrors of famous incidents (63.8%) than on the incidents themselves (98.5%). General capability is not the same as steering calibration: higher-capability models often over-refuse at the commit boundary, and more reasoning can repair a weak gate while leaving a calibrated one flat. The public leaderboard is at steerbench.com.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

Morality is a fundamental aspect of human behavior and ethics, influencing how we interact with each other and the world around us. When faced with a moral dilemma, a person's ability to make clear moral judgments can be clouded. Due to many factors such as personal biases, emotions and situational factors people can find it difficult to decide their best course of action. The AmITheAsshole (AITA) subreddit is a forum on the social media platform Reddit that helps people get clarity and objectivity on their predicaments. In the forum people post anecdotes about moral dilemmas they are facing in their lives, seeking validation for their actions or advice on how to navigate the situation from the community. The morality of the actions in each post is classified based on the collective opinion of the community into mainly two labels, "Not The Asshole" (NTA) and "You Are The Asshole" (YTA). This project aims to generate comments with moral reasoning for stories with moral dilemmas using the AITA subreddit as a dataset. While past literature has explored the classification of posts into labels (Alhassan et al., 2022), the generation of comments remains a novel and challenging task. It involves understanding the complex social and ethical considerations in each situation. To address this challenge, we will leverage the vast amount of data on the forum with the goal of generating coherent comments that align with the norms and values of the AITA community. In this endeavor, we aim to evaluate state-of-the-art seq2seq text generation models for their ability to make moral judgments similarly to humans, ultimately producing concise comments providing clear moral stances and advice for the poster.

Evaluating modern machine learning models has become prohibitively expensive. Benchmarks such as LMMs-Eval and HELM demand thousands of GPU hours per model. Costly evaluation reduces inclusivity, slows the cycle of innovation, and worsens environmental impact. The typical approach follows two steps. First, select an anchor subset of data. Second, train a mapping from the accuracy on this subset to the final test result. The drawback is that anchor selection depends on clustering, which can be complex and sensitive to design choices. We argue that promoting diversity among samples is not essential; what matters is to select samples that maximise diversity in model responses. Our method, Diversifying Sample Condensation (DISCO), selects the top-k samples with the greatest model disagreements. This uses greedy, sample-wise statistics rather than global clustering. The approach is conceptually simpler. From a theoretical view, inter-model disagreement provides an information-theoretically optimal rule for such greedy selection. DISCO shows empirical gains over prior methods, achieving state-of-the-art results in performance prediction across MMLU, Hellaswag, Winogrande, and ARC. Code is available here: https://github.com/arubique/disco-public.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Advancing towards generalist agents necessitates the concurrent processing of multiple tasks using a unified model, thereby underscoring the growing significance of simultaneous model training on multiple downstream tasks. A common issue in multi-task learning is the occurrence of gradient conflict, which leads to potential competition among different tasks during joint training. This competition often results in improvements in one task at the expense of deterioration in another. Although several optimization methods have been developed to address this issue by manipulating task gradients for better task balancing, they cannot decrease the incidence of gradient conflict. In this paper, we systematically investigate the occurrence of gradient conflict across different methods and propose a strategy to reduce such conflicts through sparse training (ST), wherein only a portion of the model's parameters are updated during training while keeping the rest unchanged. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that ST effectively mitigates conflicting gradients and leads to superior performance. Furthermore, ST can be easily integrated with gradient manipulation techniques, thus enhancing their effectiveness.

Typed decision models are built for settings where model outputs are consumed directly by software. Instead of generating free-form text, they return a decision over a predefined set of options. By construction, every output conforms to the required schema. Yet this guarantee does not tell us whether the model interprets the options as intended. We study Jev and two Jev-like models with open weights by changing how option names are assigned to rubrics. Each option consists of an option name and a textual rubric that defines what the option means. We change only which option name is assigned to each rubric; the question, state, rubric wording, and set of option names remain exactly the same. On 1200 workflow decisions with task-specific rubrics, renaming the two options from 0/1 to no/yes changes 70.4 more answers per hundred (95% CI: [67.6, 73.1]) and shifts AUC from .94 to .23, revealing a systematic reversal in the decision ranking rather than simple uncertainty. The same operation has little effect with neutral option names. This pattern holds across all 4 predicates, where the effect is at least 7.4x larger than under the neutral control, and becomes stronger as the number of options increases. The effect also depends on the read-out geometry: a second model family that mean-pools over the full option span flips 4.1x less often. The hosted model exhibits the same behavior: the swap changes AUC from .8146 to .5806 and produces 24x as many answer flips as its test-retest floor. In contrast, replacing the option names with random character strings returns all model families to the neutral-control regime without reducing accuracy. The failure therefore depends on the semantic polarity of the option names rather than on the renaming operation itself. Across all conditions, the type-error rate remains 0%, even when decision accuracy degrades substantially.

Deep neural policies have recently been installed in a diverse range of settings, from biotechnology to automated financial systems. However, the utilization of deep neural networks to approximate the value function leads to concerns on the decision boundary stability, in particular, with regard to the sensitivity of policy decision making to indiscernible, non-robust features due to highly non-convex and complex deep neural manifolds. These concerns constitute an obstruction to understanding the reasoning made by deep neural policies, and their foundational limitations. Hence, it is crucial to develop techniques that aim to understand the sensitivities in the learnt representations of neural network policies. To achieve this we introduce a theoretically founded method that provides a systematic analysis of the unstable directions in the deep neural policy decision boundary across both time and space. Through experiments in the Arcade Learning Environment (ALE), we demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique for identifying correlated directions of instability, and for measuring how sample shifts remold the set of sensitive directions in the neural policy landscape. Most importantly, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art robust training techniques yield learning of disjoint unstable directions, with dramatically larger oscillations over time, when compared to standard training. We believe our results reveal the fundamental properties of the decision process made by reinforcement learning policies, and can help in constructing reliable and robust deep neural policies.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants have become increasingly popular for aligning language models with human preferences. These methods aim to teach models to better distinguish between chosen (or preferred) and rejected (or dispreferred) responses. However, prior research has identified that the probability of chosen responses often decreases during training, and this phenomenon is known as likelihood displacement. To tackle this challenge, in this work we introduce \method to controllably shift the distribution of the chosen probability. Then, we show that \method exhibits a fundamental trade-off between improving the chosen probability and sacrificing the reward margin, as supported by both theoretical analysis and experimental validation. Furthermore, we demonstrate the superiority of \method over DPO on downstream tasks such as MT-Bench and a designed win rate experiment. We believe this study shows that the likelihood displacement issue of DPO can be effectively mitigated with a simple, theoretically grounded solution. Our code is available at https://github.com/Meaquadddd/DPO-Shift.

Understanding sources of a model's uncertainty regarding its predictions is crucial for effective human-AI collaboration. Prior work proposes using numerical uncertainty or hedges ("I'm not sure, but ..."), which do not explain uncertainty that arises from conflicting evidence, leaving users unable to resolve disagreements or rely on the output. We introduce CLUE (Conflict-and-Agreement-aware Language-model Uncertainty Explanations), the first framework to generate natural language explanations of model uncertainty by (i) identifying relationships between spans of text that expose claim-evidence or inter-evidence conflicts and agreements that drive the model's predictive uncertainty in an unsupervised way, and (ii) generating explanations via prompting and attention steering that verbalize these critical interactions. Across three language models and two fact-checking datasets, we show that CLUE produces explanations that are more faithful to the model's uncertainty and more consistent with fact-checking decisions than prompting for uncertainty explanations without span-interaction guidance. Human evaluators judge our explanations to be more helpful, more informative, less redundant, and more logically consistent with the input than this baseline. CLUE requires no fine-tuning or architectural changes, making it plug-and-play for any white-box language model. By explicitly linking uncertainty to evidence conflicts, it offers practical support for fact-checking and generalises readily to other tasks that require reasoning over complex information.

Decision models return probabilities over supplied options, but a deployed agent may also need to reply in words. The present study introduces System X, a large language model (LLM) decision model that adds a text-reply option to the LLM-as-Jev readout. When this option wins, or confidence is low, the same model continues from the decision's key-value (KV) cache, avoiding a repeated prompt prefill. Qwen3-0.6B has been fine-tuned with LoRA on Reason-9k and Bitext reply rows. JevBench accuracy shows no statistically significant change (55.4% to 54.5%, p=0.87), while expected calibration error falls from 0.292 to 0.169. Held-out Bitext routing accuracy reaches 98.3%. Cache reuse saves 15-37% of latency on an Apple M4 Pro, with token-identical replies in the FP32 demonstration cases. Scoring options on copies of the prompt cache matches full-sequence scoring to within 1.4e-6 in probability. Adding dialogue, industry and complaint data (System X+) improves support-task results but lowers IFEval accuracy from 55.5% to 45.0%. System X v4 uses Qwen3-1.7B, rebalanced data and teacher-rewritten reply targets. Against its base LLM, JevBench accuracy rises from 55.0% to 61.0% (p=0.04), with no statistically significant IFEval change (p=0.71). A matched latency test on unadapted Qwen3-1.7B saves 17-39%. One LLM judge prefers v4 replies to an unadapted 1.7B second call (31 to 11 pairs, p=0.003); the other's preference is not significant. These reply comparisons also differ in prompts and generation limits. State conflicts and unsupported reply details remain failure modes. Further studies with several seeds, human raters and real support data are recommended.

Reliable Large Language Models (LLMs) should abstain when confidence is insufficient. However, prior studies often treat refusal as a generic "I don't know'', failing to distinguish input-level ambiguity (data uncertainty) from capability limitations (model uncertainty). This lack of distinction limits downstream action decisions like requesting clarification or invoking external tools. In this work, we introduce UA-Bench, a benchmark of over 3,500 questions drawn from six datasets spanning knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive tasks, designed to evaluate explicit uncertainty attribution. An evaluation of 18 frontier LLMs shows that even state-of-the-art models struggle to reliably discriminate between data uncertainty and model uncertainty, and that high answer accuracy does not necessarily imply strong uncertainty attribution ability. To narrow this gap, we propose a lightweight data synthesis and reinforcement learning strategy. Experiments on both Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 and Qwen3-8B in thinking mode show that the proposed method improves uncertainty attribution while preserving answer accuracy. Our code and data are publicly available now.

We employ an audit design to investigate biases in state-of-the-art large language models, including GPT-4. In our study, we prompt the models for advice involving a named individual across a variety of scenarios, such as during car purchase negotiations or election outcome predictions. We find that the advice systematically disadvantages names that are commonly associated with racial minorities and women. Names associated with Black women receive the least advantageous outcomes. The biases are consistent across 42 prompt templates and several models, indicating a systemic issue rather than isolated incidents. While providing numerical, decision-relevant anchors in the prompt can successfully counteract the biases, qualitative details have inconsistent effects and may even increase disparities. Our findings underscore the importance of conducting audits at the point of LLM deployment and implementation to mitigate their potential for harm against marginalized communities.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.